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Abstract 
Since the advent of the millennium, a growing interest has arisen in information 
and communication technologies (ICT) given the potential to bridge the digital 
divide. ICT have had a central role to play in terms of economic, regulatory and 
political development. Telecommunications is used in this thesis as a sector 
case to study policy diffusion, which focuses on the movement of policies 
across borders and actors. This thesis answers the following research question: 
does policy diffusion take place in the telecommunications sector in the Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries? This is answered using qualitative 
methods, such as expert interviews and the comparison of six cases, composed 
of two sectors of ICT; Universal Service Obligation (USO) and spectrum 
management, and of three countries; Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. 
In case the research question is positively answered two further foci are central 
to the thesis. Firstly, the thesis explores the conditions leading to policy 
diffusion. The thesis argues that the conditions leading to policy diffusion are 
linked to different degrees of vulnerability of countries to external actors. This 
vulnerability is described through four variables, which reveals the levels of 
governance and market openness and economic and political 
interconnectedness of the adopting countries. Secondly, it scrutinizes the links 
between sector variables and mechanisms of diffusion. The argument of this 
part is that different combinations of these sector variables support the 
differentiation across the four traditional mechanisms of policy diffusion; 
learning, imitation, competition and coercion. 
The main contributions of this thesis are both theoretical, to the literature of 
policy diffusion and empirical, regarding telecommunications regulation in three 
MENA countries. The thesis underlines the key role of government 
administrations as the main driver for policy change in MENA countries, 
compared to international pressures and market forces. Furthermore this thesis 
concludes that, in the telecommunications sector, transgovernmental channels 
are nowadays omnipresent in the phenomenon of policy diffusion and are thus 
not sufficient to disentangle mechanisms of diffusion. The thesis examines the 
additional factors of efficiency, economic interests and sanction capacity for 
explanatory power.   
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1 CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Introductory words  
Increasingly, international regulatory governance has grown into a complex set 
of rules, actors and processes. Telecommunications regulations are no 
exception to this tendency. It is a sector where international regulation and 
cooperation has taken place intensively due to the cross-border characteristics 
of its technologies and uses. Actors involved in the process have grown in 
number, diversity and intensity, including governments, international 
organisations, transnational communities, the private sector and civil society 
(Raboy and Padovani, 2010:152, Bauer, 2010c). To account for this diversity in 
actors and channels of policy-making, the literature of policy diffusion is 
revealing. It proposes methods, tools and theories to frame policy-making 
across states and actors. In this thesis, however, the focus is set on the states 
which adopt policies, rather than the ones diffusing them, to account for 
strategies taking place at the domestic levels in interaction with external forces.  
However, even if several authors acknowledge the value of policy diffusion to 
explain the increasingly intertwined policy-making practices, this has been 
mostly done on a conceptual and theoretical level and less indication exists so 
to conduct research empirically. This is notably the case regarding which 
variables are to be selected so to observe policy diffusion and analyse it 
systematically. For instance, authors debate the value of state and sector 
policies to disentangle different types of policy diffusion, but only a few 
researchers test such frameworks empirically. Framing and testing policy 
adoption to unravel strategies and types of diffusion is the aim of this thesis. 
Empirically, three countries of the MENA region and two policy fields of the 
telecommunications sector, USO and spectrum management are taken as case 
studies. The main research question of the thesis is: does policy adoption take 
place in the telecommunications sector in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt? Two 
subquestions are derived from it: under which conditions is a country expected 
to adopt a policy that originated in another country and how does this adoption 
take place?     
The selected policy case is the telecommunications sector. It was chosen due 
to its cross-border characteristics, on an infrastructure and services level, but 
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also regarding the need to attract international investments and to adapt 
regulation so to keep up with worldwide technological advances. It is also a 
sector where potential profits are high, both for the governments and the private 
sectors. This sector, showing cross-border characteristics, marked profit 
potential and high needs in investments is quite specific and carry with it 
intertwined international interests and competition. The need to look at other 
countries’ regulatory systems seems inevitable. A comparison of two subsectors 
within the telecommunications field, allows for a variety of diffusion strategies to 
be analysed. The first policy subsector is USO, which refers to the provision of 
affordable basic telecommunications services to every resident of a country. 
The second subsector is spectrum management referring to the regulation, 
allocation and use of spectrum. They both present different characteristics, in 
terms of scope and intertwined economic and political interests.  
The three countries studied in this paper are Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. These 
country cases have been chosen for their similarities in economic and 
technological development. In fact, these three countries have a little 
technological and economic development delay, in comparison to other more 
advanced countries and models, such as the EU regulations in the sector. This 
suggests that these countries are constantly in search for new policy models to 
test and apply to their context. In addition, these countries represent a very 
interesting market, in particular for foreign mobile operators, due to the marked 
reliance on mobile telephony of a large and young population. This is promising 
in terms of policy diffusion and more specifically policy adoption. It is also 
promising to observe entangled and sometimes competing interests in the 
process of policy-making. At the same time, these countries represent different 
degrees of vulnerability to external pressures, which allows for various levels of 
policy adoption to be at play.  
This introductory part is structured as follows. Firstly, an overview of the policy 
problem is given. Secondly, the literature of policy diffusion is presented, with a 
focus on where this thesis proposes a contribution. Thirdly, the theoretical and 
conceptual framework is addressed briefly. It builds on the literature of policy 
diffusion and more broadly on policy-making to best set the framework of this 
project. In this part, the research question and main hypotheses are fully 
outlined. Fourthly, the country and sector case selections and assumptions are 
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introduced. It is followed by the rationale framing this thesis. Finally, the 
organisation of the seven chapters of this thesis is given. 
1.2 Policy Problem 
The selected countries of this thesis, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt are all part of 
the MENA area. They are bound by several similar characteristics such as 
lower levels of technological and economic developments than more developed 
countries in the field. In sectors such as telecommunications, where both 
investments and innovation are key for development, states such as Morocco, 
Jordan and Egypt, are expected to look for regulatory models externally to 
improve the domestic context. The telecommunications sector is defined by 
several interesting characteristics, which need to be taken into consideration 
when discussing policy diffusion. It is a sector with high potential for profits, as 
both the government and the private sector may gain from it. The government is 
typically the owner of spectrum and can gain substantially from its sale, through 
auction for instance. Private companies also have a notable interest in the field, 
as most citizens around the world are now consumers of phone services, 
representing an immense market with vast potential gains. Such sectors are 
typically regulated by international associations or bodies intending to order 
both the worldwide standards to allow the service to be functional and balance 
the many interests in the field. Similar sectors, presenting intrinsic cross-border 
characteristics and high potential for profit, include international aviation, where 
bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based in 
Montreal, Canada or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), a European 
Union’s (EU) agency, based in Cologne, in Germany, regulate the field.     
Several key regional and international actors are present in the three case study 
countries of this thesis.  Historically, the Gulf countries are very similar both due 
to their geographical proximity and their interlinked economic systems. The Gulf 
oil industry is a particularly unambiguous reason for these interlinkages. Labour 
forces of non-oil MENA countries are closely involved in the Gulf countries and 
their work remittances return to their home countries, as part of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Oil-rich Gulf countries have also been economically 
very close to the MENA countries due to their shares in loans and aid grants 
across decades. Another key actor is the United States (US), with a strategic 
14 
 
role immersed both in oil-related geopolitical issues and as a key member of the 
Middle East peace process. Finally, the EU, with which the area has had 
everlasting ties on a variety of levels, from a colonial past to free trade 
agreements. The close relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean 
countries originates to past history and is discussed in chapter 5 (Sections 5.2 
and 5.3). In the telecommunications sector, the European impact is more 
marked than that of other regional actors. Several reasons may account for this. 
One of the principal reasons is the fact that countries in the Mediterranean area 
share similar telecommunications standards This is broadly linked to the fact 
that European and MENA countries are all part of the same International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) area ‘Region 1’ sharing the same set of 
spectrum. More analysis regarding standards is given in Section 6.2, 
Framework Proposition 1. In such cases, countries have had to harmonise 
standards among themselves to facilitate the sharing of equipment and benefit 
the markets of scale.  
The relationship between both sides has changed drastically in nature since the 
colonial times1. Traces of this relationship were perceptible during the field 
research. Close links were observed between Morocco and France and while 
the relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and Egypt and Jordan, was 
less obvious, it remains influential. Several experts notably mention the 
attention to the French and British systems, let alone because of shared 
languages in policy-making (Expert MO3, 2014). In the telecommunications 
sector, the role of the EU in setting the standards has been quite influential 
regionally, due to several reasons. One of them is that the EU has had to 
develop standards and harmonise the telecommunications sector to bridge the 
multiple factions across member states from the 1980s. The division of the EU 
market and the lack of competitiveness were seen as an impediment to the 
realisation of wider and more affordable telecommunications services. In this 
                                            
 
1 The British occupation of Egypt started in 1882. Morocco became a French protectorate in 
1912 and the League of Nations gave a British mandate over Transjordan in 1922. The 
mandate of the League of Nations officially ended in 1946 and Jordan became independent. 
Morocco acquired independence from France in 1956 and Egypt from British occupation in 
1952 (AYUBI, N. 1995. Over-stating the Arab State; Politics and Society in the Middle East, 
London, New York, I.B. Tauris.) 
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case, the European Commission (EC) emerged as a key actor. This shift in 
power was accompanied with a strengthening of the role of National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) to assist and support the EC’s regulatory decisions 
(Michalis, 2007:155;200). The strengthening of NRAs in the field of 
telecommunications is also observable in the three countries of this thesis and 
is one of the key foci of the theoretical and conceptual framework.  
The advent of the EC as a key regulatory actor had an impact beyond the EU 
member states. Rodine-Hardy states that the EU not only became a drive for its 
member and accession states but also in international arenas of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the ITU (2013:46). For MENA countries the EC 
model both represented a case where a standardised policy model was readily 
available and of which application could be observed across all member states. 
It also showed regulatory solutions to accompany parallel transformations of the 
sector from state-owned monopolies to the insertion of competition. For 
instance, Bauer argues that at the time of reforms in Southern countries, it was 
often the European model which was followed, notably because of a 
comparable history of state ownership (2010b:9). Rodine-Hardy also underlines 
the focal point of EU developments, particularly for former European colonies or 
countries trading heavily with the EU (2013:46). In fact, since the 1980s, the EU 
and the Southern Mediterranean countries have dramatically increased their 
interest towards one another in the telecommunications sector. Convergence of 
regulations, guidelines, principles and technologies has been augmented 
greatly. This justifies in this thesis the particular focus on the relationship 
between the EU and MENA countries. 
It is understandable that MENA countries have followed the EC model or the 
models of individual member states, which were based on EC regulations in the 
1980s onwards, as it represents the most discernible model of a main political 
and trade partner. However, what is less obvious is the extent to which the 
European model can be applied to MENA countries considering the diverging 
market specificities of both areas. Hence, while the EU model is built on fixed 
telephony infrastructure in relatively small territories with concentrated 
competition, MENA countries have experienced a rise in mobile telephony in 
bigger territories, often less easily accessible with no available fixed 
infrastructure. In addition, a wide younger population is almost exclusively 
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interested in mobile telephony. In such a context, it is legitimate to wonder 
whether the EU regulatory influence is still as strong in MENA countries and to 
ask why that is the case.  
1.3 Addressing the literature  
In an increasingly more complex and regularised world, policies and regulations 
travel at several levels, such as municipalities, counties, states or countries, 
regarding a variety of subjects and including a large range of actors. Some 
authors stress the role of globalisation in increasing the significance of 
regulatory movements particularly since governments and international 
organisations have become increasingly proactive in promoting harmonisation 
of policies (Stone, 1999, Bennett, 1991). However, not all studies discussing the 
characteristics of policy movements refer to the same terminologies. The policy 
diffusion literature widely draws on lesson-drawing, constructivism2, theories of 
rationality and interest-based decision-making. In fact, policy diffusion, lesson-
drawing, isomorphism and policy transfers are only some of the many schools 
of thought dealing with cross-cutting dynamics of convergence. These theories 
have brought new theoretical insights to international relations and public policy 
analysis. As Stone underlines, it has somehow bridged the gap across 
disciplines (1999:53). However, the concepts have been stretched, defined and 
redefined and scholars’ meticulous exercises of typology have increasingly 
taken place (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2012, Evans, 2006, Marsh and Sharman, 
2009, Newmark, 2002). Delimiting what is policy diffusion and what it is not, is 
central to this thesis. It is generally a contentious issue of this literature, with 
authors criticising the validity of policy diffusion as a separate literature (James 
and Lodge, 2003).  
The development of policy diffusion as an independent literature body originates 
with authors studying policy innovation in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Mohr 
                                            
 
2
 Constructivism focuses on the inter-subjectivity of meaning, where both the ends and the 
means are social constructs  (SIMMONS, B., DOBBIN, F. & GARRETT, G. 2008b. Introduction: 
the diffusion of liberalization. In: SIMMONS, B., DOBBIN, F. & GARRETT, G. (eds.) The Global 
Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) This is linked to 
Max Weber’s idea that social action is defined by the perception of the actors themselves and 
must be understood as the product of a social context (WEBER, M. 1978. Basic Sociological 
Terms. In: WEBER, M. (ed.) Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.) 
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(1969), Walker (1969) or Gray (1973). Eyestone proposed a study on policy 
diffusion and innovation (1977). He was followed by several studies mixing 
designs on innovation and diffusion, with a focus on federal states (Savage, 
1985) or the development of methods to address policy diffusion (Klingman, 
1980, Berry and Berry, 1990). The definition of policy diffusion, as used in this 
research is largely reflecting previous studies on innovation. For instance, 
Walker defines an innovation as a program or policy, which is new to the states 
adopting it, no matter how old the program is or how many other states have 
adopted it (1969:881). The novelty of a diffused programme is key to the study 
of policy diffusion. The definition has however developed to still encompass the 
notion of innovation but to also address the increasing number of actors 
involved in policy making, as well as the increasing objects of diffusion. 
Simmons et al. propose a broad definition of policy diffusion. They mention that 
policy diffusion occurs “when government policy decisions in a given country 
are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries 
(sometimes mediated by the behaviour of international organizations or private 
actors and organizations)” (2008b:7). This definition allows for a broader 
application of policy diffusion theories, adequate to the research design of this 
thesis. However, it also carries a key dilemma, which is the identification of 
policy diffusion as a discernible form of policy making.  
Hence, several authors argue that policy diffusion shall not be confused with 
other forums of policy making and shall not be explained otherwise (Evans, 
2006, Starke, 2013, Bennett, 1997, Stone, 1999). Other forms of policy-making 
are more clearly outlined in the second chapter of this thesis focusing on the 
conceptual and theoretical framework of this thesis (Section 2.2). For instance, 
as James and Lodge argue “[i]t is hard to think of any form of rational policy-
making that does not, in some way, involve using knowledge about policies in 
another time or place to draw positive or negative lessons” (2003:181). As such, 
in the literature of policy diffusion, several authors have intended to pin down 
the very specificities of diffusion as a distinguishable form of policy making. 
Evans states that “[t]he study of policy transfer can only be distinctive from the 
analysis of normal forms of policy-making if it focuses on the remarkable 
movement of ideas between systems of governance in different countries” 
(2006:487). It is understandable from this argument that one of the key aspects 
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of policy diffusion is the interaction between two models, with the diffused model 
being new to the country adopting it. Clarifying methodological tools to 
systematically observe policy diffusion, and specifically policy adoption, is the 
aim of the first part of the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis.  
Progressively, authors of policy diffusion have moved from the exercise of 
identifying policy diffusion to the study of the mechanisms of policy diffusion 
(Starke, 2013). This shift is notably explained by the methodological difficulties, 
discussed earlier, to identify the process in the first place (Bennett and Howlett, 
1992:290, Starke, 2013). This progression of interest from the observation of 
policy diffusion to the study of mechanisms of diffusion is observed in this thesis 
as well. The last focus in this thesis is set on four traditional mechanisms of 
diffusion, learning, imitation, economic competition and coercion. Coercion is 
included as a mechanism, even if it does not reflect a voluntary act of the 
adopting country as do the other three mechanisms, as it may also lead to the 
adoption of policies (Shipan and Volden, 2008, Simmons et al., 2008a, Rogers, 
2003). The first mechanism, learning supposes that decision-makers in one 
country observe policy adoption, implementation and impact in another country 
and decide whether to apply it domestically or not (Shipan and Volden, 
2008:841). The second mechanism, imitation diverges from learning, as the 
policy-maker is not interested in learning from an action, but in copying a 
perceived leader (Dobbin et al., 2007:450). Economic competition is defined by 
the fight over scarce resources, with policy-makers adopting certain 
programmes for fear of economic loss in case they do not adopt them 
(Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009:530). Coercion is the result of an imposed model 
by a dominating actor. It can take place by physical means, the manipulation of 
economic costs or benefits or the monopolisation of information (Dobbin et al., 
2007:454). Conceptualising and disentangling the four mechanisms of diffusion 
are the focus of the third and last part of the theoretical and conceptual 
framework of this thesis and is discussed in the last empirical chapter (Chapter 
6).  
While policy diffusion literature has proposed a large number of theoretical 
accounts to define the theory, tools to implement the systematic empirical 
application of policy diffusion have been weak. Several studies exist on objects 
being diffused (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Karch, 2007), the channels through 
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which policies diffuse (Greenhalgh et al., 2004, Hall, 1993) and conducive 
properties to policy diffusion (Evans, 2006, Greenhalgh et al., 2004, Rogers, 
2003). Several authors have addressed the role of the domestic context and 
have identified independent variables explaining the likelihood of policies being 
diffused (Newmark, 2002, Evans and Davies, 1999, Rodine-Hardy, 2013, 
Weyland, 2006). While all these studies are relevant to this thesis as they 
provide the theoretical grounding to the conceptual framework, they do not 
present systematic and practical examples of how to use policy diffusion 
literature in real case scenarios. The lack of systematic empirical application is 
particularly obvious in the case of mechanisms of diffusion and conditions 
leading to policy diffusion. The necessity to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice is essential if one wants to use the full potential of policy diffusion to 
explain cases of policy adoption.   
This thesis intends to participate in bridging the gaps currently visible in policy 
diffusion literature. Its contribution can be seen on several aspects. It firstly 
identifies and clarifies methodological tools to observe policy diffusion 
empirically. This is the aim of the first theoretical and conceptual part and is 
discussed in the context of the field research in the first empirical chapter 
(chapter 4). This thesis then builds on conditions leading to policy diffusion, 
based on the vulnerability of adopting countries to external models. This 
vulnerability addresses both the openness to external models and the 
interaction between the diffused and the adopted model. This is the focus of the 
second part of the theoretical and conceptual chapter and the second empirical 
chapter (chapter 5). Finally, this thesis proposes an understanding of the links 
between sector variables, and the environment and pressures under which 
policy-making is conducted and the mechanisms of diffusion. This is the focus 
of the third part of the theoretical and conceptual framework and of the third and 
last empirical chapter (chapter 6).    
1.4 Research question, conceptualisation and hypotheses 
The main research question of the thesis is: does policy adoption take place in 
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in the telecommunications sector? Building on this 
question, the thesis has two foci. The first one researches the conditions under 
which countries engage in policy adoption. The subquestion to be answered is: 
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under which conditions is a country expected to adopt a policy which originated 
in another country. The second one relates to the mechanisms of diffusion and 
the combination of sector variables that shed light on to such mechanisms. The 
subquestion to be answered is: how does this adoption take place? The 
dependent variable is defined as the adoption of policies according to the four 
mechanisms: learning, imitation, economic competition and coercion. The 
independent variables, which aim to explain the outcome of the dependent 
variables, correspond to four state and five sector variables. The thesis argues 
that state variables shed light on the conditions leading to policy diffusion, 
whereas different combinations of the sector variables allow for differentiation 
across the four mechanisms of diffusion.   
The selected timeline for this thesis starts with the major reviews of the 
telecommunications laws of Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, in the late 1990s and 
beginning of 2000s. It ends with the developments in the field in April 2014, 
which is the date where most interviews in the three MENA countries were 
concluded. In Morocco, the main telecommunications law was reviewed in 1997 
(Telecommunications law No.24-96). In Jordan, the law was reviewed in 1995 
(Telecommunications law No.13). In Egypt, it took place in 2003 
(Telecommunication Regulation Law No.10). Hence, this study does not focus 
on the processes surrounding the establishment of the 1997, 1995 and 2003 
telecommunications laws respectively, but their developments since these 
frameworks were introduced up until 2014. More information regarding the 
country cases contextualisation is given in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2 and Section 
5.3). In all three countries, USO and spectrum management provisions are 
included in the telecommunications laws. The focus is set on how these 
provisions have evolved since then.  
In this thesis, policy diffusion is assumed to take place in the six case studies 
under review. However, this does not mean that variation does not take place. 
In agreement with Weyland, a focus on causal mechanisms on “positive cases” 
does not imply that there is no variance across cases. In fact, the selection of 
cases may capture different levels of variation including the diffusion or non-
diffusion of the policies and differences among the cases of diffusion (2006:15-
6). Variations in contexts and regulation is common in the telecommunications 
sector and authors such as Rodine-Hardy, have noted that if it can be assumed 
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that policy diffusion does take place in the telecommunications sector, this does 
not mean that no variation across countries takes place. She argues that 
“international organizations and international policy convergence leave room for 
substantial variation among the national cases” (2013:XVI). In the selected case 
studies, variance is expected in order to allow for various hypotheses to be 
addressed and analysed. It is notably the case regarding the Egyptian cases, 
which resulted in lower policy diffusion than the Moroccan and Jordanian ones. 
There are three different steps that create the conceptual and theoretical 
framework in this thesis. Each of them is briefly overviewed below. The detailed 
explanation of the framework is explained fully in the next chapter of this thesis 
(Chapter 2). The first step of this research is to observe if policy adoption has 
taken place or not. To do so, a conceptualisation was selected, derived from 
works of different authors, notably Beyers (2010) and Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2004). In this conceptualisation, two aspects have to be taken into 
account, the product and the process. If the presence of both is confirmed, then 
the existence of policy adoption can be concluded. The product takes the form 
of a regulation, law, idea or programme that has been imported from another 
country. The comparison of the products of both the policy-making and the 
policy-taking countries is necessary to identify whether policy diffusion from one 
country to the other occurred. As a second step, the process sheds light on the 
context in which the product adoption has taken place. It is necessary to show 
that interaction has occurred between the policy-maker and policy-taker and 
that policy adoption has not taken place without the necessary links to policy 
diffusion. Both the product and process are necessary to establish policy 
diffusion and are best supported by qualitative methods, such as expert 
interviews.  
The second step of this research is based on the conditions leading up to policy 
adoption. It is detailed in chapter 2 (Section 2.3). A selection of four state 
variables defines the degree of vulnerability of a state to external forces. This is 
based on the premise that policy adoption results in the necessity of adopting 
countries to look abroad for models. It is argued that the conditions leading to 
policy diffusion are related to different degrees of openness and interconnection 
with external actors. Therefore, the four properties identified in the thesis are: 
governance and market openness, political interconnectedness and market 
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interconnectedness. More precisely, governance openness refers to the degree 
to which a country is taking into account the rule of law and the work of 
regulatory authorities. It is measured in terms of effective regulatory 
governance, based on both the governance and regulatory effectiveness of a 
country. The second variable, market openness is defined as the reliance on 
national and international market forces to regulate the economy. The third 
variable, political interconnectedness is defined by the relation of dependency 
between two countries for political reasons. It is here related to the issue of 
foreign aid and the political motivations and consequences of giving and 
receiving foreign aid. The final variable on market interconnectedness refers to 
the degree of international trade interdependence, in particular in terms of the 
role of the private sector and specifically the role of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) in the economy of the adopting country. Together they form a continuum 
showing whether the policy diffusion is going to take place extensively (high) or 
not (low).  
Figure 1 shows this continuum and outlines the following hypothesis (H₁ High): 
The higher the degree of governance and market openness, political and 
market interconnectedness, the higher the probability of policy diffusion taking 
place. As a consequence, the second hypothesis can be deduced (H₂ Low): 
The lower the degree of governance and market openness, political and market 
interconnectedness, the lower the probability of policy diffusion taking place. 
Figure 1  Conditions leading to policy diffusion 
Low  High 
Governance openness Governance openness 
Market openness Market openness 
Political interconnectedness Political interconnectedness 
Market interconnectedness Market interconnectedness 
  
LOW Policy diffusion  HIGH Policy Diffusion 
(H₂ Low) (H₁ High) 
Source: Author. 
 
The third and last step of this research is linked to the mechanisms of diffusion 
and builds a framework linking five sector variables to the four mechanisms of 
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diffusion. The detailed definitions, conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
the mechanisms are given in Section 2.4.1. The main idea of this third and last 
step is that these four mechanisms can be defined into four different 
combinations of five sector variables. The analysis surrounds the role of NRAs 
in policy-making. The decision was taken to focus on NRAs, due to their role as 
delegates for Ministries in technological fields like telecommunications. The key 
role of NRAs in telecommunications regulations has been outlined by various 
authors and is confirmed both in European member states (Büthe and Mattli, 
2013, Zhao, 2002, Christou and Simpson, 2014) and in MENA countries, as 
demonstrated clearly in the last empirical chapter of this thesis (chapter 6).  
The five sector variables are divided into two different sets impacting the 
manner in which NRAs engage in policy-making. The first set refers to two 
types of environment in which NRAs conduct policy-making activities, 
international regulatory channels and transgovernmental and bilateral channels. 
International regulatory channels include the work of international organisations 
such as the ITU, the WTO or the World Bank in the field. All three countries of 
this research participate in these bodies. Transgovernmental and bilateral 
channels include cooperation between various NRAs and within NRAs 
groupings such as the EuroMediterranean regulatory group (EMERG). The 
second set of variables refers to the pressures that NRAs encounter and is 
divided in three variables. Efficiency is the first pressure variable and is defined 
by an attention to achieve performance. The absence of efficiency is linked to 
an attention towards the leaders instead of the efficiency of the policy itself. The 
second variable is economic interest. It is defined by the presence of potential 
profits in the sector. Finally, sanction capacity refers to the risk of suffering 
sanctions in case of non-adopting certain policies. The five variables are 
combined to the four mechanisms of diffusion following four framework 
propositions that are detailed in next chapter (Section 2.4.2). Table 1 shows the 
linkage between the sector variables and the mechanisms of diffusion. 
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Table 1 Sector variables defining mechanisms of diffusion 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures 
International 
regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Efficiency 
 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanction 
capacity 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - 
Competition (H₅) + - + + - 
Coercion (H₆) + - - + + 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The first hypothesis corresponds to the learning mechanism. Learning 
supposes that decision-makers in one country observe policy adoption, 
implementation and impact in another country and decide whether to apply it 
domestically or not. Decision-makers put time and effort into learning from the 
best adaptable model. Learning includes the time-consuming process of 
engagement with other policy actors, with a focus on bridging a sectoral 
performance gap. The following hypothesis can be drawn (H₃ Learning): 
Learning mechanisms occur in a context exempt of international regulatory 
channels, economic interest and sanction capacity, where transgovernmental 
collaboration is used with the objective of efficiency enhancement.  
The second hypothesis relates to the mechanism of imitation. Imitation refers to 
the focus of policy-makers on copying the other. It differs from the idea of 
learning, as the adopting country is not interested in learning from the action, 
but is rather directed towards imitating the perceived leading actor itself. In such 
cases, the diffused policy is not linked to specific incentives or to specific needs 
to improve a policy, but it corresponds to the idea, that adopting a specific 
regulation is the most appropriate action to take. The following hypothesis can 
be drawn (H₄ Imitation): Imitation mechanisms occur in a context exempt of 
international regulatory channels, economic interest and sanction capacity, 
where transgovernmental collaboration is used with the objective to reach 
conformity with the perceived leaders in the field (absence of efficiency 
variable).  
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The third hypothesis relates to the mechanism of competition. It was mentioned 
earlier that competition can be understood as a fight over scarce resources, 
also, for example, in the sense of acquiring direct loans or contracts. Enhancing 
the performance of the sector is however linked to economic interests. For 
instance, economic competition can be inferred where adopted policies satisfy 
the main investors. The following hypothesis can be drawn (H₅ Competition): 
Economic competition mechanisms occur in a context exempt of sanction 
capacity, where international regulatory channels and not transgovernmental 
ones, are used with the objective to satisfy economic interests and reach 
efficiency.  
The fourth and last hypothesis concerns the mechanism of coercion. It can take 
place in various forms, levels and actors, representing a way to enforce 
convergence in the absence of autonomous decision-making of the adopting 
state. Physical means or the manipulation of economic costs and benefits can 
equally become coercive. In this case, it is observed that the adopted laws 
satisfy the third country and not the adopter. The following hypothesis can be 
drawn (H₆ Coercion): Coercion mechanisms occur in context of economic 
interest, leadership and sanction capacity, where international regulatory 
channels and not transgovernmental ones, are used principally and possess the 
capacity to impose sanctions. 
1.5 Case selection & assumptions 
1.5.1 Country-case selection & assumptions  
According to Karch, innovation can spread in diverse settings for example, from 
city to city, from state to state or from one country to another (2007:3). In this 
study, the focus is set on three countries, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, which 
were selected for their similarities, such as cultural and social values, economic 
and technological development. Even if they are not of equal size, they present 
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similar economic development characteristics3. All three countries possess a 
similar specification, as middle-income economies, according to the Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita. More precisely, Morocco and Egypt are lower 
middle-income economies and Jordan has become an upper middle-income 
economy since 20114. Between 2005 and 2012 the yearly average of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) corresponded to 5.1% in Egypt, 4.7% in Morocco and 
5.2% in Jordan (ITU, 2014). All countries have experienced a sharp fall in GDP 
growth; since 2010 in Jordan and 2011 in Egypt and 2012 in Morocco, following 
the political turmoil in the region (World Bank, 2015a).  
Politically, all three countries show characteristics of semi-authoritarian political 
regimes. Jordan and Morocco are monarchies and Egypt is now ruled by a 
military regime. In fact, since 2011 Egypt has experienced several political 
upheavals and changes of government. This needs to be taken into account 
when addressing policy diffusion, in particular with regards to the autonomy of 
the NRA and the limited autonomy in implementing changes considering the 
political instability. The role of the political system in the development of policies 
in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt is assessed in relation to the quality of the 
governance in Chapter 5. The relationship between the political system and 
telecommunications more specifically is addressed in Chapter 6. 
All three countries are linked to the EU through a variety of agreements, in 
particular the Barcelona Process, which started in 1995 and aims at creating a 
stable and prosperous Euro-Mediterranean area. All three countries are part of 
similar Euro-Med telecommunications regulatory projects, largely linked to the 
Barcelona programmes. They have participated in several intergovernmental 
and regional projects, notably the New Approach to Telecommunications 
programmes (NATP), which started in 2001. They are also all members of the 
regulatory group EMERG, which was set up by the EU and Mediterranean 
NRAs in 2008 through the funding of the NATP-III programme. Lastly, Jordan 
and Egypt took part in telecommunications twinning programmes with European 
                                            
 
3
  In 2014, Egypt’s total population amounted to 83.4mio. Morocco’s total population amount to 
33.49mio and Jordan’s total population amounted to 7mio. (WORLD BANK. 2015a. Data 
[Online]. Available: http://data.worldbank.org/ [Accessed Nov 20 2015].) 
4
 Lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita 
of $4,125. Ibid. 
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countries (from 2008 to 2010 in Egypt and from 2011 to 2013 in Jordan), which 
are instruments of institution building created around EU policy objectives. The 
similar membership of all three countries to these policy-making fora makes it 
interesting to compare, and explain why some are more influential than others. 
The different scopes and influence in policy-making of the above mentioned 
agents and programmes are clearly discussed in the third empirical chapter 
focussing on various policy-making fora (chapter 6). 
The cooperation between the EU and Egypt is less advanced than with both 
Jordan and Morocco. Jordan and Morocco were granted the EU advanced 
cooperation status in October 2008 for Morocco and in October 2010 for 
Jordan. This status formerly recognises efforts to come closer to the EU in both 
regulatory and trade sectors and reinforces bilateral relationship between each 
countries and the EU. The status formalises, according to the European 
institutions, the ambitions for political, economic and social changes (European 
Council, 2013, European Commission, 2014). Table 2 shows a selection of 
comparative indicators. It focuses on trade-related indicators. The GDP per 
capita shows how similar all three countries are to one another. All three are 
middle-income economies. The next indicator is the most interesting as it shows 
the importance of trade within the economy of a country. It shows clearly that 
Jordan relies on trade more than the two other countries, with a value showing 
a deficit, as Jordan imports drastically more than it exports. The specific case of 
Jordan is explained in detail in Chapter 5 (Sections 5.2 and 5.3.2).  
The Egyptian case is different, representing the country with the lower trade 
ratio in percent of GDP, showing a greater capacity to export. The next indicator 
shows trade in services including communications services as a percentage of 
GDP. It shows that Jordan relies on trade in services the most followed by 
Morocco and Egypt. Finally, the last indicator shows the top three trade partners 
for each country. It shows that trade with the EU-28 is central to each of the 
selected country-cases and in particular to Morocco, where more than half the 
total trade is done with the EU-28 partners, followed by Egypt with 31.4% and 
Jordan with 15.5%. The US is also one of the top three trading partners for all 
three countries, with China and Saudi-Arabia following closely.  
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Table 2 Selection of comparative indicators 
 GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
(2013) 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
(2012) 
Trade in Services 
(% of GDP)  
(2012) 
Top 3 partners (% of 
Total Trade) 
(2014)* 
Morocco 3,108.64 86.5 24.4 1. EU-28   
2. US 
3. China  
55.2 
5.9 
5.4 
Jordan 5,214.19 
 
120.5 
 
32.9 1. Saudi Arabia 
2. EU-28 
3. US 
17.7 
15.5 
8.5 
Egypt 3,314.4 43.7 14.4 1. EU-28 
2. China 
3. US 
31.4 
8.4 
6.5 
Source: Author. Based upon World Bank statistics (World Bank, 2015b, World Bank, 2015c, 
World Bank, 2015d). *Based on Eurostat statistics (Eurostat, 2015c, Eurostat, 2015b, Eurostat, 
2015a). 
 
The main observation based on Table 2 is the trade balances in each country, 
with different reliance on imports relative to exports. Trade percent in relation to 
GDP is high in Jordan, medium in Morocco and low in Egypt. This is notably 
linked to the capacity of each country to produce and sustain its own economy 
domestically, instead of relying on external sources. This is directly related to 
the conceptual and theoretical framework of this thesis and relates to the state 
variable adequately. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between reliance on 
external sources and actors for the country’s domestic development or a rather 
autonomous development relying on internal sources of production. In this 
context, this thesis argues that Egypt is likely to correspond to lower degrees of 
external vulnerability, while Jordan and Morocco are likely to correspond to 
higher degrees of external vulnerability. 
 
 
 
 
  
29 
 
Figure 2 Country-cases assumptions 
Low  High 
Governance openness Governance openness 
Market openness Market openness 
Political interconnectedness Political interconnectedness 
Market interconnectedness Market interconnectedness 
  
EGYPT  MOROCCO 
 JORDAN 
Source: Author. 
 
This reliance on external versus domestic sources of development is also 
observable in the context of telecommunications, where each country has had a 
distinct development strategy in the field. Egypt represents a case study with a 
different telecommunications development of Morocco and Jordan. 
Telecommunications in Egypt have historically been used by the government to 
establish supremacy and spread Egyptian leadership in the Arab world. For 
instance, Abdulla argues that in 1952, when Egypt gained its independence 
from the British occupation, the radio became nationalised. From that moment, 
the radio became the official voice of government, as a propaganda device, with 
Nasser using the station strategically, helping nations gain independence and 
serving other nationalist causes (2007:6-7). Egypt soon established itself as a 
leader in its use of communications technologies. Following the radio, television 
and cinema soon occupied all Egyptian public spaces. Abdulla argues that 
Cairo soon became the Hollywood of the Middle East, with a leading and highly 
sophisticated radio, TV and Motion Picture producer in the Arab World (2007:8-
9). In fact, several authors confirm that Egypt has been a "media hub" in the 
Middle East for many years (Guaaybess, 2011:23, Boyd, 1999). The cases of 
Jordan and Morocco are considerably different and development of the 
telecommunications started in the late 1990s. The telecommunications contexts 
of the three country cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (Sections 5.2 
and 5.3). 
In conclusion, Egypt presents a country case with a stronger focus and capacity 
in autonomous development rather than Jordan and Morocco. Following the 
argument of this thesis, the three case studies can be divided into two different 
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scenarios. Morocco and Jordan have had a closer linkage to the EU and have 
developed with a closer relationship to external regulatory and economic actors. 
Egypt instead has shown a will as an independent economic and regulatory 
force. This defines the country assumptions as follows. On one side, Morocco 
and Jordan are more likely to adopt policies that have originated elsewhere due 
to their closer vulnerability to external actors, particularly the EU. They 
correspond to the first hypothesis (H₁ High), which expects that the higher the 
degree of governance and market openness, political and market 
interconnectedness, the higher the probability of policy diffusion taking place. In 
contrast, Egypt is less likely to adopt policies originated elsewhere. It 
corresponds to the second hypothesis (H₂ Low), which expects that the lower 
the degree of governance and market openness, political and market 
interconnectedness, the lower the probability of policy diffusion taking place. 
1.5.2 Sector selection & assumption 
Telecommunications is the sector chosen for analysis in this thesis. More 
precisely, two subsectors were selected, USO and spectrum management. It is 
necessary as a first step to define key characteristics of the telecommunications 
sector. The WTO proposes several adequate descriptions of the sector, which 
are used in this thesis. From a purely technological view, the annex on 
telecommunications defines the sector as the “transmission and reception of 
signals by any electromagnetic means” (WTO, 1995b:art.3(a)). This is a broad 
definition, which allows for many different forms and technologies to be 
included. It is apparent from that definition that the telecommunications sector is 
bound to sophisticated expertise and requires equally high levels of know-how 
for its development. This characteristic is important to take into account when 
studying policy diffusion. In fact, as the field is very sophisticated, it becomes 
apparent that citizens or the public are less involved in policy change. This is 
even more defined in semi-authoritarian countries of MENA region, where 
citizens’ involvement in policy-making is less observable. These levels of 
technology can be compared to sectors such as bio-technologies, artificial 
intelligence or nuclear physics regulations where notable levels of education or 
experience need to be achieved before participation in the policy making 
process is possible.  
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The dynamic nature of the telecommunications sector is also linked to its 
sophistication. Telecommunications are bound to technological development, 
thus decisions have to be taken regularly so to enhance the regulatory context 
of the field. The impact of dynamic sectors on policy diffusion was already 
perceived by Mohr who addressed the issue of evolving environments, stating 
that policy diffusion occurs when an environment is rapidly changing, including 
market conditions, technological changes, clientele needs and demands and 
labour market (1969:112). In such fields, policy changes take place regularly 
and observing the development of these policies and programmes is the 
sources of much research potential. Even if technology may not be the main 
and certainly not the only driver for policy change in the sector, it cannot be 
ignored and it is discussed closely in the empirical part of this thesis.  
Besides the role of technology, one of the further characteristics of the sector is 
its cross-border interactions. Telecommunications have spread across 
boundaries, creating a worldwide interconnection of actors, technologies and 
services. Mansell and Raboy outline that “[t]he spread of digital technologies 
and the ease with which these technologies ignored national boundaries 
expanded the reach of networks such that nation-states were no longer 
perceived as the only containers for policy measures” (2011:3). The limitless 
scope of telecommunications is closely linked to its particular form of 
supranational regulation (Padovani and Pavan, 2011:543). In this sector, 
international fora, such as the ITU have been active since the 1930s. These 
forms of supranational regulations exist in other fields, such as international 
aviation with the ICAO or the banking sector, where the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) represents a pre-eminent organisation 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000:117). In sectors marked by cross-border 
interaction, international regulatory fora provide promising areas for policy 
diffusion research.  
Lastly, the telecommunications sector has a strong weight in the GDP of a 
country. This is notably due to the role of telecommunications as a profitable 
business, but it is also as a carrier of other services. The WTO recognises this 
duality in the General Agreement on trade in services (GATS). The Annex on 
Telecommunications recognises “the specificities of the telecommunications 
services sector and, in particular, its dual role as a distinct sector of economic 
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activity and as the underlying transport means for other economic activities” 
(WTO, 1995b:art.1). Hence in such a business-oriented sector, several 
interested parties are likely to compete to attract more gains. This is relevant for 
the states notably because of revenues from spectrum auction and taxes paid 
by corporations active in the field. It is also a very lucrative business for national 
and international companies active in the sector, such as fixed and mobile 
phone operators. For instance, in such fields, it is likely to be observed that 
domestic and international investors, lobbies or business entrepreneurs have a 
role to play in regulation as well. In fact, the sector of telecommunications is 
sufficiently complex, in terms of technology, regulation, cross-border 
interconnections and business weight so to conclude that policy-making in the 
field is both marked by domestic and international interests and an important 
regional and international regulatory environment.  
The selection of two different policy subsectors, USO and spectrum 
management allows for variation within the sector to be analysed. Firstly, USO 
is a typical national-oriented policy. At the origin of the argument is a discourse 
based on social inclusion and the need for the state to bridge the gap of 
competition failure and to provide affordable telecommunications services to the 
whole national territory. USO is limited to the national territory and USO 
decisions domestically do not have a direct impact on USO systems elsewhere. 
Secondly, spectrum management provisions as opposed to USO, are linked to 
international regulation and practice as well as large economic interests. 
Spectrum management is a cross-border issue, where the laws of physics5 
have forced countries to cooperate for decades in order to avoid interferences. 
The international framework for spectrum management is closely linked to the 
ITU regulation. Furthermore, spectrum management provides a very dynamic 
and international context, where stakes are high. For example, major operators, 
often European, wish to enter or expand their markets in the developing 
                                            
 
5 Electromagnetic spectrum is similar to non-physical waves. In cases where they overlap with 
each other, they interfere and harm each other signals. Regulation occurs mainly to prevent 
these harmful interferences, but also to achieve economic and technical efficiency of spectrum 
use (WELLENIUS, B. & NETO, I. 2008. Managing the Radio Spectrum: Framework for Reform 
in Developing Countries. World Bank: Global Informaiton and Communication Technologies 
Department, Policy Research Working Paper 4549.) 
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countries through the acquiring of more spectrum and more market shares. 
Major equipment companies are also closely concerned with spectrum 
management regulation, as the standards set for the use of spectrum are tied to 
large markets (Büthe and Mattli, 2013:210). Based on these characteristics, 
Table 3 summarises the different assumptions according to each mechanisms 
of diffusion.  
Table 3 Subsector-cases assumptions 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures  
Internationa
l regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Effici
ency 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanctio
n 
capacity 
Policy 
Sector 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - USO 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - USO 
Competition (H₅) + - + + - Spectrum 
Coercion (H₆) + - - + + Spectrum 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
Table 3 shows that USO corresponds to learning and imitation mechanisms in 
majority. This is based on the premise that economic interests and sanction 
capacity are only limited in this field. Competition can arise according to which 
system the USO contracts are given, but it normally only concerns markets that 
are difficult to access and where a non-regulated market based system would 
fail to provide services. In consequence, it is expected that in the case of USO, 
only little international political and economic interest will be involved in policy 
making. This thesis argues that USO is more likely to be subject to two 
mechanisms of diffusion exempt from international regulatory framework, 
sanction and economic interest. The first one is learning, which corresponds to 
the third hypothesis (H₃ Learning), arguing that the mechanism occurs in a 
context exempt of international regulatory channels, economic interest and 
sanction capacity, where transgovernmental collaboration is used with the 
objective of efficiency enhancement. The second one is on imitation, which 
corresponds to the fourth hypothesis (H₄ Imitation), arguing that the mechanism 
occurs in a context exempt of international regulatory channels, economic 
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interest and sanction capacity, where transgovernmental collaboration is used 
with the objective to reach conformity with the perceived leaders in the field 
(absence of efficiency variable).  
Table 3 also shows that spectrum management corresponds to economic 
competition and sanction mechanisms in majority. This is due to the cross-
border scope of spectrum associated to important economic interests. In such 
sectors, conflict of interests may arise and power relationships are likely to take 
place. This corresponds to the argument of Mansell and Raboy defining 
spectrum regulation as a key area for destabilisation, due to the many stakes 
involved (2011:10). This thesis argues that spectrum management is more likely 
to be subject to two mechanisms of diffusion marked by international regulatory 
framework, sanction and economic interest. The first one is economic 
competition, which corresponds to the fifth hypothesis (H₅ Competition), arguing 
that the mechanism occurs in a context exempt of sanction capacity, where 
international regulatory channels and not transgovernmental ones, are used 
with the objective to satisfy economic interests and reach efficiency. The 
second one is coercion, which corresponds to the sixth and last hypothesis (H₆ 
Coercion), arguing that the mechanism occurs in context of economic interest, 
leadership and sanction capacity, where international regulatory channels and 
not transgovernmental ones, are used principally and possess the capacity to 
impose sanctions. 
1.6 Rationale of research  
This project contributes to academic research on various levels. It contributes to 
the literature on policy diffusion, but it is also innovative with regard to the 
selection of case studies and the sector chosen. The contribution to the policy 
diffusion literature has already been explained earlier (Section 1.3). In 
particular, this study aims at bridging the gap of the systematic use of policy 
diffusion theories in real case scenarios. It proposes methodological, theoretical 
and empirical tools to observe the phenomenon of policy diffusion, analyse the 
conditions to engage in policy diffusion and disentangle the four mechanisms of 
diffusion. The selection of three developing countries of the MENA region as 
country-case studies is furthermore adequate as it proposes both theoretical 
and empirical value of the states’ vulnerability to external actors in policy 
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diffusion. It links questions of technological, political and economic development 
to policy making in an innovative way. 
Moreover, the sector of telecommunications diffusion in developing countries is 
important for several reasons. From a global regulatory perspective, minimal 
research has been carried out that tackles regulatory flows beyond the 
traditional North-South flows (Bauer, 2010b:9). In fact, Bauer argues that 
several directional trends have taken place in the history of communications 
and mentions that four flows of information are now coexisting. The first flow 
represents a North-North dimension, where the US and other Northern 
countries embarked on policies of privatisation and liberalisation. A North-South 
dimension soon appeared after the reform processes in industrialised countries. 
Southern countries followed the trends of industrialised countries, partly 
because of the demands of lenders such as the World Bank. More recently, a 
regional South-South flow has progressively emerged among developing 
countries, whose experience and context are more similar compared to the 
Northern countries. Lastly, a reverse flow of information from the South to the 
North has taken place, with industrialised countries being influenced by 
insightful approaches from innovative Southern countries (2010b:9). One of the 
aims of this thesis is to bring empirical insight challenging the traditional North-
South view. The use of three MENA countries as policy adopters, as opposed to 
policy givers, allows observing empirically whether the North-South trend still 
holds nowadays, but more importantly, it allows observing whether this flow has 
evolved over time and whether it confirms the emergence of new regulatory 
trends such as South-North or South-South flows.  
From an economic perspective, telecommunications diffusion in developing 
countries is also essential, since it represents a vast potential for development 
(Gasmi et al., 2013, Gasmi and Recuero Virto, 2010). As mentioned earlier, 
telecommunications services have been increasingly recognised by the 
international community, and notably within the WTO and the GATS, as a 
lucrative industry in itself and as a provider for other services. For instance 
Rodine-Hardy argues that telecommunications is one of the most global 
markets and can represent significant shares of GDP and gross domestic 
investment. She argues that “[d]omestically, the telecom sector is one of the key 
drivers in the economy, the glue that binds together firms and market 
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participants. Demand for telecommunications services and products is high, and 
there are vast profits to be made in the sector” (2013:2). For developing 
countries, ICT carry the potential to advance the societies economically.  
This focus on developing the ICT sector is remarkable in semi-authoritarian 
countries which control the use of technology closely (Guaaybess, 2012). In 
fact, as Zarwan mentions the conflicting interest of semi-authoritarian MENA 
countries to develop ICT on the one hand and control the access to information 
on the other, leads to contradictory policies (2005:2). Preserving 
telecommunications from further censorship and supporting greater access to 
information is at the core of several international development goals6. 
Numerous reports and articles tackle the question of the lack of freedom in 
telecommunications, press and Media in Arab states (Guaaybess, 2008, 
Zarwan, 2005, UNDP, 2012). The lack of free press and free media remains a 
concern across the wider academic and NGO communities (Rivlin, 2013:26, 
Dabbous, 1994:70, Lynch, 2006:37). However, sophisticated censorship aimed 
at the telecommunications sector specifically has been less covered by 
researchers. In fact, censorship, through for example state-controlled internet 
service providers and proxy servers has equally important consequences to 
restrain access to information (Burkehardt and Older, 2003, Kalathil and Boas, 
2003). Censorship also takes place through state-ownership and control of the 
national telecommunications network and eventually the international gateways 
(Goldstein, 1999:28, El Gody, 2007). The role of regulation to counter 
censorship and state control is of tremendous importance and justifies 
                                            
 
6
 Art. 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions that “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers” (UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [Accessed 
Dec 1 2015].) 
Art. 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) reaffirms that 
everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. In particular, it states that 
everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice (UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 
1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Treaty Series, vol. 
999/14668) [Online]. Available: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
[Accessed Dec 12 2015].) 
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academic attention. Ownership in the telecommunications sector is discussed 
more broadly in Section 6.2, Framework Proposition 1. 
Lastly, linked to the question of censorship and access to information is the 
issue of the digital divide (Loo and Ngan, 2012, Milner, 2006). As Norris 
mentions, the internet age has generated substantial worldwide inequalities in 
access and use. However, it is also believed, that if such inequalities could be 
overcome, digital technologies could provide multiple opportunities for 
development (2001:9). Since the millennium, a growing interest has arisen into 
the potential of information technology to bridge the digital divide. This issue 
was central to the 2003 and 2005 conferences of the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS), where both focused on the need to overcome an 
uneven distribution of benefits (WSIS, 2003a:2, WSIS, 2003b:11, WSIS, 2005). 
This view was also articulated by the 2003 Pan Arab Cairo Declaration on the 
Information Society reckoning the need to bridge the digital divide and create a 
comprehensive and sustainable community development in the Arab World 
(Cairo Declaration, 2003:5). Several authors however doubt whether 
technologies have brought the world any closer together (Abdulla, 2007:2). Still 
technological development carries broad hopes for socioeconomic and 
democratic development (Norris, 2001:6-7). The specific connection between 
telecommunications and opportunities, in addition to the booming demand in 
developing countries, reinforce the importance and validity of the selected case 
studies. 
1.7 Organisation of the study 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The first chapter of this thesis presents the key building blocks of this thesis. It 
aims at defining the design of this thesis. To frame this project, the first section 
explains the policy problem. It is followed by a discussion on the literature to 
identify where a contribution is needed to expand the research on policy 
diffusion. The third section defines the research question and the 
conceptualisation of the research framework. It notably explains the three-step 
framework, based on the observation of policy diffusion, the conditions leading 
to policy diffusion and finally the variables disentangling mechanisms of 
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diffusion. The fourth section illustrates the case selection and assumptions, 
focusing on the three countries and two sector-cases. The fifth section gives the 
rationale of research and focuses closely on the importance of studying both the 
telecommunications sectors and developing countries. This section, the sixth 
and last one, summarises each chapter to facilitate the comprehension of this 
thesis’ structure.   
Chapter 2 – Conceptual and Theoretical Framework  
This chapter explains the theoretical and conceptual framework which is going 
to be followed in the thesis. This is based mostly on policy diffusion literature, 
which is used to ground the framework. This chapter is divided into three 
sections mirroring the three steps of the framework and the three chapters of 
the empirical part (Chapters 4 to 6). The first section addresses the question of 
how to evidence and observe policy diffusion. It answers the main question of 
this thesis: does policy adoption take place in the cases under study. The 
second section relates to the state conditions leading to policy adoption. It 
concerns the vulnerability of adopting states to external actors. This section 
answers the first subquestion derived from the main research question: under 
which conditions is a country expected to adopt a policy which originated in 
another country. The last section frames the question of the mechanisms of 
policy diffusion. It explains four mechanisms that are well established in policy 
diffusion literature; learning, imitation, competition and coercion. It then clarifies 
how these mechanisms are operationalised in the research. An additional 
contextualisation of the telecommunications sector is given to illustrate the last 
part of the theoretical framework. This answers the second and last subquestion 
of this thesis: how does this adoption take place. 
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
The methodological chapter addresses the sources and methods used to 
conduct the research. The first section defines the different methodological 
instruments used in this thesis. In particular, case studies are used jointly to 
identify policy diffusion and examine the contexts in which policy diffusion 
occurred. This section also introduces the use of expert interviews, which are 
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the main source of original data for this project. Information gathered from the 
mentioned interviews has then been inserted in qualitative software, NVivo, to 
systematise the coding and analyse the information. Furthermore, different 
secondary and primary sources are specified, which have been consulted to 
gain the holistic picture of the case studies. The second section of the 
methodology chapter addresses the measurements of the dependent and 
independent variables. It proposes clarification regarding the use of different 
indexes and statistical databases to measure state variables. In addition, it 
defines how to measure qualitatively the selected sector variables. 
Chapter 4 – Observing policy adoption 
The fourth chapter is the first empirical chapter. It clarifies the observation of 
policy adoption in all six cases of this thesis. The first section defines the 
reference points to observe policy diffusion. For the two policy cases, USO and 
spectrum management, two recent management ideas are extracted to observe 
whether Morocco, Jordan and Egypt have integrated them in their policy making 
domestically. As a comparative point, the EU model is used. The second 
section analyses each of the six case studies using the expert interviews made 
during the field research. The results are given at country level to simplify 
comparison. 
Chapter 5 – Conditions leading to policy adoption 
The fifth chapter is the second empirical chapter. Once the observation of policy 
adoption has been defined, the conditions leading to policy adoption are 
analysed. In this chapter, four state variables, defining degrees of vulnerability 
of states to external forces are discussed: market and governance openness 
and market and political interconnectedness. The first section gives a historical 
contextualisation of the four variables for MENA countries as a whole, starting 
from the years following their Independence from colonial powers in the 1950s. 
The second section provides a closer analysis to the background of Egypt, 
Jordan and Morocco. Finally, the last section discusses the selected variables 
and examines their reliability and validity. 
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Chapter 6 – Mechanisms of diffusion 
The sixth chapter is the last chapter of the empirical section. It focuses on 
mechanisms of diffusion. It is built on the idea originating from soft governance 
literature that NRAs are delegate to the Telecommunications Ministries to 
participate in policy-making activities. This is specifically the case in 
technological fields such as telecommunications. In this chapter, both sets of 
sector variables defined in terms of environment and the pressures of policy-
making are analysed in detail. Environment variables relate to the context in 
which NRAs have to engage in policy-making activities. Pressure variables 
relate to the forces leading the engagement of the NRAs into policy making 
activities. The first section of the chapter contextualises the telecommunications 
sector in the light of the four theoretical propositions surrounding the 
mechanisms of diffusion framework. The second section analyses the five 
variables in the empirical context of Morocco and Jordan in USO and spectrum 
management. In this part, the case of Egypt is not examined as both previous 
chapters conclude that policy adoption in Egypt is lower than in the policy cases 
of Morocco and Jordan.  
Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
This last chapter presents the key findings of this thesis. This chapter firstly 
reviews the contribution, innovation and findings of each of the three empirical 
chapters. It proceeds by answering the main research question and two 
subquestions. By doing so, it addresses both the hypotheses and assumptions. 
The first section reflects on each one of the empirical chapters of this thesis. It 
firstly focuses on methodological tools to observe policy diffusion, which 
corresponds to Chapter 4. It then discusses theoretical and empirical 
contributions regarding the conditions leading to policy diffusion, corresponding 
to Chapter 5 and the variables disentangling the mechanisms of diffusion, 
corresponding to Chapter 6. The next section then gives the limitations of the 
thesis. The last section finally proposes different directions to generalise the 
findings, based on the selected state and sector cases’ characteristics.  
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2 CHAPTER 2 – Conceptual and Theoretical Framework  
2.1 Introduction  
This thesis focuses on strategies behind policy adoption, using six cases that 
comprise of three countries, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt and two policy 
subsectors that are part of the telecommunications field, USO and spectrum 
management. This thesis is constructed as a three-step framework, the details 
of which, is the aim of this chapter. The leading question of this project is does 
policy adoption take place in the telecommunications sector in Jordan, Morocco 
and Egypt? This question is answered by observing the product and the 
process of diffusion across different models. If policy adoption has indeed taken 
place, then two secondary questions are asked. The first one is under which 
conditions is a country expected to adopt a policy which originated in another 
country. This question is answered by using a selection of four state variables 
which indicate different levels of vulnerability of the adopting countries to 
external models. The second and last question is how does this adoption take 
place. To answer this question, four identified mechanisms of policy diffusion 
are assessed using different combinations of five sector variables.  
The theoretical and conceptual framework is closely linked to the characteristics 
of the telecommunications sector. The peculiarities of this sector were 
addressed in the previous part (Section 1.5.2). It is nonetheless important to 
restate the characteristics of the sector in order to make sense of the chosen 
framework. It was observed that the telecommunications sector is a highly 
technological field. In such sectors, citizens’ participation is only limited, as a 
certain level of knowledge is required to understand the policy making process. 
These highly technological fields also include the need to face a challenging 
and changing environment forcing leaders to adapt regulation to improve 
technologies and its uses. This is also linked to the need to invest significantly 
to keep the sector up-to-date. High investments are also linked to power 
relations related to the potential profit in the field, for government and 
corporations. Another peculiarity of the sector is its intrinsic cross-border 
characteristic. The field of telecommunications crosses boundaries regardless 
of the physical limitations. Hence, actors in the policy-making process need to 
interact with each other to regulate the field and avoid interferences. They also 
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need to take into account the regulations made at a supranational level. In 
effect, in the telecommunications sector, supranational bodies such as the WTO 
and ITU are key regulators, whose decisions spread worldwide.   
It is in this context, characterised by the interaction between a variety of actors, 
including supranational bodies, where performance, profits and complexity are 
key, that the theoretical and conceptual framework was developed. The first 
focus of the framework aims to observe policy diffusion in the 
telecommunications sector in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. In this part, the 
points of reference to observe policy diffusion in the sector are closely linked to 
technological and regulatory innovations in the field. Two management ideas 
existing for USO and spectrum management are the focus of diffusion across 
systems. The second focus of the framework is on conditions leading to policy 
adoption. In this part, the focus is set on state level variables defining the 
vulnerability of a country to external forces. In this context as well, vulnerability 
to external forces must be understood in a context where economic and 
regulatory exchanges matter, as is the case in the telecommunications sector. 
Finally, the third focus of the framework is on mechanisms of diffusion. In this 
last part, five sector variables are selected and their combinations infer which 
mechanism has been at play. In this case, even more precisely than in the two 
previous parts, the impact of the telecommunications sector is distinct. It is 
based on the characteristics of this sector, that the framework was developed. 
For instance, generalisability of this thesis is possible, but must be 
contextualised adequately. Further discussion regarding generalisability is given 
in the last chapter of this thesis (Section 7.4). 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is divided into three parts to mirror the 
three driving questions of this research. This is also the structure of the 
empirical section of the thesis—Chapters 4, 5 and 6—which mirror this three-
step framework. As such the first section of this chapter focuses on observing 
policy diffusion. It explains what policy diffusion is and how to methodologically 
and systematically observe it. The empirical application of these tools is the 
focus of Chapter 4. The second section of this chapter conceptualises the 
conditions leading to policy diffusion. It assesses the literature on the subject 
and discusses a selection of four state variables linked to market and 
governance openness and market and political interconnectedness. The 
43 
 
empirical application of this framework is the focus of Chapter 5. The third and 
last section conceptualises the mechanisms that policy diffusion is following and 
proposes different combinations of five sector variables. The aim of this part is 
to infer that in an observed situation of policy adoption, the presence of certain 
sets of variables gives indication so to allow a deduction of which of the four 
mechanisms was at play. These five variables are divided into two sets—
environment and pressures—linked to the work of NRAs. The empirical 
application of this last part of the framework is the focus of Chapter 6.  
2.2 Observing policy diffusion 
The first aim of this thesis is to observe whether policy adoption is taking place 
in the telecommunications sector in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. To do so it is 
necessary to define systematically and methodologically what is policy diffusion 
and how to observe it and not to confuse it with other forms of policy-making. As 
has been expressed in the introductory part of this thesis, policy diffusion has 
been criticised by several authors due to the difficulty in systematically 
observing it and the need to differentiate it to other forms of policy making. 
Other forms may for example include socialisation, meaning that individuals 
develop a sense of belonging with a group and adapt their behaviour 
accordingly (Beyers, 2010:909, Freyburg, 2014). This form of policy-making 
means that the involvement with a certain set of norms and values, causes a 
redefinition of ones’ own norms and practices and that these norms become 
internalised (Beyers, 2010:909). Such forms of policy making are “adaptive”, 
rather than “adoptive”. In this thesis, however, the internationalisation of norms 
is not discussed. Instead the close observation of the movement of policies is at 
the core. The main challenge is to identify this movement. 
Several authors develop theoretical tools to exclude other forms of policy 
making from policy diffusion. Starke outlines that in policy diffusion studies, it 
must be empirically demonstrated that the diffusion effect is not explained by 
alternative explanations, such as independent domestic or international causes, 
a common external shock or pure chance (2013:565). To distinguish policy 
diffusion from other forms of policy making, Bennett (1997:215) and Stone 
(1999:56) outline four parameters. They focus on validating policy adoption as a 
result of prior knowledge. Firstly, it must be demonstrated that idiosyncratic 
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domestic factors are not independently responsible for policy adoption. 
Secondly, it must be demonstrated that adoption is not the result of similar 
modernising forces having the same, but separate, effects in different states. 
Thirdly, it must be demonstrated that policy makers are aware of the policy 
adoptions elsewhere and finally, it must be demonstrated that this overseas 
evidence was utilised within domestic policy debates. Based on these four 
parameters, one main lesson is drawn to identify policy diffusion. The observed 
policy adoption must be the result of a visible interaction with another model. It 
must not have occurred independently, due notably to modernising forces or to 
external shock.  
Based on this element, this thesis proposes the use of two complementary 
concepts to conclude that policy diffusion has taken place, the product and the 
process. The product refers to the ‘physical’ observation of the diffused 
regulation item. It must be discernible in the policy documents of two different 
countries that a similar element has been transferred from one regulatory unit to 
the other. The product can however take a loose form, such as a regulation, 
law, policy guidelines, idea or programme. There is, in fact, an agreement 
among different authors that diffused policies can take different shapes and 
include a wide range of phenomena (Karch, 2007:2, Weyland, 2006:17). 
Dolowitz and Marsh mention seven objects of transfer including policy goals, 
structure and content, policy instruments or administrative techniques, 
institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes and concepts and finally negative lessons 
(1996:350). Weyland also distinguishes between model diffusion, such as a 
well-defined blueprint, and principle diffusion, taking a looser form such as ideas 
(2006:17). Proposing different forms of product, looser and harder, is ideal to 
this project, as the aim is to grasp the complexity of real case scenarios and 
unravel the intricacy of policy-making. As a second step, the process of 
diffusion must be observed. This relates to the context in which the product has 
been adopted. It must be clear that the effects of interaction have taken place 
between the original policy and the adopted one. This can be done by 
discussing with the policy-makers directly or consulting meeting documents 
between different regulators.  
The use of both the product and the process has seduced several authors 
(Farrell and Heritier, 2005). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier use a two-steps 
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observation of rule transfer, similar to the concept of product and process 
explained here (2004:662). The first focus is set on what is exported, which 
corresponds to the product, and the second is how the rule transfer took place, 
corresponding to the process. They mention the importance of distinguishing 
the causal link between two systems (2004:662). The commonality of these 
approaches is on the focus of the interaction taking place between different 
systems. In policy diffusion, interaction is at the core, both in terms of methods 
and theory. The theoretical use of interaction is more explicitly detailed in the 
next part of this thesis (Section 2.3), where two state variables, market and 
political interconnectedness intend to grasp this singularity. Beyer also recalls 
the importance of distinguishing between process and outcomes and proposes 
useful complementary propositions to Easton’s distinction of output, outcome 
and impact (1965, 2010:911). Beyers notably mentions the importance of 
distinguishing the product from the process to distinctly separate the causes 
from the consequences (2010:911). In this thesis, both the product and the 
process need to be separately identified and jointly assessed to conclude that 
the diffused law, programme or idea (the product) has been the result of an 
interaction between two different systems (the process). Only then is it 
concluded that policy diffusion has taken place.  
2.3 Conditions to engage in policy diffusion 
The second aim of this thesis is to operationalise the domestic context of the 
adopting countries to answer the first subquestion of this thesis: under which 
conditions does a country adopt a policy that originated elsewhere. In the 
literature, the domestic context has been discussed broadly, but not always 
analysed systematically. Several authors have identified useful independent 
variables to define this context. Berry and Berry suggest to use jointly the 
internal determinants model, addressing the political, economic and social 
characteristics of a state and the regional diffusion model, addressing the 
influence of nearby (1990:396). More precisely, Newmark argues that a variety 
of indicators of wealth can be chosen to explain internal determinant models, 
such as excess resources, per capita income, expenditures, urbanization, larger 
governments, higher education levels, higher literacy rates and greater upward 
mobility (2002:158-9). These variables give an interesting insight into which 
properties to use to best define the domestic context. However, they lack 
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systematisation. In addition, it is not always straightforward in the literature how 
to operationalise the regional characteristics of a certain context. The result of 
which is a lack of tools to apply policy diffusion theories to empirical cases.  
In this thesis, state properties have been closely linked to the policy diffusion 
literature. Two major and complementary trends exist so to explain why a 
country is likely to engage in policy diffusion. The first one relates to the 
vulnerability of a state to external developments. This vulnerability is more 
commonly referred to as the uncertainty and limit to rationality that policy-
makers face when having to choose among solutions. They are limited in their 
capacities to systematically assess all possibilities. As such getting inspiration 
from a model in operation elsewhere represents the best solution. Rogers 
defines uncertainty as a situation where there is a lack of predictability, structure 
and information (2003:6). Rose mentions that uncertainty is one of the structural 
forces, which conditions to a certain degree the transfer and character of 
implantation of policies across countries (1999:53-4). It is closely linked to the 
limits of rationality that decision-maker face when choosing between complex 
alternatives (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009, Simmons and Elkins, 2004, Dobbin et 
al., 2007). To deal with these situations, Walker argues that one of the only 
ways is thus to look for analogy in other states, where the policy has proved to 
be successful (1969:881). Hence, it is observed that vulnerability derives from 
the limits of rationality for policy-makers to evaluate all sources of information 
and policy options available to them. In this context, policy-makers need to look 
abroad for examples to follow. 
The second trend in the literature explaining why a country is likely to engage in 
policy diffusion refers to the interrelation between domestic decisions and 
external ones and corresponds to the “interactional” core of policy diffusion. It 
was observed that this interaction in the process of policy-making is essential 
methodologically to conclude that policy diffusion is taking place. In fact, the 
interaction of two systems is at the core of policy diffusion. It can be perceived 
from different angles. Firstly, interaction must be understood in terms of 
interdependence of decision-making. Decisions taken abroad influence 
decisions taken domestically and vice versa. This is notably due to the similarity 
of problems that countries face. Majone for example mentions that “different 
governments faced with the same problem respond with the same or similar 
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polices” (1991:103). Rose also argues that problems tend to be similar to 
various countries at the time, thus creating a tendency for policy-makers to 
search for programmes elsewhere and draw lessons from them (1991:7). The 
similarity of issues and solutions is an important factor driving policy diffusion, 
but interaction must also be understood in the sense of interdependence or 
interconnectedness. In that sense, as mentions Brooks, a decision taken in one 
place is conditioned to some degree by similar choices made elsewhere 
(2007:703). This interconnectedness of policy-making is described in two steps 
by Simmons and Elkins. They argue that the adoption of policies and 
programmes elsewhere firstly alters the benefits of adoption for others and 
secondly provides information about costs or benefits of policy innovation 
(2004:172). Interconnectedness is best defined as an inexorable link between 
different administrations, where decisions taken abroad have an impact 
domestically.  
Based on the theoretical concepts of vulnerability and interaction, four state 
variables have been identified. The vulnerability of a state to external 
developments is operationalised into two variables, governance and market 
openness. Openness is used instead of vulnerability, as it does not carry the 
negative connotation of weakness linked to the concept of vulnerability, but 
epitomises the same susceptibility of exposure to external actors. Openness is 
a concept that has been increasingly used worldwide and notably by 
international organisations. For instance, trade openness is regularly used to 
define the correlation between GDP and trade (WITS, 2014). It is thus 
appropriate when defining the vulnerability to external actors.  
The interrelation between domestic and external systems is operationalised in 
this thesis into two variables, political and market interconnectedness. 
Interconnectedness is also a recent term that has been adopted by several 
international organisations and academic research to describe similar 
phenomenon (Didier and Schmukler, 2013). The 2014 World Developments 
Report uses this term, mentioning that openness and modernisation have made 
economic, social and ecological systems increasingly interconnected (World 
Bank, 2014c:35). The four variables of governance and market openness and 
political and market interconnectedness give an indication of the degree to 
which countries need to pay attention to external actors for political and 
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economic reasons. It is expected that all four variables give homogenous and 
comparable indication regarding the likelihood of adoption. A higher level of all 
four of them supposes a higher likelihood to engage in policy adoption. On the 
contrary, a lower level of all four of them supposes a lower likelihood to engage 
in policy adoption. They are presented according to the same continuum, as 
shown in Figure 1 (firstly given in Section 1.4, page 22).  
Figure 1  Conditions leading to policy diffusion  
Low  High 
Governance openness Governance openness 
Market openness Market openness 
Political interconnectedness Political interconnectedness 
Market interconnectedness Market interconnectedness 
  
LOW Policy diffusion  HIGH Policy Diffusion 
(H₂ Low) (H₁ High) 
Source: Author. 
 
Based on the above theoretical insights, the four chosen variables are defined 
more precisely. Firstly, governance openness is meant as the degree to which a 
country is taking the rule of law and the work of regulatory authorities into 
account. It is measured in terms of effective regulatory governance, based on 
both the governance and regulatory effectiveness of a country. The focus on the 
rule of law seems quite automatic when studying policy diffusion. In fact, several 
authors underline the role of the governance climate in policy-making (Rodine-
Hardy, 2013:57-9) or national regulatory styles (Humphreys and Simpson, 
2008:855). The degree of governance openness is central to observe to what 
extent an adopting country is part of the international regulatory game. This 
variable indicates that the more open governance in a country is, the more likely 
it is to look abroad at other regulatory models to improve its own domestically. 
Secondly, market openness is defined as the reliance on national and 
international market forces to regulate the economy. It takes into account the 
role of the private sector leading to regulatory changes and the necessary 
harmonisation across countries to permit exchanges and trade. This is 
particularly revealing in sectors, such as telecommunications, which have 
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experienced a tremendous evolution from a system based on state-monopolies 
to an almost complete liberalisation. Market openness is also a known variable 
to define the domestic context. Humphrey and Simpson argue that the market 
specificities of a country, whether a market is large or small, developed or 
under-developed, has an impact on policy developments (2008:855). This 
variable implies that the more open a market is, the more likely it is to look at 
other models to be a part of the global market community. 
Thirdly, the variable on political interconnectedness is defined by the relation of 
dependency between two countries for political reasons. It is here related to the 
issue of foreign aid and the political motivations and consequences of giving 
and receiving foreign aid. It is based on the premise that the more an adopting 
country is relying on third countries for political reasons, the more it will have to 
pay attention to the policy decisions taken abroad. Rodine-Hardy argues that it 
is probable that a country’s debt service affects its probability of liberal 
telecommunication reform. This author argues that a country with higher debt 
service, is more likely to establish certain regulatory changes (2013:24-5). This 
is the argument followed in this thesis. This variable indicates that the more a 
country is dependent on foreign aid, the more likely it is to adopt policies that 
emanate from countries providing this aid.  
Finally, the variable on market interconnectedness refers to the degree of 
international trade interdependence, in particular in terms of the role of the 
private sector and specifically the role of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the 
economy of the adopting country. The role of foreign investors is central for a 
country’s domestic development. Again, this is interesting when looking at the 
example of the telecommunications sector, which requires high levels of 
investments to develop. Market interconnectedness has also been used by 
Rodine-Hardy who includes the role of government-business relations and the 
government attitudes toward foreign direct investment as key indicators of the 
domestic context (2013:57-9). The argument behind this variable is that the 
higher a country depends on FDI from foreign countries, the more likely it is to 
follow policy formulations emanating from these countries.  
To conclude, the operationalisation of all four variables is central to understand 
under which conditions do countries adopt a policy that originated externally. 
This is useful theoretically and conceptually. However, in real case scenarios it 
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must be expected that the four variables are overlapping to some degrees. This 
is visible, as Faruk Aysan and Véganzonès-Varoudakis mention, that while a 
poor quality of administration reflects in the security of property rights, 
regulation and taxation, greater openness of trade and competition are 
conducive to better governance as well (2009:94-5). This shows the overlapping 
characteristics of all four variables empirically. Each individual development of 
the variables may have an impact over the other variables, as each of them is 
part of the same system.  
2.4 Disentangling mechanisms of policy diffusion 
This section presents the third and last part of the conceptual framework. Once 
the adoption of a policy and the conditions leading to policy adoption have been 
discussed, it is possible to differentiate among the four mechanisms of 
diffusion—learning, imitation, competition, coercion—according to different 
combinations of sector variables. The aim of this section is to answer the 
second research subquestion: how does policy adoption take place. This 
question can only be answered if it has been previously concluded that a 
phenomenon of policy diffusion, in the case of this thesis, policy adoption, has 
taken place. In this last part of the framework, the focus is set on the work of 
NRAs in policy-making. The decision to take NRAs as focal points corresponds 
to changes in the governance environment that several scholars have recently 
underlined (Maggetti, 2009, Thatcher, 2002). In the context of the EU 
institutions, Harcourt mentions that ‘new’ or ‘soft’ governance, which is defined 
by weak instruments of control, is a key development of governance, as a way 
to bypass political stagnation (2008:7). She describes soft governance by non-
binding agreements, where policy is taking place within soft policy fora such as 
committees, NRAs or the industrial area (2008:29). The idea of soft governance 
and the increasing role of NRAs in policy making is however, not only bound to 
the EU institutions. Their relevance is perceptible in the MENA region as well 
and is an interesting starting point to discuss mechanisms of diffusion.  
In the field of telecommunications, NRAs have had an increasingly relevant role. 
This is the case in such sectors, where technological sophistication is required 
to develop the regulatory framework. It can be seen in a variety of other sectors 
as well, such as finances, medical and health sectors and electricity. Such 
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NRAs present closer competences to the field and often substitute Ministries for 
technical questions. In the telecommunications sector, they have emerged in 
parallel to the liberalisation process of the sector (Badran, 2012, Simpson, 
2008). In Europe, their creation dates back to the late 1990s as is the case in 
most MENA countries. In Morocco, the NRA was created in 1998, in Jordan in 
1995 and in Egypt in 2001. One of the peculiarities of the NRAs of the MENA 
countries is the fact that they are not as independent of the Ministries and 
corporations as international regulations wish them to be. The WTO Reference 
Paper on telecommunications mentions that NRAs shall be “separate from, and 
not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services. The 
decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with 
respect to all market participants” (WTO, 1996:art.5). In addition, to be separate 
from market participants, NRAs must also be ideally separated from the 
relevant government ministry (Rodine-Hardy, 2013:13). However, in MENA 
countries the independence from Ministries and corporations is not as 
transparent and a blurred line exists, which was perceptible during the field 
research. The independence of NRAs in MENA countries is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
The emergence of soft governance and the increasing role of NRAs in the 
policy-making process are both contributing to expand a technocratic style of 
governance, increasingly separated from public debate. Harcourt mentions that 
the technocratic style of governance is remarkable in the communications field, 
where the involvement of media, national political parties or citizens is seen as 
an impediment to successful technocratic administrations. In such cases, the 
politicisation of a policy initiative is feared to lead to inefficient solutions and loss 
of support from the industry (2008:10). This is again closely applicable to this 
thesis. As the telecommunications sector is highly technological and investment 
intensive, its policy developments are more frequently than not bound to a 
technocratic, industrial and close community of experts. The involvement of 
non-technocratic experts from the media, political parties or citizens is hardly 
seen. This is relevant for MENA countries, which do not systematically include 
citizens or political parties in processes of policy-making (Schmitt, 2015:338). 
As such, the role of political parties and citizens in the telecommunications 
policy process were not included in the framework. 
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In this part of the framework, two sets of variables were selected to frame the 
work of NRAs in the sector. Firstly, the environment variables define who are 
the main agents and channels that the NRAs need to work with during the 
policy-making process. The first environment variable reviews the work of NRAs 
with international and supranational bodies, such as the ITU or WTO 
(international framework). It then discusses transnational and bilateral channels, 
such as telecommunications regulatory groups and bilateral partnerships 
(transgovernmental collaboration). Secondly, the pressure variables define what 
is the motivation and objectives behind engaging in policy making. Pressures 
are defined into three sets. Firstly, engaging in policy making results of a will to 
improve the sector (efficiency). Secondly, it may be linked to the need to satisfy 
economic interests in the field (economic interests). Lastly, it may take place as 
a result of a risk of sanctions (sanction). This thesis argues that the presence or 
absence of each one of the five variables infer which mechanisms of diffusion 
may have been at play in the process of diffusion.  
This last section of the framework is divided into three parts. Firstly, a close look 
into the conceptualisation of the mechanisms of diffusion is proposed. Based on 
policy diffusion literature, the four mechanisms are discussed in detail. 
Secondly, the combination of the sector variables and mechanisms of diffusion 
is given. This is based on four framework propositions that are all presented 
and discussed in this part. Finally, an illustration of the telecommunications 
sector is given to propose a first contextualisation and facilitate the 
understanding of the framework and of the empirical part as a whole. As 
mentioned earlier, this framework is closely linked to the telecommunications 
sector but also applies to other sectors presenting similar multilevel actors in 
policy-making, with high technology, investment and dynamism requirements. 
This generalisability is further discussed in the conclusion of this thesis (Section 
7.4).  
2.4.1 Operationalising learning, imitation, competition and coercion  
The four mechanisms of diffusion that are used in this theoretical framework are 
mostly based on the typologies of Shipan and Volden (2008), Simmons et al. 
(2008a) and Rogers (2003), who classify the categories of diffusion, according 
to four distinct mechanisms: learning, imitation, economic competition and 
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coercion. These four mechanisms represent a theoretical direction for policy 
research. However, as Shipan and Volden mention, in reality strict distinction 
hardly takes place and overlap between all four mechanisms is likely to be 
observed (2008:844). This section offers a review of all four mechanisms of 
diffusion to define the ideal-types of each mechanism based on available 
literature. To allow for a comprehensive review of the four mechanisms, 
different bodies of literatures are used in addition to policy diffusion. These 
include works from a variety of sources such as policy transfer, lesson-drawing, 
constructivism and rational theories.  
To facilitate the conceptualisation and comparison of the four mechanisms of 
diffusion, Table 4 classifies each mechanism according to four criteria. 
Engagement stands for the domestic impulse to engage in policy diffusion, it 
can be voluntary or forced, in the case of coercion. Attention refers to the push 
factor behind the engagement of the policy maker. These are performance for 
learning, following a perceived leader in the case of imitation, satisfying 
corporate interests in the case of competition and finally, the risk of sanction for 
coercion mechanisms. Action refers to the work of the policy-maker towards the 
external model. This is of course a simplification, as in reality, it seems logical 
that several actions overlap. Comparison is typical of learning, copying is 
central to imitation, a fight over benefits is clear in competition and finally, 
compliance defines coercion mechanisms. Finally, Decision stands for the final 
choice related to the policy change. In the case of learning, the decision refers 
to adapting the model. In the case of imitation, the decision is made to adopt the 
model. In the case of competition, satisfying economic interests in the main 
driver and finally, in coercion mechanisms, the model is imposed.  
Table 4 Conceptualisation of the four mechanisms of diffusion 
 Learning Imitation Competition Coercion 
Engagement Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Forced 
Attention Performance Perceived leader Economic profit Sanction 
Action Comparison Copy Fight over benefits Compliance 
Decision Adapt model Adopt model 
Satisfy economic 
interests 
Model imposed 
Source: Author. 
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Learning 
Learning is the first mechanism of this study. It supposes that decision-makers 
in one country observe policy adoption, implementation and impact in another 
country and decide whether to apply it domestically or not (Shipan and Volden, 
2008:841). Learning is a voluntary act. The focus is on efficiency and the need 
to improve a policy. To best enhance a certain programme or policy, the policy-
makers then decide whether to look at different options and take different 
systems into account. Rose defines this act as an action-oriented conclusion 
about a programme in operation elsewhere (1991:7). The learned lesson can 
either be positive, meaning that it is something that should be used, or negative 
indicating what shall be avoided. In any case, however, a causal link between 
the policies and the outcome are observed and examined by the adopter, 
including the notion of success of the implemented policy (Meseguer, 2005:72, 
Shipan and Volden, 2008:841). The result of the learning mechanism is an 
adapted model, sometimes originating from different sources, to best suit the 
domestic context. Thus, learning includes a notion of involvement of the policy-
maker with several models, where the policy abroad is assessed in terms of its 
potential for domestic success.  
However, this ideal-type of learning assumes a context, where rational learning 
is possible. In such environments, free flow of information and the access to a 
broad range of systems and programmes, with no selection bias, is possible 
(Meseguer, 2005:72-3, Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009:530-8). However, this is not 
always the case and bounded and channelled learning represent cases where 
the adopting countries need to use shortcuts due to the impossibility to 
reviewing a wide range of information (Dobbin et al., 2007:460-1). Information is 
thus selected and weighted differently according to different subjective 
requirements. Bounded learning might thus lead to rational bias and the 
adoption of inefficient and non-functional policies (Meseguer, 2005:72-3, 
Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009:530-8). According to Simmons and Elkins, learning 
from success represents a cognitive shortcut in itself, as it shows no ability to 
reason but merely to be influenced by the best-performing actors (2004:175). In 
that sense, bounded learning or channelled learning take a closer form to 
imitation, more heavily based on the successful countries and the act of 
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adoption rather than the efficiency and lessons drawn from other countries. This 
shows the difficulty of completely disentangling one mechanism from the other.    
Imitation 
Imitation is the next mechanism under review. It is also called emulation, 
mimicking or constructivism according to different bodies of literature. Imitation 
is also the result of a voluntary act from a domestic administration. However, in 
this case, contrarily to learning mechanisms, the focus is not set on efficiency, 
but on the perceived leader in the field. The involvement of decision-makers is 
to copy a policy, by adopting it with only minimal corrections (Rogers, 2003, 
Simmons et al., 2008a). Hence, one of the main characteristics of imitation is 
that the adopting country is not interested in learning from the action, but is 
oriented towards the actor itself, perceived as the leader in the field (Shipan and 
Volden, 2008, Shipan and Volden, 2012, Dobbin et al., 2007:452). Dobbin, 
Simmons et al. define imitation as a product of social construction (2007:450). 
This is directly linked to constructivism, as mentioned earlier (Footnote 2, page 
16), where social action is defined by the perception of the actors themselves 
and must be understood as the product of a social context (Weber, 1978). 
Differences with learning are also straightforward regarding the efficiency of a 
policy. Meseguer and Gilardi argue that in imitation mechanisms programmes 
or policies are spread because they are socially valued independently from their 
functions and efficiencies (2009:530). DiMaggio and Powell also argue 
organisations might decide to model each other not because of the evidence of 
increased efficiency, but because it represents a safer option to address 
uncertainty (1983:150). Hence, imitation mechanisms are not linked to 
enhancing performance directly, but aim at addressing uncertainty by copying 
the perceived leader in the field. 
In imitation mechanisms, policies that experience increasing popularity may be 
equally increasingly adopted, as it becomes the most ‘typical’ thing to do. This is 
notably explained by the concepts of policy momentum and information 
cascades, where the growing adoption of a certain policy creates a polarisation 
process of adoption. Walker argues that in some cases, the wide adoption of a 
policy makes the adoption of this policy a state responsibility (1969:890). Elkins 
and Simmons argue that information cascades can lead to a polarisation 
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towards a policy without including a rational learning process and thus creating 
adoption inconsistencies (2005:43). This might lead the policy to be more and 
more adopted, according to the growing frequency of adoption acts, without 
being proof-checked by efficient and functional learning. The policy gains 
momentum on its own (Walker, 1969, Dobbin et al., 2007). This phenomenon 
can be enhanced in situations where there is limited information regarding the 
possible options. In such cases, no other information might be available than 
the adoption itself. It is possible that the more available the model is, the more 
likely it will become legitimate, independently from its efficiency. This confirms 
the interest, in imitation mechanisms, of extrinsic aspects of the policy, such as 
its origin and its adoption frequency, rather than its content.  
Economic Competition 
Economic competition is the third mechanism under review. It is also defined by 
a voluntary act to engaging with policy-making activities. In this case, however, 
the attention is put on the competitor and is motivated by the maximisation of 
benefits. In competition mechanisms, the role of profits and benefits is at the 
core. According to Elkins and Simmons, economic competition must be 
understood as a fight over scarce resources, also in the sense of for example 
acquiring direct loans or contracts (2005:42). In the literature, economic 
competition is both linked to the fear of economic privation and to the potential 
gains of rewards. Meseguer and Gilardi define economic competition as a 
process whereby governments compete for the same resources and tend to 
adopt the same policies and programmes adopted by other governments for 
fear of loss in case of deviation (2009:530). The potential to reaching 
competitive rewards is central to economic competition mechanisms. Brooks 
mentions that in such competition mechanisms, diffusion can also be 
understood as a signal given by the policy to secure greater access to 
international investment, aid or participation in international organisations 
(2007:704). In fact, competition mechanisms do not only include the potential 
for increased material gains, but also concerns non-material rewards, such as 
an improved regional or international status or reputation.  
Hence, in economic competition mechanisms, a variety of actors linked to 
corporations and the market become central. It can be observed that a country 
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tends to adopt specific policies in order to compete for investments or market 
benefits. Countries facilitate harmonisation and standardisation of regulation to 
facilitate market access or may implement market friendly measures to attract 
investors. But as Brooks mentions, competitive rewards may also be non-
financial and represent a signal to secure non-economic profits. The diffusion of 
policies in these cases become instrumental, as a lock-in reform strategy 
(Mattli, 1999, Büthe and Mattli, 2013). It might show a real commitment from the 
partner countries towards implementing and improving practices (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983:151). In such cases, economic competition mechanisms become 
closer to imitation mechanisms, where countries adopt certain policies because 
of their growing popularity and polarisation, in order not to miss out in case of 
deviation. This confirms once more the overlapping reach of mechanisms of 
diffusion in real case scenarios.  
Coercion 
Coercion is the last mechanism of diffusion presented in this thesis. This 
mechanism is the only one not characterised by a voluntary engagement in 
policy-making. On the contrary, it represents an imposed act of policy-change. 
In this thesis, coercion is included as a mechanism of diffusion, even if it does 
not result of a voluntary choice, as it describes a policy change following an 
alteration in incentives. This is supported by Dobbin et al., who state that as 
long as coercion involves changes in incentives, it can be considered as one of 
the diffusion mechanisms (2007:454). The focus in such cases is on coercive 
leaders, who have the capacity to impose compliance on the adopting country. 
The result is a policy-change which usually confirms the interests of the 
imposing leader. In such cases, identifying the coercive actors is necessary to 
show evidence of the promotion of policies (Dobbin et al., 2007:457). Bennett 
defines coercion through the idea of penetration, representing a way to enforce 
policy convergence portraying an absence of autonomous decision-making of 
the adopting state (1991:227). It can take place under various forms, such as 
direct coercion, representing a situation where a country imposes its policy to 
another government, for example through physical means. Indirect coercion 
represents cases where the diffusion follows externalities or functional 
dependences (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996:346, Evans, 2006:480-1). Numerous 
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academic authors have discussed coercive practices. Dobbin et al. mention the 
manipulation of economic costs and benefits (2007:454). Shipan and Volden 
discuss pressure instruments through trade practices or the promise of financial 
aid or grants incentives (2012:791). Finally, Simmons et al. underline the 
monopolisation of information or expertise and the potential of monopolistic 
decisions (2008b:10). It appears that coercion mechanisms can be very broad 
and complex to identify. The focus on the actor is key to understand the power 
relationship.  
In the case of regulatory developments, however, coercion shall not be 
understood in terms of direct and physical means exclusively. Subtler power 
relationships may be at play influencing domestic decisions coercively. In this 
mechanism, the distinctive characteristic is the risk of sanctions encountered by 
the adopting state. It must be effectively shown that a country is at risk in case 
of deviation. In academic literature, the notion of conditionality is revealing. 
According to Dobbin et al. conditionality occurs when powerful actors set 
requirements in order to provide aid, loans or any other sort of support 
(2007:457). Membership accession to regional schemes can also become a 
form of conditionality. This is for example the case when considering the EU 
and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE). For instance, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier describe the EU politics in relation to CEE 
countries as a bargaining strategy of policy enforcement by reward, through the 
use of EU membership prospects (2004:663). In that kind of relationship, 
coercive actors can be identified as they promote certain types of policies. Even 
if the MENA context is different from the CEE countries, due to the impossible 
accession to the EU, the concept of conditionality is useful. The reward for 
compliance with EU rules is not EU membership but a series of instruments 
ranging from cultural cooperation to trade negotiations. In such cases, 
asymmetrical relationships between both areas may have an impact on policy-
making and must be kept in mind for the empirical analysis.  
2.4.2 Combining sector properties with mechanisms  
The four mechanisms of diffusion have now been described and discussed 
according to the available literature on the subject. The next step is to link the 
four mechanisms to sector variables. In this thesis, the work of NRAs is central 
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and sector variables describe the environment and pressures that NRAs face 
when engaging in policy making in the telecommunications sector. Firstly, the 
environment variables refer to the main types of channels that regulate the 
telecommunications environment. Differentiating the environment in which 
NRAs conduct policy making is central when disentangling the different 
mechanisms of policy diffusion. However, it must be clarified that in reality, 
multi-level interactions across a variety of stakeholders take place 
simultaneously. The complexity and variety of agents in the telecommunications 
sector have been extensively discussed by authors of telecommunications and 
media studies. Raboy and Padovani argue that “[w]hat used to be multilateral 
arrangements amongst state actors has now turned into a highly complex 
landscape, where states and intergovernmental institutions share the stage with 
private corporations, standard setting entities, civil society organizations, 
epistemic, and technical communities” (2010:161). However, to simplify the 
framework, the environment in which NRAs conduct policy-making activities has 
been divided into two main categories. The first environment variable is related 
to the work of NRAs with international bodies, such as the WTO, the ITU or the 
World Bank. The second environment variable describes the work of NRAs with 
other NRAs. This includes regulatory groups, such as the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), the EMERG or the 
Independent Regulators Group (IRG). It also includes bilateral cooperation 
between NRAs, such as memorandum of associations (MoA). The last part of 
this section details the different actors of the telecommunications environment 
for a better empirical understanding of the context (Section 2.4.3).  
Secondly, pressure variables refer to the main types of motivations faced by 
NRAs in engaging with policy-making in the sector. The three pressure 
variables identified in this framework are based on the theoretical definition of 
the four mechanisms of diffusion. They have a specific resonance in the case of 
the telecommunications sector. In particular, the need to enhance performance 
is usual in technology-loaded fields, where the dynamism and sophistication of 
the sector pushes actors to improve regulation frequently. Secondly, the need to 
satisfy economic interests in the field is essential. Lastly, supranational 
institutions may enforce sanctions to ensure states are complying with 
international regulations. Both sets of variables are equally important to 
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disentangle the mechanisms of diffusion. The environment reveals the main 
channels of policy-making and suggests different mechanisms of diffusion 
linked to the different channels. The pressures faced by NRAs are key to 
finalising the differentiation across mechanisms. In this thesis, four propositions 
combine the sector variables and the mechanisms of diffusion. These 
propositions are based on policy diffusion literature. They create a framework 
on which the hypotheses have been developed (Section 1.4). Table 1 shows 
these combinations (firstly shown in Section 1.4, page 24).  
Table 1 Sector variables defining mechanisms of diffusion 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures 
International 
regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Efficiency 
 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanction 
capacity 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - 
Competition (H₅) + - + + - 
Coercion (H₆) + - - + + 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The first proposition (Framework Proposition 1) defines that the capacity to 
institutionalise economic interests resides in the international bodies regulating 
the sector. Competition and coercion mechanisms are linked with economic 
interests and power relationships. In that case, international regulatory channels 
and economic interests are linked with both mechanisms. The second 
proposition (Framework Proposition 2) defines that two of the four mechanisms, 
learning and competition, focus on the improvement of the policies as a priority, 
whereas the two other mechanisms are not. Imitation mechanisms focus on the 
leadership and not efficiency. This mechanism aims at copying the actor and 
not the action. Coercion is not focused on efficiency neither, as the policy 
change is imposed by an external actor. The third proposition (Framework 
Proposition 3) defines that sanction capacity distinguishes the competition and 
coercion mechanisms. Coercion occurs in situations where an international 
body has the capacity to impose sanctions. The fourth proposition (Framework 
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Proposition 4) defines that transgovernmental collaboration is central to learning 
and imitation, where the exchange of information is freer from institutionalised 
economic interests and risk of sanction. Together the four framework 
propositions combine the five sector variables to the four mechanisms of 
diffusion. Each one of the framework propositions is explained and discussed 
as follows. The empirical discussion of all four framework propositions is given 
in the last empirical chapter of this thesis (Section 6.2). 
Framework Proposition 1: Economic interest and international structures 
Economic interests are defined in terms of potential profits in a specific sector. It 
often leads to conflicting objectives between different actors to maximise their 
earnings. This thesis argues that sectors presenting large economic interests 
are likely to be regulated by international bodies. This is due to the potential 
conflicting nature of profit-oriented sectors. The institutionalisation of economic 
interests has been embodied from the 1970s in the creation of a global order 
based on trade, liberalisation and privatisation. This was illustrated by the 
emergence of international financial and trade institutions such as the WTO and 
World Bank and the necessary economic restructuration that developing 
countries needed to embrace in exchange for short term rescue (Simpson, 
2008, Humphreys and Simpson, 2008). In this thesis, the relationship between 
economic interests and the global world order ruling the telecommunications 
sector since the 1970s and 1980s has been linked to mechanisms of 
competition and coercion. This is based on the premise that in fields where 
large economic profits and benefits are at stake, as it the case in the 
telecommunications sector, conflict may easily arise and so may asymmetrical 
power relationships. In such cases, international regulatory bodies impose rules 
to create a worldwide framework and control the developments in the sector.  
Based on the above, the framework defines that economic interests and 
international channels of regulations are linked to competition and coercion 
mechanisms. Table 5 illustrates this relationship.  
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Table 5 Framework proposition 1: Economic interest and international 
channels  
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures 
International 
regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Efficiency 
 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanction 
capacity 
Learning (H₃) - 
 
 -  
Imitation (H₄) -   -  
Competition (H₅) + 
  
+  
Coercion (H₆) +  
 
+ 
 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The role of international regulatory channels in policy-making is discussed 
extensively in academic research. It is accepted that international regulatory 
bodies have a role in policy-making (Rodine-Hardy, 2015). However, their 
impact must be nuanced. International organisations may have the power to 
persuade, coax, push, or force governments to adopt policy blueprints or ideas 
they advocate (Weyland, 2006:2). They may also be used by individual 
countries to conduct coercive practices (Shipan and Volden, 2008:843). 
However, the power of international organisations is not always constraining 
and not every international organisation possesses an enforcement capacity. 
For instance, Weyland mentions that external pressures matter but are far from 
decisive, since loan conditionality may constrain government decisions, but by 
no means determine the outputs (2006:3-4). To conclude, international 
regulatory bodies may create a channel for power relations to take place. As 
such, they are linked to economic competition and can be linked to sanction 
mechanisms, which is discussed later on. The sanction capacity of such 
organisations however is not always straightforward and needs careful analysis.  
Various categories of international bodies exist in the field of 
telecommunications. Three main international actors are part of the international 
regulatory landscape and are discussed in next section. The ITU encompasses 
state and non-state actors, the private sector and NGOs. It does not possess 
sanction power, but its regulation on radiocommunications is followed 
worldwide. The WTO is a multilateral organisation among member states. The 
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inclusion of the telecommunications sector into the GATS has dramatically 
changed the way nation states are used to regulate the sector. Finally, the 
World Bank has offered a series of best-practices intended to share knowledge 
on the sector. In this thesis, they are part of the same category as they 
represent an environment characterised by international cooperation with or 
without sanction power, even if they are in fact, not similar at all in their 
structure and scope. A presentation of the different international regulatory 
bodies active in the telecommunications sector is given in the next subsection 
(Section 2.4.3).  
The role of economic interests has also been discussed extensively in 
academic literature. It includes the role of the corporate sector, including private 
and public domestic and multinational companies and the potential for profits in 
the policy making process (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, Büthe and Mattli, 
2013). Corporate actors and interests have an impact on a national level and 
crystallise in international organisations directly, for example with their 
participation in the ITU and indirectly with the opening of markets through the 
World Bank and WTO (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, Codding, 1995). The 
influent role of economic interests in developing the telecommunications sector 
has also been debated (Krasner, 1991, Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2013). In this 
thesis, the focus on corporations in the telecommunications sector is on fixed 
and mobile phone companies. A particular interest is set on multi-national 
corporations and their linkages with standardisation across countries. 
In MENA countries, several multinational European consortiums are or have 
been present, such as the British company Vodafone, the French consortiums, 
Orange and Vivendi and the Spanish Telefonica. Several companies have 
origins in the oil-rich Gulf countries, such as the Emirati Etisalat, the Kuwaiti 
consortium Zain and Batelco, a Bahraini company. For instance, a rich 
complexity of multinational actors is based in the field and present interesting 
policy-making objectives and capacities. Several authors underline the role of 
corporations in the policy making process. This is unambiguous in the context of 
telecommunications. For instance, Humphreys and Simpson argue that 
business lobbies have an impact on policy making in the sector of 
telecommunications (2008:855). According to Bennett, multinational businesses 
have a part in diffusion, for example when they intend to secure a common 
64 
 
regulatory framework for a certain product (1991:228). Several authors also 
underline the role of corporations in telecommunications regulation and 
international standardisation (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000:342, Büthe and 
Mattli, 2013:208). In this thesis, the corporate sector and corporate interests are 
naturally linked to competition mechanisms as the aim is to engage with policies 
that will enhance profit or favour certain actors facing competition.  
Framework Proposition 2: Efficiency versus Leadership 
In this thesis the concept of efficiency is proposed in opposition to the concept 
of leadership. This is based on policy diffusion literature, distinguishing the 
focus of policy-makers on the efficiency of a certain policy or on the actor who 
has implemented it. This distinction is useful to the framework of policy 
diffusion, as it allows a distinction between learning and competition on one side 
and imitation and coercion on the other. Learning is directly linked to the idea of 
efficiency, due to the importance for the policy-maker to improve the status-quo 
(Meseguer, 2005, Shipan and Volden, 2008, Rose, 1991). Competition is also 
considered as a focus on efficiency, as the aim is to improve market conditions 
for the actors involved in the policy process (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). In 
imitation mechanisms, the focus on the actor is the best example of a 
mechanism based on leadership rather than efficiency (Shipan and Volden, 
2008, Shipan and Volden, 2012, Dobbin et al., 2007). Finally, coercion is not 
linked to performance as it reflects an act of external imposition independently 
from domestic motivations to improve the policies in a specific sector (Dobbin et 
al., 2007). Table 6 illustrates this relationship. 
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Table 6 Framework proposition 2: Efficiency versus Leadership 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures 
International 
regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Efficiency 
 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanction 
capacity 
Learning (H₃) 
  
+   
Imitation (H₄) 
 
 - 
 
 
Competition (H₅) 
  
+   
Coercion (H₆) 
 
 -  
 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The role of efficiency has been discussed extensively in academic research. It 
refers to the premise that efficiency or performance seeking is the main aim of 
engaging in policy-making. Engaging in policy diffusion activities is understood 
as an objective to bridge the performance gap. The idea of performance is 
closely related to the telecommunications sector, as it is a technology intensive 
sector. It is linked to the idea of efficiency and the need to address a regulatory 
failure. Rodine-Hardy argues that a performance shortfall may create possible 
pressures for reform (2013:67), underlining the importance of performance in 
policy-making. In this research, performance is directly linked to learning 
mechanisms as there is a coherent link between learning and the need to 
address a failure domestically. However, addressing a performance gap may 
also be the aim of the corporate sector. Corporations may want to adapt 
regulatory frameworks to develop their product or gain market access. The 
variable of efficiency in not linked to imitation, as a country is engaging in policy 
diffusion to follow a leader and not because of the efficiency of a policy itself. 
This follows the argument that in some cases, enhancement of efficiency is only 
secondary in diffusion mechanisms. On the contrary, following the perceived 
leader is interesting to legitimise policy-change (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983:147;154-5, Radaelli, 2004:728). The idea of legitimising policy-change is 
closely linked to constructivism and the idea described by Hall, that the policy 
process is a response to societal pressure (1993:275-6). The premise that 
policy-makers must build societal consensus is also supported by Evans, who 
argues that in developing and developed countries, a societal consensus must 
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be built across elites and masses on programme imperatives to ensure effective 
implementation (2006:486-8). The efficiency variable is not linked to coercion 
either. In such cases, the policy change is imposed from an external actor and 
is not originating from a decision to improve the domestic policy.  
Framework Proposition 3: Sanction capacity and coercion 
In this thesis, the role of sanctions or the risk thereof is directly linked to 
coercion mechanisms. It represents a situation where asymmetrical decision-
making or the existence of a power asymmetry between the policy making and 
the policy adopting country is framing the policy change. Bennett mentions that 
coercion is linked to the absence of autonomous decision-making by the 
adopting state (1991:227). However, it is important to understand coercion as a 
complex phenomenon and not as a mere use of power against certain 
countries. In fact, coercion and sanctions in regulatory and policy-making 
situation is far less obvious than the use of force. The role of sanctions has had 
a key role in authors discussing mechanisms of diffusion and policy making in 
general. Coercion can take many forms, notably through conditionality, the 
manipulation of costs and benefits or the manipulation of information. In such 
complexity, the risk of sanctions can be difficult to pinpoint. It is nevertheless 
directly related to the mechanisms of coercion. The main differentiation of the 
risk of sanctions resides in the potential for enactment of the sanctions by the 
policy making body. To identify the potential for enactment of a sanction, careful 
analysis of empirical cases using policy documents, legal cases and expert 
interviews is essential. Table 7 illustrates this relationship. 
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Table 7 Framework proposition 3: Sanction capacity and coercion 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures 
International 
regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Efficiency 
 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanction 
capacity 
Learning (H₃) 
  
  - 
Imitation (H₄) 
 
  
 
- 
Competition (H₅) 
   
 - 
Coercion (H₆) 
 
 
 
 + 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The potential for sanction in the telecommunications sector has not been 
extensively discussed in the literature. Several authors agree however that the 
question of sanctions in the sector is key as much as it is ambiguous. It gives an 
interesting insight into the potential for coercive mechanism to be observed. In 
the sector not many international bodies possess a sanctioning power legally. 
This is the case of the ITU. The WTO, however, possesses a dispute settlement 
mechanism (DSM), which represents a potential for sanctions. The World Bank 
does not possess a legal sanctioning power in terms of telecommunications 
regulation, but it does however possess the capacity to lay down conditions in 
exchange for aid (Rivlin, 2001:82). These three cases are very diverse in the 
way they function and ensure their policies are respected. According to Rodine-
Hardy, the role of coercive agents in the telecommunications sector has been 
overstated. She states, that theories considering international organisations (the 
WTO, the EU) and ‘big states’ (the US, France) as coercive agents overlook the 
subtler power dynamics involved in policy processes (2013:40-1). She also 
mentions the need to observe the practices of adopting countries, which may 
vary substantially in their implementation of the received wisdom (Rodine-
Hardy, 2013:40-1). Sanction capacity in the sector of telecommunications may 
be more subtle than expected. As such, an international regulatory framework 
alone does not allow the conclusion that coercion is taking place. It is essential 
to observe the decisional power inside an international organisation to gain a 
more precise idea about power alliances and the margin of actions of less 
powerful states.  
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Framework Proposition 4: Transgovernmental framework 
In this thesis, the variable of the transgovernmental framework is proposed as a 
counterweight to the variable of the international framework. It is argued that in 
transgovernmental collaboration, the motivation is not linked to the 
asymmetrical relationship of powers, as is seen in coercion and neither is it 
linked to economic interests. Conversely, the relationship between 
transgovernmental collaboration is linked to mechanisms of learning and 
imitation, where the engagement in this channel comes out of a desire to 
change a policy with no economic or sanctions pressure. Table 8 illustrates this 
relationship. 
Table 8 Framework proposition 4: Transgovernmental framework 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures 
International 
regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Efficiency 
 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanction 
capacity 
Learning (H₃) 
 
+    
Imitation (H₄) 
 
+  
 
 
Competition (H₅) 
 
- 
 
  
Coercion (H₆) 
 
- 
 
 
 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The role of transgovernmental collaboration in policy-making has been 
discussed extensively in academic literature on transgovernmental 
communities. The denomination of the concept itself is of extreme diversity and 
different definitions coexist and overlap, such as epistemic communities, 
professional networks or elite networking. Policy communities are said to have a 
key role in policy making from raising the awareness on a special issue to 
formulate and articulate adequate policies (Savage, 1985:8, Mintrom, 1997:738, 
Dobbin et al., 2007:456). Bennett argues that transnational groups of actors 
share motivation, expertise and information about common problems, which 
leads to convergence (1991:224). More precisely, in the technological fields 
such as telecommunications, the concept of technocratic experts is interesting. 
Evans and Davies introduce the notion of policy transfer networks, which are 
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mainly ad hoc and only exist with the intention of engineering policy change 
(1999:374-7). In this case, the focus on knowledge being deployed by a limited 
set of experts is key (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2012:5-6, Rose, 1991:15-6). The 
discussion is narrow and pretends to reach an appropriate technical policy 
solution. The concept of transnational policy networks, encompassing the focus 
of specific knowledge networks run by a restricted set of experts is appropriate 
to this thesis and is linked in a priority order to learning mechanisms, but also 
imitation mechanisms, due to the better visibility of leaders in such 
communities.   
In the telecommunications sector, regulatory groups are delimited by regions 
such as BEREC or EMERG or by languages, such the French-speaking 
Telecommunications Regulation Network (FRATEL). This variable also 
encompasses bilateral agreements among two or more countries, such as MoA. 
These are revealing to see who are the main partners of the Jordanian, 
Moroccan and Egyptian NRAs. An interest is put on the role of the EU member 
states and other major states, such as the US in the policy-making process. 
However, as Rodine-Hardy  mentions the role of the EU and “big states” such 
as the US and France shall not overshadow subtler power dynamics involved in 
policy processes (2013:40-1). Transgovernmental regulatory forums are thus 
key locations to observe the dynamics of policy-making. EMERG is a case in 
point, as all three NRAs of the case studies are part of it, as are most of the EU 
member state countries. A presentation of the different transgovernmental 
channels active in the telecommunications sector is given in the following 
subsection.  
2.4.3 Illustrating the telecommunications environment 
Several comments have already been given to contextualise the main actors of 
the telecommunications sector. A short historical and factual account of the 
main international and regional frameworks, as well as the main Euro-
Mediterranean regulatory groups in the field, is nonetheless useful to ground the 
conceptual framework and empirical chapters. This is notably the case, as the 
telecommunications sector has experienced dramatic changes in the last few 
decades. Understanding these changes and the impact on the sector nowadays 
is essential to grasp the characteristics of the sector since the millennium. The 
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main actor to have come across radical regulatory, economic and governance 
pressures is the state. The telecommunications system evolved from state-
owned monopolies to liberal market economies. The sector increasingly 
became viewed as a free-trade issue, ruled under competition law.  
The role of international bodies in the telecommunications sector also 
developed intensely. This is notably the case of the World Bank, the IMF and 
the WTO. They have had a key role in the evolution of the telecommunications 
sectors across the world, but they also experienced their own development. For 
instance, the ITU evolved dramatically since its first inception. Drake and Noam 
argue that the ITU’s role changed from the 1980s, in particular due to the 
emergence of the WTO, as a new actor in the telecommunications sector 
(2000:48). The consolidation of the GATS regime under the 1995 WTO 
agreement represented a turning point in the multilateral governance of 
telecommunications. The ITU had longed encouraged cooperation between 
international regimes to fade out international competition, but it was soon 
overthrown by the competitive framework of the GATS. The ITU however, still 
maintains a central role in terms of technical standardisation, frequency 
management and assistance to developing countries. The World Bank also 
embarked on a liberalised promotion of the telecommunications sector and the 
World Bank handbook on telecommunications published in 2000 confirmed the 
interest in broadening best-practices in the field based on competition (World 
Bank, 2000). The World Bank, IMF and WTO are the three main international 
regulatory bodies assessed in this thesis. 
Finally, transgovernmental collaboration has developed drastically to become 
nowadays one of the main channels for regulatory cooperation in the field, 
proposing an alternative to international regulatory bodies. This section aims at 
presenting the different bodies that form part of the Euro-Mediterranean 
telecommunications sector nowadays. Table 9 gives a selection of the main 
regulatory actors and instruments present in the Euro-Mediterranean 
telecommunications landscape. 
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Table 9 Policy-making channels & instruments 
International frameworks Transgovernmental frameworks 
ITU - Radio-Regulations, WRC 
World Bank -  Handbook 
WTO - Reference Paper, DSM 
EU-MED – EMERG, Telecom Twinnings 
EU – BEREC, IRG* 
Various bilateral agreements (MoA etc) 
Notes: *BEREC and IRG are not discussed separately. They are integrated in discussions 
surrounding EMERG.  
Source: Author. 
 
This section firstly examines three international regulatory frameworks, the ITU, 
World Bank and WTO. It then focuses on channels of transgovernmental 
collaboration. Based on the regional focus of the Euro-Mediterranean 
telecommunications space, two forums are explored, the EMERG and the 
twinning projects in the telecommunications sector. MoA between NRAs are 
also included in this category. It is moreover essential to mention the work of 
two bodies central to EU telecommunications regulations, BEREC and IRG. 
Both are discussed in relation to the EMERG. 
International regulatory frameworks  
The ITU is the main regulatory body in the field of telecommunications. It is one 
of the first international regulatory bodies and was created 150 years ago. This 
associative forum consists of more than 190 members and more than 700 
sector members and associates (ITU, 2015a). It is now part of the United 
Nations and is headquartered in Geneva, using a one-nation, one-vote system. 
The ITU is the descendant of the International Telegraph Union, which was 
established in 1865. Originally, it was perceived as a forum to coordinate the 
technical operations of the telegraph and soon included telephone and 
radiocommunications systems as well (Renaud, 1990:37). It merged in 1932 
with the International Radiotelegraph Union to become the ITU. The ITU was 
completely restructured in 1992, with three sectors dealing with spectrum 
management, standardisation and development. 
It is in the context of a telecommunications sector run by state-owned 
monopolies that the ITU was created. According to Renaud, from the beginning, 
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nearly all national governments asserted almost total control over 
communications, which explains why public international organisations such as 
the ITU were created (1990:40). In fact, several authors argue that the ITU used 
to be a comfortable clubhouse between state-owned monopolies. However, it 
evolved to become a platform of best-practice sharing, dialogue enhancement 
and representative of a growing diversity of stakeholders (Rodine-Hardy, 
2013:34, Drake and Noam, 2000:48). The ITU’s direct relevance to this thesis 
relates to its regulatory framework on spectrum. It proposes a wide array of 
policy tools to implement certain best practices and ensures a practical use of 
spectrum around the world. It notably hosts influential international conferences 
including the World Radio Conference (WRC) and the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS). One of the most recent and important decisions of 
the ITU was made during the 2012 WRC regarding the additional allocation of 
spectrum for mobile services (discussed in Sections 4.2.2 and 6.2). 
The WTO framework for the telecommunications sector only appeared later. 
The GATS, which was created by the Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1995, is a 
key milestone in the field (Blouin, 2000, Koenig et al., 2009:11). The GATS 
proposed a series of principles which were applicable to the 
telecommunications sector as well. Such principles include the most favourable 
nation treatment (MFN) principle, meaning that WTO members shall not 
discriminate among each other, except if an exemption has been agreed. Other 
principles comprise transparency, disclosure of confidential information and 
increasing participation of developing countries (WTO, 1995b:art.II-XV). 
Following the Uruguay round negotiations, a group of 22 WTO member 
governments, the Negotiating group on basic Telecommunications (NGBT) 
intended to extend liberalisation to the sector to include current reforms in 
regulatory regimes and advances in technology. As the talks were never 
completed successfully, the group was joined by 24 other WTO members 
created in 1997, the Group on Basic Telecommunications (GBT) (WTO, 2014). 
The GBT created the fourth protocol including the schedules and MFN 
exemptions lists in 1998. The GBT deal is not embodied in a separate regime or 
treaty. It is embodied in the GATS, as a part of the existing regulatory 
framework.  
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In parallel to the GBT deal, several members expressed interest in elaborating 
on a set of principles to cover matters such as competition safeguards, 
interconnection guarantees and the independence of regulators. This was 
negotiated in a text called the 1996 Reference paper (WTO, 1996). It sets the 
regulatory principles for the establishment of fair market conditions. As most 
WTO members accepted the commitment, this reference paper became part of 
the international treaty and became binding to WTO members. According to the 
World Bank handbook on telecommunications the Reference paper was 
negotiated jointly by trade and telecommunications officials and largely reflected 
best practice in pro-reform telecommunications regulation (World Bank, 
2011:21). It includes six principles regarding competitive safeguard, 
interconnection, universal service, public availability of licensing criteria, 
independent regulators and allocation and use of scarce resources (WTO, 
1996). The WTO is interesting in this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it changed 
the telecommunications sector as it applied its liberalisation principles to a 
regime previously marked by the government monopolies. The inclusion of the 
telecommunications sector within the WTO illustrates this change of regime. 
Furthermore, the WTO has a particular importance due to its DSM, which is 
unique in the sector. No other international regulatory framework possesses 
such enforcement capacity. The scope and importance of the DSM is discussed 
in detail in the last empirical chapter of this thesis (Section 6.2, Framework 
Proposition 3). 
Finally, the World Bank is also one of the international bodies framing regulation 
in the telecommunications sector. However, the World Bank is mostly, if not 
only, a framework for best practice sharing in terms of specific policies. The 
World Bank had a key impact on economic reforms from the 1970s in 
developing countries, where financial aid was proposed in exchange for drastic 
reforms including the opening of markets, privatisation and liberalisation. In this 
case, policy reforms corresponded to coercion mechanisms (Section 5.2). 
Nowadays however, the World Bank does not have a similarly coercive role as 
it used to have in the 1970s. As Rodine-Hardy mentions, in the field of 
telecommunications, the World Bank has become a key forum for best practice 
sharing (2013). It publishes renowned documents sharing best practices and 
reviewing most recent trends in the sector (World Bank, 2011 , World Bank, 
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2014a). Its 2000 handbook and the re-edition of 2011 is in line with the World 
Bank’s goals to promote economic development (World Bank, 2011, World 
Bank, 2000)7. However, the handbook does not foresee sanctions to ensure the 
implementation of its suggestions. These are guidelines to develop the sector. 
Transgovernmental frameworks 
Transgovernmental collaboration takes place across a wide number of 
channels. In many cases, countries sign MoA between two NRAs. Such 
memorandum are taken into account in this thesis, however a particular focus is 
set on transgovernmental channels, such as regulatory forums, due to their 
possibility of acting as a forum for shared-practices among a small group of 
NRAs. Numerous transgovernmental networks surrounding the 
telecommunications sector exist, most of them are networks built on regional 
alliances, such as the Arab Regulators Network (AREGNET). There are also 
several based on a shared language, such as the French-speaking regulatory 
forum FRATEL. In this thesis however, the focus is on two forums 
encompassing both European and MENA NRAs. This is the case of EMERG 
and the Euro-Mediterranean telecommunications twinning projects. These 
projects are not formally a transgovernmental forum but represent an alliance of 
several NRAs following a mutually agreed work plan in the field. They provide 
an interesting institutional setting for policy-making. Both EMERG and Euro-
Med twinning projects have had overlapping fields of policy-making, however 
the approaches are radically different. For instance, the analysis of both 
institutional approaches is interesting when discussing cross-national regulatory 
exchanges. 
                                            
 
7
 The World Bank handbook addresses issues, such as the technological context surrounding 
telecommunications, the role of regulatory organisations and international frameworks. It also 
addresses the need to regulate to achieve effective competition. Furthermore, several chapters 
address the question of licensing, spectrum management, interconnection and universal access 
(WORLD BANK. 2011. Telecommunications regulation handbook; 10th Anniversary Edition 
[Online]. Available: http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/reg/D-REG-TRH.01-2011-PDF-E.pdf 
[Accessed August 8 2015], WORLD BANK. 2000. Telecommunications regulation handbook 
[Online]. Available: http://www.infodev.org/infodev-files/resource/InfodevDocuments_22.pdf 
[Accessed August 8 2015]..) 
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In this thesis the focus is put on the Euro-Mediterranean relationship in the 
telecommunications sector. This decision has been motivated earlier and can 
notably be explained by the increasing role of the EU institutions and 
specifically the EC as a key regulatory power in the field surpassing the EU 
borders (Michalis, 2007:143). Since the mid-1980s, the EU telecommunications 
sector has undergone dramatic changes and gone through effective 
liberalisation, with competition law becoming the main source of regulation for 
the sector (Simpson, 2008:106-7). Furthermore, telecommunications regulatory 
reform and harmonisation between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean 
partners have taken place under various initiatives since the 1990s. In 1996 a 
Conference on Euro-Med cooperation for the information society was organised 
to discuss regional approaches to the information ICT, focusing on services and 
infrastructures (Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers, 1996:1). This 
materialised in the NATP programmes. 
The NATP programmes were founded by the European Commission in 2001. 
The first one, NATP-I, focused on broader policy goals and the benefits of 
liberalisation of the telecommunications industry. NATP-II followed in 2005 and 
focused on the practical implementation of regulatory reform. It combined 
regional components with direct and practical bilateral technical assistance to 
NRAs. NATP-III lasted from 2009 to 2013, but the project changed in scope and 
focus, due to the cutting of funding of the NATP programmes at the time. The 
NATP-III was aimed essentially to support the creation of the EMERG in 2008 
and opened EMERG’s membership to all NRAs enlisted in the 2008 Malta 
Declaration, member of BEREC or of the Southern European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) countries (EMERG, 2012a:art.2)8. It now comprises of around 20 
NRAs of both the EU and the Southern Mediterranean areas.  
                                            
 
8
 Countries of the Southern Mediterranean shore are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Turkey was initially a beneficiary of 
NATP-II programme, but as a candidate country to EU accession, it is no longer part of the 
beneficiaries of NATP-III. Countries of the European area are Austria, Cyprus, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. Algeria and Malta have not 
participated to EMERG since 2008 and 2009 respectively (EMERG. 2012b. Towards Sound and 
Efficient Regulatory Frameworks for a Healthy Electronic Communications Sector in the Euro-
Mediterranean Region [Online]. Available: 
http://www.emergonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=39 
[Accessed Nov 11 2015]. & EMERG. 2008. Statement on the Founding of a Network of Euro-
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Until 2014, the NATP-III worked as a logistic body for EMERG until it became 
autonomous with an established secretariat and structure hosted by the 
Portuguese NRA ANACOM. The EU diminished its funding since the end of 
NATP-III but remains, however, close to the development of EMERG. A parallel 
can be made between the EMERG and BEREC, which was created in 2006. 
BEREC replaced the European Regulators Group (ERG) as a pan-European 
platform for NRAs to ensure a consistent application of the EU regulatory 
framework9. One of its main novelties is the presence of the EC as a member, 
which has been accepted with criticism by EU member states, as the heavy 
hand of the EC into the telecommunications sector (Michalis, 2007:214). The 
parallels between BEREC and EMERG take place on a variety of levels, 
including aims and agenda. Enhanced cooperation has been institutionalised 
between both groupings. In 2014 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between EMERG and BEREC foreseeing the planning of an annual joint 
meeting. Furthermore, one of the aims of the 2015 EMERG Work Plan was 
indeed, to reinforce cooperation with BEREC and hold joint-workshops. In 
EMERG, however, the EC is not a member, even if members of DG Connect 
are regularly invited as observers. In fact, the cooperation with the EC is one of 
the strategic aims of the 2015 EMERG work-plan as well, notably with the 
objective to launch further EC funding of EMERG programs (EMERG, 2015). It 
can be observed that regarding EMERG, the EC and BEREC are closely 
followed.  
The telecommunications twinnings between EU and Mediterranean NRAs are 
the second type of transgovernmental channels observed in this thesis. They 
aim to enhance the organisation and competences of NRAs of several countries 
of the Southern Mediterranean shore. They are instruments of institution 
                                                                                                                                
 
Mediterranean Regulators [Online]. Malta. Available: 
http://www.emergonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=39 
[Accessed Nov 11 2015].) 
9
 BEREC is composed by one member per NRA and the EC representatives. Non-voting 
observers include the EC, EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) 
and EU candidate accession countries. It is supposed to enable cooperation and sharing of best 
practices among NRAs. It can also advise the European Parliament, the EC and the Council 
and provide non-binding opinions on EC’s working documents (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT & 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2009c. Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council ofof 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office. Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009.)  
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building built around EU policy objectives10. Lavenex states that twinning 
projects are transgovernmental channels of promoting approximation to the EU 
acquis communautaire where member states officially visit public 
administrations of ENP countries in order to promote administrative and 
legislative reforms in line with the EU (2011:385). They were introduced in 1998 
in the EU enlargement context to support the implementation of the EU 
regulation in CEE states. They were progressively extended to ENP countries 
from 2004 onwards to implement the association, partnership and cooperation 
agreements (European Commission, 2012b). Twinning projects usually consists 
of two or three European countries sending experts jointly to a third ENP 
country in order to achieve practical results.  
This form of collaboration is innovative as the beneficiary country retains the 
ownership of the project until its final completion. Furthermore, the beneficiary 
country commits to achieve results. This is different than in EMERG, where no 
practical and observable result is expected, at least in the short term. A 
similarity with EMERG exists regarding the role of the EC. In twinning 
partnerships, the EC is not included neither among the participating NRAs. In 
both twinnings projects and EMERG, however, the EC funds the full (twinning) 
or partial (EMERG) expenses. In the case of twinning projects as well as in 
EMERG, the EC is in fact closer to the grouping as it may appear, as in both 
cases, EU NRAs convey regulations that take their origins from EU regulation.  
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 Twinnings partnerships aim at fulfilling an objective related to one or more priority areas set 
out in the Actions Plans. In the context of telecommunications policy, the Jordanian NRA 
twinning projects aimed at supporting the EU-Jordan Action Plan, in particular in implementing 
legislative reforms and regulatory alignment of policies. For example, Action 29 of the Jordanian 
Association Agreement states that regional cooperation shall be supported in various regional 
projects, such as environment, energy, telecommunications and transport. Action 56 states that 
Jordan should enhance the development and use of Information Society applications, take 
steps to liberalise the market for fixed voice telephony, work towards harmonising licensing 
access, interconnection or universal service and implement plans on e-Government, e-
Commerce and e-Finance. In this context, the NRA twinning project planned a variety of areas 
of work including, the planning of the digital switchover (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2012a. 
Final Report, Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. In: BOUSCHARAIN, G. & MOREAU, J.-B. (eds.) Project No. 
2010/249504. HTSPE Limited. & EUROPEAN UNION & HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. 
2005. EU-Jordan Action Plan [Online]. Available: http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/eu-
jordan-enp-action-plan [Accessed Dec 12 2015].) 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to detail the theoretical framework of this thesis to 
support the systematic analysis of the main research question and two 
subquestions. The theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis is 
grounded mostly on policy diffusion literature, but other literatures were also 
used, such as lesson-drawing and constructivism. The characteristics of the 
telecommunications sector is also central to the framework and the chapter 
reiterates several key features of the field, which need to be taken into account, 
notably for generalisability. Further discussion regarding the limits and the 
generalisability of the framework can be found in the final chapter (Section 7.3 
and 7.4). The first section of the chapter gives methodological and theoretical 
tools to observe policy adoption. This is linked to the use of the product and 
process of policy adoption. This means that there must be a clear and 
observable similarity between two policies (the product). In addition, the process 
of adoption must show an interaction between the policy making country and 
the policy adopting country (the process). Only then, can it be concluded that 
policy diffusion has taken place. Based on the results of the first part of the 
theoretical and conceptual framework, the two additional foci of the thesis, 
discussing state and sector specific variables, can be analysed. 
The next section introduces the second step of the framework. In this part, four 
state variables are identified to answer the first subquestion: under which 
conditions do countries adopt a policy that originated externally. The focus on 
the conditions leading to policy diffusion is discussed from the adopting side of 
diffusion. As such, the operationalisation of the state characteristics is linked to 
the vulnerability and interconnectedness of the adopting states with the giving 
state. This focus, while key to policy diffusion, only operationalise half of the 
process, as the policy giving countries are not systematically conceptualised in 
this thesis. The interest to confront both sides and understand mechanisms of 
diffusion from the perspective of the policy giver country could be the focus of 
further research.  
The third and last section of the chapter finalises the third step of the 
framework. This part focuses on sector variables and their use to disentangle 
mechanisms of diffusion. The operationalisation of the sector variables is 
closely linked to the telecommunications sector and epitomises its 
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characteristics of being a technology and investment intensive field, where the 
sophistication of policy-maker actors is required. This field is characterised by 
the presence of NRAs underlining the emergence of soft governance to conduct 
policy making in technical fields. This last section firstly describes the four 
mechanisms of diffusion and conceptualises each of them. It then discusses the 
four framework propositions on which the mechanisms of diffusion framework is 
built. The propositions link five selected sector variables to the four mechanisms 
of diffusion. Each of these variables is detailed in this section and discussed in 
relation to policy diffusion literature. Finally, the chapter gives an overview of the 
main actors of the telecommunications sector. This contextualisation is based 
on recent changes in regulation and roles of international and regional bodies in 
the field to support the empirical analysis of Chapters 3 to 6.  
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3 CHAPTER 3 – Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the methods used to conduct the empirical research based 
on the three-step framework addressed in the previous chapter (Chapter 2). It 
also discusses the measurements of the above-mentioned state and sector 
variables. The main source of data in this thesis originates from expert 
interviews conducted mainly from September 2013 to April 2014 during two 
different field trips. The first one took place in Europe, from Brussels mostly and 
the second one took place in each one of the three selected country cases, 
Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. Experts from the telecommunications sector and 
experts involved in Euro-Mediterranean relationships were consulted as a 
priority. In total, 52 experts have provided the information on which this thesis is 
built. As such, the three-step framework of this thesis, focusing on the 
observation of policy diffusion, the conditions behind the adoption of policies 
and the disentanglement of the four mechanisms of diffusion, use the data 
gathered during field research. Each part, however, uses the information in a 
different way, which is explained in detail in this chapter.  
The methods in policy diffusion research are important, as several authors 
mention the difficulties of conducting empirical policy diffusion research. 
Meseguer and Gilardi argue that testing diffusion mechanisms is challenging 
due to bias and limitations. For instance, homogenising assumptions do not 
reflect the complex nature of causal processes, as any mechanisms are both 
equally relevant and irrelevant across a variety of cases (2009:531-3). This is 
one of the reasons why qualitative methods are used to analyse policy diffusion 
in this thesis, as quantitative methods might hinder the heterogeneity of the 
phenomenon. Sugiyama illustrates this point arguing that large-n event history 
models can account for the likelihood of policy adoption, however statistical 
modelling might obscure the heterogeneity of diffusion decisions (2012:32). For 
instance, the methods and sources, which are outlined in this chapter, are 
based on a combination of qualitative techniques, using comparative case 
studies and expert interviews mostly, to account for the heterogeneity of real 
case scenarios. 
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This chapter is divided into two sections. The first one presents in detail the 
selection of methods and sources. It articulates the use of case studies, 
followed by a detailed account of expert interviews, reviewing the selection and 
types of experts and the structure of the interviews. It is followed by 
considerations regarding research ethics, data storage and the use of 
qualitative software. Finally, a selection of secondary and primary sources, 
including laws and regulations, statistical databases and academic research on 
telecommunications and Euro-Mediterranean relations is given. The second 
section focuses on the measurement of the dependent and independent 
variables. The dependent variable, in this thesis, is defined as the act of 
adoption. It takes four different shapes, according to which mechanism—
learning, imitation, competition, coercion—has taken place. The independent 
variables are linked to four state and five sector variables as mentioned earlier. 
They are measured using different sources and methods. Two state variables, 
government openness and market openness are measures through the use of 
indexes created by the World Bank and the Bertelsmann Foundation. The two 
remaining state variables, political and market interconnectedness are 
measured using statistical data from the World Band and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The sector variables are 
measured using a qualitative approach to analyse the interview data. 
3.2 Selection of methods and sources 
3.2.1 Case studies & Expert interviews 
In this thesis, cross-case comparative analysis is used to test qualitatively a 
selection of variables across Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, in two sectors, USO 
and spectrum management. According to Starke, cross-case analysis means 
the systematic investigation of qualitative similarities and differences of values 
on theoretically relevant variables across several cases (2013:567). He argues 
that drawing inferences from controlled contrasts between a small number of 
carefully chosen cases provides a useful tool for the analysis of policy diffusion 
(2013:569). Appreciating qualitative similarities and differences across the six 
cases selected in this research is at the core of this thesis. Policy diffusion is 
analysed using qualitative methods uniquely. This is based on the assumption 
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that qualitative methods may bridge the gap of quantitative methods, which 
cannot account for unquantifiable information and the heterogeneity of cases. 
This is supported by Weyland, who underlines the importance of qualitative 
methods, such as intensive field research. He argues that the burgeoning 
statistical analyses have undoubtedly made important contributions, but often 
suffer from indicators of questionable validity (2006:14). For instance, the focus 
on six case studies composed of three countries, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt 
and two policy sectors, USO and spectrum management represents an 
interesting and complex environment, where the use of qualitative methods is 
appropriate.  
In this thesis, expert interviews provide the main source of original data to 
compare the selected cases. The use of expert interviews is appropriate for 
qualitative methods. Sugiyama underlines the role of broad qualitative sources, 
such as  governmental bulletins, international organisation publications and 
archival records, in addition to semi-structured interviews with key actors at 
municipal, state and national-levels, to account for the heterogeneity of cases 
(2012:33). The selection of experts has been broad and extensive and focused 
on a variety of key actors, embracing different roles in the field, such as 
employees of regulatory agencies, technical organisations, business operators 
and ministries. The relevant experts were selected after reading reports linked 
to the telecommunications sector in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Reports from 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), WTO or ITU 
were useful in gathering key names in the field. In addition, the minutes and 
reports of EMERG, as well as twinning fiches between EU countries and both 
Jordan and Egypt were interesting sources of information, providing the contact 
details of the main project leaders. These relatively recent documents, dating 
back at the latest to 2005, often provided a valid email address. Furthermore, 
the mentioned experts in the reports were often still working in the same offices, 
which facilitated the contact with them. In addition, discussions with my 
supervisor at the University of Exeter, Professor Alison Harcourt and with my 
supervisor during the exchange programme at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels 
(VUB), Dr Jan Loisen, complemented this list with contacts at the European 
level.  
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To identify more experts in the field, the snowball method was used. The 
snowball method supports the identification of additional experts to be met, by 
referral of the already interviewed people (Berg, 2009:51). This method has 
proven very useful for two main reasons. Firstly, the method was useful to 
understand who were the key experts in the field and to create a relevant 
network. Secondly, the snowball method was helpful to secure interviews with 
further experts, as often, and in particular in the MENA region, the interviewed 
experts contacted their colleagues directly at the end of our meeting in order for 
me to meet them as soon as possible. This introduction method created an 
invaluable technique to gain time to understand who were the main experts in 
the sector and convince them to participate to the interviews.  
In practice, the field research was divided into two phases. The first one took 
place mostly in Brussels and focused on European experts. The second one 
took place in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt and mostly focused on local NRAs. In 
addition to being geographically divided into two distinct phases, the field 
research also aimed to look at different objectives. The first field research in 
Europe mostly aimed at general questions and focused on understanding the 
Euro-Mediterranean relationship from a broad angle. The second field research 
mostly focused on technical questions and studied the policies in detail. Both 
phases are addressed in more details below. Most experts were contacted only 
once, however, as the research developed and the field research got more 
precise, few additional questions arose, which required a second contact. In 
such cases, written contacts via email have been the preferred methods for 
clarification on certain subjects. This has been the case, with most European 
and MENA NRAs. In total, 22 expert interviews were conducted in Europe. In 
addition, 30 experts were interviewed in the three country cases of this thesis: 
12 experts were met in Morocco, 12 in Jordan and 6 in Egypt. At the end of both 
field research trips, 52 experts were interviewed, spanning a timeframe from 
September 15 2013 to April 2014. An additional four interviews were conducted 
in Europe in June and July 2014. These interviews form the database of this 
thesis.  
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European field research (September to December 2013 and June-July 2014) 
The first phase of field research occurred mostly from the location of Brussels, 
Belgium. Taking the advantage of a university exchange with the VUB during 
the second year of the PhD, a first group of experts were selected for their role 
in Euro-Mediterranean affairs and when possible in the field of 
telecommunications. This first phase of field research lasted from September 15 
to December 31 2013. Four additional interviews were held between June 18 
and July 10 2014, following new snowball suggestions from experts. Most 
interviews were conducted in Brussels, but some interviews took place in 
Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, several experts were interviewed through 
online calling technologies, such as skype, which was the case with experts 
from Portugal, Denmark, The Netherlands and Italy. In this first phase of experts 
interviews, the main objectives have been to discuss the Euro-Mediterranean 
relationship and when possible the Euro-Mediterranean relationship in the field 
of telecommunications from a general and historical point of view. This 
contributed to framing the research and understanding which policy items were 
essential in the field and which were of lesser interest. 
The experts from this first phase of field research were categorised into four 
groups: EU experts, NRA experts, private consultants and international bodies. 
The first group of experts came from the EU institutions. These experts were 
chosen for their knowledge and participation in the Euro-Mediterranean policy 
process generally. A selection of experts came from DG Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection (DG ECHO), DG Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO), 
DG Trade and DG Research. In addition, experts from DG Connect were 
specifically working on telecommunications issues. Experts from the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) were interviewed to gain a broader 
understanding of the EU action in the MENA region.  
The second group of experts consisted of three European NRAs: the Italian 
Authority for Communications Guarantees (AGCOM - Autorità per le Garanzie 
nelle Comunicazioni) and the Portuguese National Communications Authority 
(ANACOM - Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações). Both ANACOM and 
AGCOM have geographical inclinations towards the MENA countries. AGCOM 
is moreover closely involved in twinning projects in the telecommunications field 
and worked with both Egypt and Jordan. ANACOM furthermore hosts the 
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secretariat and website of EMERG. In addition, the Swiss Federal Office for 
Communications (BAKOM) was consulted, due to its situation as a non-EU 
member state, but still closely involved in European regulation approximation.  
The third group of experts were chosen for their independent work as 
consultants in the telecommunications sector. This is the case of Regulaid who 
is often mandated by the EU to organise telecommunications related projects. 
The Electronic Communications Committee (ECC)/European Communications 
Office (ECO) in Denmark was consulted due to its authority in Europe on 
spectrum regulation. Cullen International in Belgium was interviewed due to 
their technical knowledge on the sector with a specific expertise on Middle 
Eastern and North African telecommunications system.  
The last group concerned international bodies. One expert from the ITU agreed 
to participate in an interview for this thesis. Another expert from the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) brought interesting insight regarding the worldwide 
convergence of media in the audiovisual and telecommunications sector. 
Concerning the WTO, the World Bank and EBRD, no expert was met, as 
sufficient reports existed on telecommunications regarding the country cases. 
As such, these reports are used instead of expert interviews. Table 10 presents 
the interview codes for each group of experts. The codes are made of two 
letters, in this case EU, standing for a European country and of a reference 
number. 
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Table 10 EU Expert interviews codes 
Notes: Interviews made by researcher from September 15 2013 to July 10 2014. 
Source: Author. 
MENA field research (February to April 2014) 
The second phase of field research took place mostly between February 4 and 
April 15 2014. Interviews were held in person in Rabat, the capital of Morocco 
from February 4 to March 4 2014 and in Amman, the capital of Jordan from 
March 20 to April 15 2014. Due to the political situation in Egypt at the time of 
the field research, only a short stay was planned. Interviews were held in 
person in Cairo, from April 5 to April 8 2014. The focus of this second set of 
interviews slightly changed compared to the ones from Brussels. The aim was 
specifically to enquire about policy diffusion in both selected subsectors of this 
thesis. Thus precise and focused questions regarding the development of 
policies, the environment and pressures encountered in policy making were the 
main drivers of the questions. It aimed at gaining a more precise understanding 
into the different interactions between the actors in the field from the 
Mediterranean point of view.  
Three types of experts were contacted in MENA countries. The first group of 
experts, which represents the main source of information from MENA countries, 
came from experts working for the telecommunications Ministries and the 
NRAs. The relevant ministries responsible for telecommunications policies were 
the Moroccan Ministry of Communication (MINCOM), the Egyptian Ministry of 
Information and Communications technology (MCIT) and the Jordanian Ministry 
Type  Name Interview Code 
EU experts DGs ECHO, DEVCO,  Trade, Research and Connect 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
EU1-EU7 
EU8-EU13 
NRAs 
experts 
BAKOM, Switzerland, AGCOM, Italy; ANACOM, Portugal EU14-EU16 
Private 
consultants 
Regulaid, The Netherlands 
ECC/ECO, Denmark 
Cullen International, Belgium 
EU17 
EU18 
EU19-EU20 
International 
bodies 
International Telecommunications Union, Switzerland (ITU) 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU) 
EU21 
EU22 
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of Communications and Information Technology (MOICT). The three NRAs, 
from which most experts were met, were the National Telecommunications 
Regulation Agency (ANRT) in Morocco, the National Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority (NTRA) in Egypt and the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Commission (TRC) in Jordan. Employees working for both USO and spectrum 
management were interviewed as a priority, followed by experts working in the 
sector of international cooperation. Finally, the three chairman and CEOs of the 
mentioned NRAs were interviewed to understand the general strategies of the 
NRAs. In Morocco, three experts from the Moroccan High Authority for 
Audiovisual Communication (HACA) were contacted, as they work closely with 
the Moroccan Telecommunications NRAs on spectrum issues.  
The second group of experts were the national phone companies of each 
country. In Morocco, Maroc Telecom accepted to participate to an interview. In 
Egypt, one expert from Vodafone accepted to participate in the field research 
and in Jordan, all three mobile operators, Orange, Umniah and Zain accepted to 
be met. The last group of experts were based in EU delegations in all three 
countries. Table 11 presents the interview codes for each group of experts. As 
for the European field research, the codes are made of two letters 
corresponding to each country case and of a reference number. MO stands for 
Morocco, JO for Jordan and EG for Egypt. 
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Table 11 MENA Expert interviews codes 
Notes: Interviews made by researcher from February 4 2014 to April 15 2014. 
Source: Author. 
Semi-structured Interviews 
The interviews aimed at exploring the contexts in which certain policies were 
adopted and others were not. As such, the most appropriate type of interviews, 
were semi-structured ones. The expert interviews were built around a set of 
topics that have been discussed with all interviewees, but slightly shaped 
according to their area of expertise and professional roles. According to Berg, in 
semi-structured interviews the interviewers is allowed and even expected to 
digress according to the answers of the interviewees (2009:107). Davies further 
argues that structuring is a matter of degree. He mentions that “there is a broad, 
grey area of ‘semi-structured’ interview strategies in which the wording or order 
Type  Name Interview 
Code 
Morocco   
Government 
experts 
Ministry of Communication (MINCOM) 
National Telecommunications Regulation Agency (NTRA) 
High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA) 
MO1 
MO2-MO7 
MO8-MO10 
Companies Telecommunications operators (Maroc Telecom) MO11 
EU 
delegation 
EU Delegation in Rabat (EEAS Morocco) MO12 
Jordan   
Government 
experts 
Ministry of ICT (MOICT) 
Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) 
JO1       
JO2-JO8 
Companies Telecommunications operators (Umniah, Zain and Orange) JO9-JO11 
EU 
delegation 
EU Delegation in Amman (EEAS Jordan) JO12 
Egypt   
Government 
experts 
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) 
National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA)  
EG1………. 
EG2-EG4 
Companies Telecommunications operators (Vodafone) EG5 
EU 
delegation 
EU Delegation in Cairo (EEAS Egypt) EG6 
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of the questions on the schedule can be altered in real time by the researcher 
conducting the interview” (2001:76). As such, the semi-structured interviews 
have been directed in a looser form, relying on a series of topics to be covered 
and shaped according to the area of expertise of the interviewees and to the 
interests of the researcher. 
Two different sets of questions were chosen corresponding to the two different 
phases of field research. The set of questions chosen for the first phase of 
expert interviews aimed at understanding the relationship between the EU and 
the MENA area in terms of regulatory approximation, both generally and in the 
telecommunications sector. The covered topics included the existence or non-
existence of joint initiatives between both areas. Some questions addressed 
also the reasons why such initiatives existed or not and the possible motivations 
of both parties behind such initiatives. The second set of questions more 
specifically aimed at the selected sector cases, as most of the chosen experts 
were based in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt and worked directly in policy-making 
in the sector. The questions directly focused on USO and spectrum policies. 
The discussions were more technical than in the first set of interviews. The aim 
was to understand the processes of policy change globally, without focusing on 
the relationship to the EU, to best understand who all the involved actors in the 
field were. Table 12 gives an overview of the main semi-structured questions 
asked according to the two different phases of field research. 
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Table 12 Selection of semi-structured questions  
Field 
Research 
Types of questions 
EU 
countries 
What initiatives are taking place between the EU and MENA countries? 
What has your role been in the above initiatives? 
How do those initiatives take place (type, frequency of meetings, participants)? 
What have been the results of those initiatives? 
What do you think worked well and what not?  
Why do you think the EU has an interest in cooperating with MENA countries in 
telecommunications sector? 
Why do you think MENA countries have an interest in cooperating with the EU 
countries in the telecommunications sector?  
What kind of regulatory changes would you like to see and why? 
MENA 
countries 
 
Who are your main partners (countries, regulatory agencies, corporations)? 
What are the main channels you use to discuss telecommunications policies? 
Are you part of regulatory groups? Which ones (EMERG, ARAGNET, EU 
twinnings)? 
What do you think works well in the above mentioned channels and what not? 
What do you wish would work better? 
Do you use models originating from elsewhere? From where? Which ones? 
What is your peculiarity in the USO/Spectrum management sector? 
Where do you see differences with other countries? 
What regulatory direction are you planning to follow in the USO and spectrum 
sectors?  
Source: Author. 
 
The first set of questions supported the framing of the issues in the field. It gave 
insight as to how the dynamics between the EU and MENA countries take place 
and what do EU experts focus on when cooperating with MENA countries. 
However, the questions were often broad and lacked precision, particularly in 
what concerns technical developments. As such, the second set of questions 
and interviews gave the most interesting and precise data to work on. The 
questions were more specific and directed. Despite the technicity of the 
selected sector, the use of semi-structured interviews allowed for the sessions 
to remain flexible. The atmosphere was always peaceful, pedagogical and 
informative. Most experts were gratified to talk about their work and give their 
opinion of transnational collaboration. The answers were written in key words, 
on a piece of paper. Nothing was recorded on tape to facilitate an informal 
91 
 
atmosphere. Straight after each interview, the hand-written draft was 
transcribed on a word document. The consistence of the transcription taking 
place less than a day after the interview ensured a close translation of the 
interviews from the oral to the written format. The interviews were then 
uploaded in the qualitative software NVivo for coding and analysis.  
3.2.2 Ethics approval process & qualitative software  
Several ethical considerations needed to be taken into consideration so to 
conduct the field research under appropriate conditions. Two ethics approval 
forms, one for European countries and one for the MENA countries, were 
prepared and approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Exeter 
before the expert interviews took place. The ethics approval process included 
the need to ensure the voluntary and informed nature of participation of the 
experts. To do so, a consent form was sent before the meeting explaining the 
main aims of the interview and the objective of the data gathering, hence being 
part of the empirical research of a PhD thesis. Written consent was obtained in 
every case, except for two interviewees who gave their oral consent (Expert 
JO9 in Jordan and Expert EG4 in Egypt). The consent forms were signed at the 
beginning of the interview, which gave the possibility of explaining the aims of 
the interviews and manage the expectations. It also gave the opportunity for the 
participants to decide whether they wished to remain anonymous or not. As 
most experts decided to remain anonymous, all experts have been anonymised 
to facilitate the reading and presentation of the empirical analysis as explained 
in Section 3.2.1.  
Regarding data storage, the transcription of the interviews and list of 
interviewee names have been kept separate in two different folders on the 
computer hard drive of the researcher. Two additional copies were saved on an 
external hard drive and on the University of Exeter secured central data storage 
facility, U: drive. Furthermore, the ethical approval process required an 
assessment of possible harm caused by the thesis. Due to the non-conflicting 
nature of the research and the technological aspects of the topic, it was 
concluded that the interviews were not likely to cause harm to the participants. 
The political situation in Egypt however required particular care when 
conducting research. The interviewed experts did not feel as confident as the 
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ones in Jordan and Morocco to share personal views. This was due to the 
instability of the political system and the uncertainties linked to government 
changes. The results of which is that in Egypt, the NRA leaders accepted to 
participate in the research, representing the official position validated by the 
Ministry, but more specialised workers preferred not to give any detailed view 
on their work.  
The interviewees were also invited to review a copy of their interview transcript, 
if they wished. This was asked by only few interviewees. This is the case of 
Expert EU14 from BAKOM, Expert JO3 from TRC and Experts MO9 and MO10 
from HACA. They amended certain aspects of their answers and the corrected 
versions were used in this thesis. Lastly, a declaration of interest ensured that 
the research thesis was self-funded, as such there were no further commercial 
or other interests involved in that project. The experts were also made aware of 
their right to withdraw from participation at any time. 
Finally, the use of qualitative software NVivo supported the qualitative coding of 
the interviews into a selection of adequate nodes. It also represented an 
additional archival support for the gathered data. Coding implies marking the 
text in order to tag particular parts of segments of that text (Atkinson and 
Delamont, 1996). Furthermore, the use of qualitative software permits the 
exploitation of hypertext and hypermedia techniques and the possibility to 
create flexible nodes through a variety of supports, audiovisual and texts 
(Atkinson and Delamont, 1996). The use of qualitative software and in this case 
NVivo has supported the retrieval of information and analysis of the qualitative 
comparative case studies. The qualitative software permitted the horizontal 
grouping of the interviews along selected topics and facilitated their comparison. 
A consistent and quasi simultaneous transcription of the interviews from hand-
written format to word document and the uploading to NVivo facilitated the 
coding and the analysis of the data. 
3.2.3 Secondary & Primary Sources 
To complement the information regarding the country cases and sector cases 
and to triangulate information gathered in the field research, additional sources 
were consulted. Policy diffusion literature and other theoretical and conceptual 
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researches were central to the elaboration of the framework. However, further 
sources were needed to understand the context and cases of this thesis 
empirically. As such, three main types of sources are used to analyse 
comprehensively the research topic, they can broadly be grouped into three 
categories, legislative documents from MENA and EU agents, international 
organisations’ statistical databases and finally, academic research.  
Firstly, to best grasp the policy-making processes surrounding the six case 
studies, laws, decrees, proposals, directives, communications and any other 
relevant legal documents, surrounding the process, were used. It includes the 
screening of key Moroccan, Jordan and Egyptian policy-process documentation 
from both the respective ministries and the NRAs. In most of the cases, these 
documents are published in French for Morocco and in English for both Egypt 
and Jordan, which has facilitated the use and analysis of documents, as both 
languages are spoken by the researcher. In one case, however, a key Egyptian 
USO policy document (NTRA, 2005) only existed in Arabic and other types of 
documents, such as leaflets and communications of the official NTRA website, 
were only partially covering the text in English. The support of a bilingual 
Arabic-English academic colleague was then requested to get a complete 
translation. The selection of key policy documents related to the Barcelona 
process and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 
framing the relationship between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean 
Countries are also used. These documents include the Association 
Agreements, Action Plans, Activity Reports and Strategy Documents of the 
countries under study. An additional focus was set on key legislative documents 
regarding the EU and MENA information society in general. Documents such as 
the Cairo Declaration on the Information Society (Cairo Declaration, 2003), the 
EU communications on NATP Programmes (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, 
2008) or the Conclusions of the Rome conference on Information Society (Euro-
Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers, 1996) are included in the dataset.  
Secondly, reports and statistics of major regulatory and economic institutions 
were consulted, such as the ITU, which compiles telecommunications data in 
yearly reports for all countries of the world, the World Bank, the EBRD, OECD 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Statistical resources on Euro-
Mediterranean telecommunications from Cullen Reports were also key to the 
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gathering of data and to understanding what types of telecommunications 
statistics were available and published by intelligence consultancies. Several 
indexes have also been used, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) and The Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index (BTI). The Polity 
IV index, from the Center for Systemic Peace, was also useful to bring an 
additional approach to the country cases based on democratic and autocratic 
authority in governing institutions. The exact measurement of the independent 
variables, both sector and state ones, is explained later in this chapter (Section 
3.3.2).  
Finally, in addition to primary source material, academic publications discussing 
the EU and Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and policies were used. When 
possible a focus on telecommunications was useful. Authors focusing mostly on 
telecommunications policies were of key interests, bringing sophisticated 
technical and economic approach to the research. Such research however 
mostly originates from technical journals and it is not always an easy task to use 
such information in political science research. However the information 
gathered from these journals was central to understanding the scope and 
challenges of the policies under study. Secondary material also includes 
authors discussing developing countries and the role of economic and technical 
cooperation in development. Once again, when possible, a focus on 
telecommunications was useful, but not always available. 
3.3 Selection of measurements 
3.3.1 Measurement of the dependent variables 
In this thesis, the dependent variable has been identified as the adoption of a 
policy. This adoption is defined in terms of the four mechanisms of diffusion, 
learning, imitation, economic competition and coercion. As mentioned earlier 
(Sections 1.4 and 2.2), to measure the dependent variable, it is necessary to 
observe the policy adoption of a specific policy item. The product is defined by a 
similar regulation, law, policy guideline, idea or programme that can be distinctly 
identified in two different systems. This represents the object that has been 
diffused from one system to the other. In addition, the process must be 
evidently perceived as well. It corresponds to the observation of an interaction 
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between the two systems. Only when observing both the product and process 
can it be concluded that policy diffusion has taken place. The dependent 
variable of this thesis can take four different shapes, as such the product and 
process may also take four shapes. Table 13 proposes a systematisation of the 
four variations. This is based on the operationalisation and conceptualisation of 
the mechanisms of diffusion in chapter 2 (Section 2.4 and particularly Table 4, 
page 53). 
Table 13 Definition of the four types of product and process  
 Learning Imitation Competition Coercion 
Product Combination of 
different 
models 
Text is copied 
(even mistakes) 
Compatible with 
economic 
requirements 
Policy benefiting 
the external actor 
 
Process Variety of 
channels and 
partners 
Most typical 
regulation 
Role of economic 
actors in policy-
making 
No autonomous 
policy-making 
decision 
Source: Author. 
 
Table 13 shows that in the case of learning mechanisms, it must be observed 
that the product is a combination of models and that the process is 
characterised by the use of a variety of channels and partners. In the case of 
imitation mechanisms, the product is marked by a close similarity of the two 
models, where even mistakes may be adopted. The process of imitation 
mechanisms is characterised by the most typical regulation to adopt in the field, 
without a close interest in the domestic context itself. The competition 
mechanism is marked by the compatibility of the adopted law with economic 
requirements and the process is defined by the role of economic actors in the 
process of policy-making. Economic actors can be represented by lobbies, the 
private or public sectors, as long as corporate, profits or investment interests 
are at play. Lastly, coercive mechanisms are defined by a product which 
satisfies the external actor pushing for it the most. The process underlines the 
lack of autonomous decisions in policy-making.   
The table is useful to recognise different patterns of adoption. However, due to 
the complexity and abundance of legislative information surrounding policy-
making, it is necessary to identify points of reference in a sector to better qualify 
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the movement of ideas, programmes or policies. In fact, two points of reference 
were chosen to identify the product and process of policy diffusion for both USO 
and spectrum management, the details of which is given in the next Chapter 
(Section 4.2). Table 14 shows the four management ideas that have been 
chosen as identification tools. They correspond to recent management trends in 
both sectors that the selected country cases have had to deal with as well.  
Table 14 Four management ideas to observe policy adoption 
 1
st
 management idea 2
nd
 management idea 
USO Mobile Telephony 
Inclusion of mobile phones in the 
definition and scope of USO  
Broadband Internet 
Inclusion of broadband internet in the 
definition and scope of USO 
Spectrum Trading Technological neutrality 
Specification of technological 
neutrality when allocating 
spectrum rights 
Spectrum trading 
Possibility given to spectrum owners 
to engage in spectrum trading  
Source: Author. 
 
The two management ideas of USO are linked to the change in the definition 
and scope of USO to include both mobile telephony and broadband internet. 
This is linked to the evolution in phone technologies connecting citizens across 
the world, concerning the increasing interest into mobile technologies rather 
than fixed ones. This is particularly true in developing countries, which do not 
possess the necessary infrastructure to provide fixed telephony to their citizens. 
Fixed telephony in such countries is in decline and households have a tendency 
to be cell-only. In such cases, fixed infrastructures are neither feasible nor 
practical (Gideon and Gabel, 2011, Xavier, 2008). The trend to increasingly 
adopt mobile rather than fixed telephony in USO is similar to broadband 
internet. Functional internet has been part of USO traditionally. However, the 
question has now arisen, as to which internet standard is vital to citizens and 
whether broadband internet should become a part of the scope of USO as well.  
The two management ideas linked to spectrum policies are also linked to the 
latest developments of the sector. The flexibility of governments to take 
autonomous decisions in the field is limited by the need to coordinate the use of 
these cross-border resources. However, leeway exists in relation to the 
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management and allocation of spectrum nationally. Two trends have arisen in 
the domestic management of wireless spectrum, technological neutrality and 
spectrum trading. Both techniques refer to the need for the states to become 
more dynamic and efficient in both spectrum allocation and use. Technological 
neutrality represents more flexibility for the phone operators to use the 
frequency with different technologies and not to be tied to restrictive standards 
(Wellenius and Neto, 2008:3, Michalis, 2007:251). Spectrum trading relates to 
the possibility for operators to trade spectrum once they have purchased it 
without having to hand it back to the regulator beforehand. All four management 
techniques reveal potential policy developments to improve the use and scope 
of USO and spectrum management. They provide interesting fields to observe 
policy diffusion.  
To measure these four management ideas coding is required regarding the 
observation of the product and the process. In this thesis, policy adoption is 
thought to be a continuum. As such the coding values represent three different 
ranges of adoption from low to high. The three different possibilities of coding 
are: high policy adoption (+); medium policy adoption (0) and low policy 
adoption (-). High policy adoption is chosen if the links between the diffused and 
adopted model are complete, direct and clear. Medium policy adoption is 
chosen if the links between the diffused and adopted model are partial. Low 
policy adoption is chosen if there is evidence of some links between the diffused 
and adopted model, but it is only weak and diffused. If no policy adoption is 
observed at all in neither the product or the process or both, the result is a 
definite ‘na’ (not applicable). To summarise, all four management ideas are 
coded for both product and process. The average is then used to conclude 
whether policy diffusion has taken place or not. In cases where an average is 
not possible, the lowest value is selected. The lowest value is preferred to the 
highest, due to the difficulty of observing policy diffusion methodologically. 
Thereafter, a more cautious approach is preferred. Table 15 gives an overview 
of the potential values for the coding. Six different possibilities may take place, 
as shown below. One possibility is high, three are medium and two are low.  
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Table 15 Dependent variables’ coding options 
 Product/Process Product/Process Degree of Policy 
Adoption 
Possibility 1 + + + 
Possibility 2 + 0 0 
Possibility 3 + - 0 
Possibility 4 0 0 0 
Possibility 5 0 - - 
Possibility 6 - - - 
Notes: Values: +: high policy adoption; 0: medium policy adoption; -: low policy adoption; na: not 
applicable.  
Source: Author. 
3.3.2 Measurement of the independent variables  
The independent variables of this research support the two subquestions of this 
thesis. Firstly, four state variables have been conceptualised to analyse the 
conditions under which a country is likely to adopt a policy originating 
elsewhere. Secondly, five sector variables have been conceptualised to support 
the analysis regarding which mechanisms of diffusion are at play, once the 
adoption of a policy item has been confirmed. Both sets of variables, states and 
sector are measured in different ways. The four state properties are measured 
according to statistics and indexes. The five sector properties on the contrary 
are measured following the qualitative observation of their absence or 
presence. This is based on the information gathered by expert interviews and 
supported by primary and secondary literature. Table 16 offers an overview of 
the ten variables with information regarding the covered period, measurement 
and sources. 
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Table 16 Independent variables’ measurement 
 Covered 
Period 
Measure
ment 
Source 
State Variables    
Governance Openness 2000-2014 Index Worldwide Governance Indicator 
Market Openness 2003-2014 Index Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
Political  Interconnectedness 2000-2013 Statistics 
 
Foreign aid data (OECD) compared 
to GDP values (World Bank) 
Market Interconnectedness 2000-2013 Statistics 
 
FDI compared to GDP values 
(World Bank) 
Sector Variables   
International Regulatory 
Channels 
*-2014 
 
Questions Were they used to discuss policy 
options? 
Did they have an impact in shaping 
the policy domestically? Transgovernmental 
Collaboration 
Efficiency *-2014 Keywords Enhancement of performance 
Satisfaction with a new model 
Pride in the results 
Economic interests *-2014 Keywords Focus on one/several 
corporation(s) 
Inclusion of corporation into policy-
making 
Importance of the market 
Sanction capacity *-2014 Keywords Compliance with  international 
regulation  
Lack of alternative options 
Need to follow leaders 
Sanction capacity 
*Notes: Telecommunications reviews: Morocco (1997), Jordan (1995), Egypt (2003). 
Source: Author. 
 
The first state variable to be discussed is governance openness. Its 
measurement is based on the aggregation of two of the WGI, the government 
effectiveness index and the Regulatory Quality measure. The WGI is a project 
supported by the World Bank. This index allows for six dimensions of 
governance to be measured; voice and accountability, political stability and 
100 
 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption (World Bank, 2014d). According to Kaufmann et al., the 
Government Effectiveness index aims at capturing perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies (Kaufmann et al., 2010:4). This measure is adequate for the thesis, as it 
aims at capturing the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations. The data covers the period from 2000 to 2014.  
The second state variable under review is market openness. Its measure is 
based on the status index and more precisely the “Economic Transformation” 
figure provided by the BTI. It includes several variables, which are the level of 
socioeconomic development, organisation of the market and competition, 
currency and price stability, private property, welfare regime, economic 
performance and sustainability. The BTI analyses and evaluates the quality of 
democracy, a market economy and political management in 129 developing and 
transition countries (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2015a). In this research however, 
the BTI is not used fully and only the index covering the economic 
transformation is taken into account. This is more useful, as the aim of this 
variable is to operationalise market openness specifically and not other types of 
transformation, such as the political system. The data covers the period from 
2003 to 2014.  
The third and fourth state variables are political and market interconnectedness. 
These two variables are measured using statistics of the OECD and the World 
Bank. Political interconnectedness is calculated as the share of foreign aid 
compared to the total revenues of a country. The foreign aid data is taken from 
the OECD (OECD, 2015). It is related to GDP values originating from the World 
Bank 2014 Country indicators (World Bank, 2014b). This allows a comparison 
across different cases of the significance of foreign aid compared to the income 
of the country as a whole. The data covers the period from 2000 to 2013. The 
last variable, market interconnectedness is measured using net inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 2000 to 2013 of the World Bank databank 
compared to GDP (2014b). This is useful, in similar terms as is the third variable 
on political interconnectedness, to show in a comparative perspective whether 
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higher level of FDI compared to the global income of a country has an impact 
on the likelihood of policy adoption.  
The sector variables are measured using a qualitative approach. The two 
environment variables are the international regulatory framework and 
transgovernmental cooperation. To observe whether the variables had a role in 
the policy decisions of the domestic countries, two questions have to be 
answered. Firstly, were the channels used to discuss policy options? And 
secondly, did they have an impact in shaping the policy domestically? Both 
questions are intended to confirm, that the channel has had a role in proposing 
different policy solutions and that the adopting country took these solutions into 
account domestically. The three pressure variables are efficiency, economic 
interests and sanction capacity. These variables can only be observed using 
qualitative methods, thanks to the coding of the interviews data. The use of a 
selection of keywords are adequate to conclude which pressure variable have 
been at play. In the case of efficiency, experts talk about the importance of 
enhancing the performance of a policy, so far characterised by failure or low 
results. The discussion introduces notions of satisfaction with a new model 
adapted to the domestic situation. Pride in the results of the new policy is 
advocated. Concerning the second pressure variable, economic interests, 
experts mention several corporate actors active in the field and eventually 
lobbies. References in the market are underlined and corporations are involved 
into policy-making. Finally, concerning the last pressure variable, sanction 
capacity, experts refer to the need to comply with international regulations and 
the lack of alternative options. They express the need to follow the leaders 
without a will to do so. However, in this variable, it is also necessary to control, 
by using triangulation and other primary and secondary sources, whether there 
is a potential for sanctions. In other words, it must be assessed in addition to 
expert data whether measures can be actioned against a country who has not 
adopted the necessary policy change.  
3.4 Conclusion  
This methodological chapter outlines the different methods, sources and 
measurements which are used to advance the empirical research. The first 
section introduces the selection of methods and sources. The use of case 
102 
 
studies and expert interviews in addition to a selection of primary and 
secondary sources represent the main tools to conduct this research. They are 
useful to account for the heterogeneity and complexity of the cases under 
review. The original data set is composed of 52 expert interviews, mostly active 
in the telecommunications sector and/or Euro-Mediterranean relations. They 
were gathered between September 2013 and July 2014 in Europe and MENA 
countries, using semi-structured interviews. Their transcription was supported 
by qualitative software NVivo. In addition, primary and secondary sources were 
used to contextualise and triangulate information received in the expert 
interviews. 
The second section of this chapter gives the measurement of the variables. 
Different methods are used to measure the dependent and independent 
variables. In this thesis, the dependent variable is defined as the act of policy 
adoption. It can take four different forms each one representing a mechanism of 
diffusion, learning, imitation, competition and coercion. This chapter shows how 
each mechanism can be differentiated using the product and process tools of 
analysis, as explained earlier in chapter 2 (Section 2.2). To focus on the act of 
policy diffusion without being lost in the amount of policy documents existing in 
the field of telecommunications in each country. This chapter outlines the use of 
two management ideas for each subsector (Table 14, page 96). The focus on 
these four management ideas, allows following a clear line when addressing 
policy diffusion. To empirically observe policy adoption, these four management 
ideas are coded in terms of product and process. This supports conclusions on 
whether policy diffusion has taken place. The results are given in next chapter, 
which represents the first empirical chapter of the thesis (Chapter 4).  
The independent variables are divided into state and sector variables. The state 
variables are measured through the use of indexes and statistics. Sector 
variables are measured through the qualitative appreciation, based on expert 
interviews, of their presence and absence. The environment variables require 
the confirmation that these channels have been used and have had an impact 
in the process of policy adoption. The pressure variables require the 
observation of the use of certain keywords and expressions in the expert 
interviews. The sector variables require the use of further primary and 
secondary sources to confirm the data of the interviews. This is notably the 
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case concerning sanction capacity and the practical risk that countries face 
when adopting certain policies. 
This methodological part shows how the research questions are going to be 
analysed. It presents the methods used to gather the data and gives arguments 
supporting these choices. This chapter shows that qualitative methods are 
necessary to account for the heterogeneity of cases, however, methodological 
bias exists in policy diffusion, due to the need to select cases where policy 
diffusion is taking place, to best observe and analyse the phenomenon. This is 
also the case in this thesis, where policy adoption is expected to take place in 
each of the cases, albeit to different degrees. The three first chapters of this 
thesis have now presented in detail the structure, framework and methods of 
the thesis. The next three chapters comprise of the empirical part of this thesis, 
with each chapter focusing on one aspect of the framework. The first empirical 
chapter focuses on the observation of policy adoption (Chapter 4), the second 
one on conditions leading to policy diffusion (Chapter 5) and the last one on the 
mechanisms of diffusion (Chapter 6).  
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4 CHAPTER 4 – Observing policy diffusion 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three empirical chapters presenting the empirical 
analysis of the three-step framework detailed in the previous sections. This first 
empirical chapter aims to observe policy diffusion. It answers the research 
questions: does policy adoption take place in the telecommunications sector in 
Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. All six cases, composed of three countries, 
Morocco, Jordan and Egypt and two telecommunications subsectors, USO and 
spectrum management, are analysed in detail. To observe if policy diffusion has 
taken place in the selected case studies, this thesis argues that different 
methodological tools are useful. Firstly, two aspects must be jointly observed. 
Both the product—the visible movement of the law itself—and the process—the 
interaction between both jurisdictions—need to be observed. Furthermore, to 
more specifically observe the movement of the product and process across 
countries, two recent management ideas were selected for each of the 
subsectors. This is useful to perceive the movement of ideas precisely. Table 
14 shows the four selected management ideas, two for each of the subsectors, 
that need to be traced, to conclude that policy diffusion has taken place in the 
six cases (firstly shown in Section 3.3.1 , page 96). 
Table 14 Four management ideas to observe policy adoption 
 1
st
 management idea 2
nd
 management idea 
USO Mobile Telephony 
Inclusion of mobile phones in the 
definition and scope of USO  
Broadband Internet 
Inclusion of broadband internet in the 
definition and scope of USO 
Spectrum Trading Technological neutrality 
Specification of technological 
neutrality when allocating 
spectrum rights 
Spectrum trading 
Possibility given to spectrum owners 
to engage in spectrum trading  
Source: Author. 
 
With regards to USO, the two management ideas are linked to the question of 
whether to include mobile telephony and internet in the definition and scope of 
universal service and access. Concerning spectrum management, the two 
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management ideas are linked to the flexibility given to spectrum owners to apply 
different technologies to their spectrum share and to eventually trade it if it is not 
used in its full capacity. The four management ideas may potentially exist in any 
of the cases under review as they represent potential to develop the use of both 
USO and spectrum management. All four management ideas need to be coded 
according to both the product and process to conclude whether policy diffusion 
has taken place and to what extent- The detailed measurement is given in 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.1).  
The following chapter is structured as follows. The objective of the first section 
is to delineate the telecommunications sector under review. Both sectors, USO 
and spectrum management are described in terms of their main current issues 
and compared to the regional framework of the EU. The second section 
analyses in detail the six case-studies in relation to the empirical data gathered 
during the field research. Each case is explained and assessed in the light of 
the regional framework of the EU. They are assessed according to the four 
management ideas described above and according to both concepts of product 
and process.  
4.2 Defining the policy cases  
4.2.1 Universal Service Obligation (USO) 
USO can be defined as the provision of a baseline level of telecommunications 
services to every resident of a country at a reasonable charge (Parsons and 
Bixby, 2010:121). At the origin of the universal service argument is a discourse 
based on social inclusion, in particular of the need to provide basic health and 
safety services to the whole population (Oguz, 2013:14). USO emerged from a 
discourse that considers basic telecommunications services as a social right for 
citizens. Simpson states that “it was argued that universal access to a basic 
telecommunications service at a uniform price was effectively a social right for 
citizens to be pursued as a goal of public policy by the corporate state well 
accustomed to interventions of this kind in a number of Europe’s industrial 
sectors, not least those of the utilities sector (energy and telecommunications, 
principally)” (2008:106). In fact, USO represented the solution to the need for an 
equitable service provision, to ensure a positive impact of economic 
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development and to develop the required infrastructure (Alleman et al., 
2010:88). Universal service has been seen as corrective regulatory tool in order 
to reduce the negative social effects of liberalisation in network industries 
(Oguz, 2013:15). This position was taken by international organisations and the 
WTO itself recognises the exceptional characteristics of USO. The WTO 
reference paper declares that “[a]ny Member has the right to define the kind of 
universal service obligation it wishes to maintain. Such obligations will not be 
regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they are administered in a 
transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are not 
more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by 
the Member” (WTO, 1996:art.3). As such, the USO policies are an exception to 
the normally enforced competition principles in the telecommunications sector. 
However, several authors and international bodies have observed the changing 
characteristics of USO provisions (Alleman et al., 2010:87). Oguz mentions that 
whereas the definition remained relatively unchanged during the last decade, 
technological advances, the widespread of liberalisation in this sector and 
changes in pricing and tariff models have brought growing uncertainty over the 
scope of universal service, considering the recent shift towards mobile services 
(2013:13). The definition and the scope of USO are in fact at the core of this 
subsector of telecommunications. An interesting distinction is given by the 
World Bank. The World Bank handbook differentiates between the concepts of 
Universal Service and Universal Access. It mentions that universal service 
refers to service at the individual or household level, for example through a 
telephone capability in each home. Universal access refers to a publicly shared 
level of services, through public payphones or internet telecenters (World Bank, 
2011:153). The generic term of universal access and service (UAS) is 
advocated by the World Bank handbook to encompass both intertwined aspects 
of USO. In this thesis Universal Service Obligation (USO) is preferred as it more 
adequately displays the compulsory component falling on mobile and fixed 
operators to provide USO phone services.    
The focus on universal access rather than universal service is advocated by 
several authors who deplore the old-fashioned definition of USO. Universal 
service is usually based on an old model of service supplying based on a fixed 
line. This is typically the case for European USO. However, considering the 
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improvements in the sector, with mobile and broadband technologies, this old-
fashioned definition is increasingly put under pressure. Aleman et al. argue that 
the definition of universal service needs to be expanded. They state “[i]n today’s 
world of communications, a call is no longer simply a signal sent over a fixed-
line to a receiver at another fixed-line, but a multitude of means of carrying a 
call. For data communications the choice set is even larger” (2010:87). In fact, 
one of the main pressurising trends on traditional USO is the advancement of 
competition. Several authors argue that the increasing number of technologies 
in the field that may thrive through healthy competition are capable of bridging 
the gap of social exclusion. Oguz argues that “[p]hones and other services have 
become more accessible for most people. Social exclusion is no longer valid in 
most societies and increasing competition improves substitutability of services” 
(Oguz, 2013:15). The conflictual trend between competition and regulation to 
manage USO is interesting as it was underlined by several experts during field 
research. In this thesis, the role of competition was included in the semi-
structured interview, notably when discussing USO with the corporate sector. 
Each one of the country cases have developed different models dealing with 
both aspects of competition and regulation. They are discussed in the next 
section in detail (Section 4.3). 
The view that healthy competition may reduce the long apprehended negative 
effects of liberalisation, with entire regions being left aside because of a lack of 
profitability is further pronounced by the premise that not every citizen who has 
access to communications technology will use it effectively. For instance, it may 
become apparent that people in rural areas with lower income do not 
necessarily require broadband services which would require massive 
investment. In some cases, increasing availability does not necessarily bring an 
increased use. Oguz argue that in such cases, some resources would be 
wasted and would reduce the social welfare in comparison to alternative uses 
(2013:15). In such cases, authors and practitioners deplore that where 
competition may bring an alternative to USO provisions, the social argument 
hinders the development of telecommunications technologies (Expert EU19, 
2013). In fact, the USO scope sometimes goes further than phone and internet 
communications services. The World Bank for instance includes the 
establishment of community access points, connecting universities, schools, 
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libraries, post offices, health centres and local governments, as part of the 
scope of USO (World Bank, 2011:154). This is motivated by the premise that 
the widespread access to and diffusion of ICTs are highly desirable for social 
and economic reasons and participates in the WSIS ambitious goal of 
connecting all villages of the world to ICTs by 2015 (World Bank, 2011:154). In 
this thesis, however, the focus is set on projects surrounding the expansion of 
phone and internet communications and not the distribution of hardware such 
as computers, as these are not always linked to telecommunications policies 
only, but also tackle sectors such as education or internal affairs, which are not 
the focus of this thesis.  
The EU framework for USO is based on the fixed line and functional internet. 
According to the 2002 universal service directive, the concept of universal 
service refers to the provision of a defined minimum set of services to all end-
users at an affordable price. Furthermore, member states should ensure that 
services must be made available in their territory, irrespective of their 
geographical location and at an affordable price (European Parliament and 
European Council, 2002:51). The revised 2009 Directive reframes USO by 
stating that the aim is to ensure the availability of good quality publicly available 
services through effective competition and choice (European Parliament and 
European Council, 2009a:art.1). Article 4 confirms the provision of access at a 
fixed location and provision of telephone services. This article further specifies 
that member states shall ensure that all reasonable requests for connection at a 
fixed location are met by at least one undertaking. In addition, the connection 
shall support voice, facsimile and data communications at data rates sufficient 
to permit functional internet access (European Parliament and European 
Council, 2009a:art.4). It can be observed from the above that the EU framework 
for USO is directly linked to the traditional definition of USO based on fixed 
telephony and minimum internet connectivity. Table 17 offers an overview of the 
EU decisions regarding both management ideas in USO. It shows that mobile 
phones and broadband internet are not included in the current scope of USO in 
the EU. 
  
 
109 
 
Table 17 USO scope and decisions in the EU 
 
Regulation and Article Review of scope 
Mobile 
Phone 
No inclusion of mobile phone (Art.4) 
(Universal Service Directive 
2002/22/EC & Citizens Rights 
Directive 2009/136/EC) 
No extension to mobile services 
(2011 Communication on universal 
service in e-communications) 
Broadband 
Internet 
No inclusion of broadband internet 
(Art.4) 
(Universal Service Directive 
2002/22/EC & Citizens Rights 
Directive 2009/136/EC) 
No extension to broadband 
connections 
(2011 Communication on universal 
service in e-communications) 
Source: Author. 
 
The inclusion of mobile phones and broadband internet has been discussed in 
the EU in the development of USO policies since 2002. The 2002 USO 
Directive mentions that USO does not refer to Integrated Services Digital 
network (ISDN)11. It specifies that a fundamental requirement of universal 
service is to provide users with a connection to the public telephone network at 
a fixed location, at an affordable price, which includes a single narrowband 
network connection (2002:(8)). This is confirmed by the recital of the 2009 
Directive which mentions that data connections should be capable of supporting 
communications at rates similar as those provided via the public internet 
(European Parliament and European Council, 2009a:(5)). Hence, at the 
moment, USO in the EU does not include broadband nor mobile services. The 
2011 Communication on universal service in e-communications confirmed that 
there would be no extension of the USO scope to broadband connections and 
neither to mobile services (European Commission, 2011). The EC stated that 
DSL broadband was available to 95% of the EU population  by the end of 2010, 
but was used by only around 23% to 83% across member states (European 
Commission, 2011:6). Hence this did not represent a substantial majority of the 
population and thus did not need to be included in USO. Regarding the 
inclusion of mobiles in USO, the 2013 communication mentioned that 
                                            
 
11
 ISDN is a data transfer technology. It enables wide-bandwidth digital transmission over the public 
telephone network, transferring data significantly faster than with a dial-up modem (TECHTERMS. 2015. 
ISDN [Online]. Available: http://techterms.com/definition/isdn [Accessed December 12 2015].)  
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subscriber penetration was of 124.4% in October 2010, to which the EC 
concluded that there was no risk of social exclusion (European Commission, 
2011:7). The European Parliament however addressed a report on October 24 
2013, to ask the EC to consider changing the scope of the USO to include the 
obligation to offer broadband internet access at a fair price (European 
Parliament, 2013). The situation has not changed since then.   
The EU policy also defines the different means that can be employed to cover 
the fees for USO. NRAs may either introduce a public funding mechanism for 
compensation or share the net cost between operators. The 2002 directive 
specifies that charges may not be imposed or collected for undertakings which 
are not used to provide USO services (2002: art.13). Furthermore, art. 14(1) of 
the USO directives mentions that where a mechanism for sharing the net cost of 
USO is established, NRAs shall ensure that the principles for cost sharing, and 
details of the mechanism used are publicly available. Humphreys and Simpson 
argue that the decentralised character of the regulation-in-practice has led to 
variations among Member states and USO provisions are an example of 
diverging practices (2008:856). Hence, France created a Universal Service 
Fund (USF) to which the operators contribute to in order to compensate the 
official USO, in practice the incumbent operator (ARCEP, 2015). This practice 
has been argued to  favour the national champion (Humphreys and Simpson, 
2008:856). The issue of the funding of USO is an interesting one, as one of the 
frequent criticisms regarding USO in MENA countries is the non-transparency of 
the USF, both in terms of contributions and allocations (EU17, 2013). The 
existence and use of USF is discussed in each of the USO cases and reveal 
very different models.  
4.2.2 Spectrum Management 
The scope, definition and regulation of spectrum management are in many 
ways different to USO. The management of spectrum has a lot to do with its 
characteristics as a scarce resource, with particular capabilities that allow it to 
carry data across borders. Its use by governments for military, defence and 
maritime and aeronautical services makes it a highly sensitive subject (Chaduc 
and Pogorel, 2008). Electromagnetic spectrum is similar to non-physical waves. 
Where such waves overlap with each other, they interfere and harm each other 
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signals (Delaere and Cullel-March, 2014, Garcia Leiva, 2013). Regulation 
occurs mainly to prevent these harmful interferences, but also to achieve 
economic and technical efficiency of spectrum use (Cave et al., 2007). Due to 
its cross-border characteristics and key role as a transporter of information, 
spectrum management has had a long history of international coordination for 
over 100 years. The ITU is particularly relevant for spectrum management and 
the international framework for spectrum management depends on a treaty 
developed, signed and ratified by the member states of the ITU. The ITU 
conveys world and regional radio conferences every three to four years, to 
establish regulations, agreements and plans for the global use of radio 
spectrum.  
For instance, the ITU radio regulation divides the world into three regions in 
order to manage spectrum efficiently, with each region consequently being 
allocated specific sets of frequencies (ITU, 2012c:art.5). The aim is to ensure 
compatibility of spectrum uses and limit interferences across countries. Region 
1 comprises of all countries in the European and African continents, as well as 
countries further east, such as Uzbekistan and Mongolia until the area to the 
North of Russia, but excluding the territory of the Islamic republic of Iran. 
Region 2 includes the Northern and Southern American continents and region 3 
includes the Asian and Australian continents, as well as the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. In this context, Expert MO7 of the ANRT mentions that the division into 
three regions of the ITU influences relationships due to a similar interest in a 
particular region, however conflicts always arise, even if parallelisms may be 
found between certain groups, such as Region 1 and 3 (Expert MO7, 2014). 
Figure 3 illustrates the above mentioned ITU regional divisions. 
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Figure 3 ITU Frequencies allocation map 
Source: Radio Regulation’s Frequencies allocation map (ITU, 2012c:Art.5(2)). 
 
The main body of laws in that sector is prepared by the ITU and called the 
Radio Regulations. This text was adopted at the WRC in Geneva in 1995. It 
was then revised and adopted by subsequent WRC, including further 
appendices, resolutions and recommendations of the ITU. The actual version 
stems from the 2012 WRC, which took place in Geneva as well (ITU, 2012c). It 
deals with the technicalities, standards and limitations for the effective 
management of spectrum and without interference from across the world (ITU, 
2012c). Spectrum management is also taken into consideration in various WTO 
sources. The WTO reference paper defines the allocation and use of scarce 
resources as any procedure, including frequencies, numbers and rights of way 
(WTO, 1996:art.6). It confirms that such management processes need to be 
carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. It 
also mentions that the current state of allocated frequency bands needs to be 
made publicly available, except for the detailed identification of frequencies 
allocated for specific governments (WTO, 1996:art.6). This shows the potential 
for the non-transparent use of spectrum for government purposes such as the 
military and defence services. Both the WTO reference paper and the ITU 
Radio Regulations do not, however, give any advice regarding domestic 
spectrum management, such as the use of auction or inclusion of technological 
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neutrality or spectrum trading in management reforms, which shows that 
decisions concerning the domestic allocation of spectrum follow other sources 
rather than ITU and WTO regulations.  
One of the main current developments in spectrum regulation relates to the 
planning of the digital switch-over, an initiative supported by the ITU. The digital 
broadcasting switchover is supposed to free a large portion of lower frequencies 
to allow for a re-allocation of spectrum and provide a more efficient use of the 
spectrum (ITU, 2012a). The World Bank handbook mentions that the transition 
to Digital Terrestrial Television Broadcasting (DTTB) is an important source of 
flexibility in spectrum management. It may release a remarkable amount of the 
radio spectrum to be re-allocated for use (World Bank, 2011:114)12. The DTTB 
is particularly relevant for mobile phone operators who may use the freed 
spectrum to expand their markets and technologies, such as the Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) standard, commonly linked to 4G technologies (Cullel, 2011, 
Lamy, 2014). The 2006 Regional Radiocommunications Conference adopted a 
document on digital migration strategies and principles, which set a deadline for 
the analogue television switch off by June 17 2015 in Ultra High Frequency 
(UHF) band and 2020 for Very High Frequency (VHF) band (ITU, 2012a, ITU, 
2006). The digital broadcasting plan, referred to as GE0613, covers 116 
countries of Africa and Europe and was agreed for the frequency bands 174-
230 MHz and 470-862 MHz (ITU, 2012d). The digital switch-over has been 
completed by several countries since the late 2000s.  
In the EU, the 2009 recommendation asked member states to complete the 
DTTB by 2012 (European Commission, 2009). Sweden and Finland completed 
it in 2007 and Germany and Switzerland in 2008. The US completed the switch-
over in 2009 (ITU, 2012b). In this field, the EU experience is important as an 
example. Expert EU6 mentions that with regards to the television digitalization, 
                                            
 
12
 The World Bank handbook mentions that Digital Dividend arises because of the greater 
compression that is possible with digital signals. Digital compression allows the transmission of 
several, and up to eight, standard digital television channels in the radiofrequency spectrum 
previously used by a single  analogue channel (WORLD BANK. 2011. Telecommunications 
regulation handbook; 10th Anniversary Edition [Online]. Available: 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/reg/D-REG-TRH.01-2011-PDF-E.pdf [Accessed August 8 
2015].) 
13
 In reference to the 2006 Geneva agreement. 
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there has been a greater success with the EU approach, contrarily to the US, 
which only had four terrestrial channels to manage. The EU was at the forefront 
of setting standards (Expert EU6, 2014). The leading role of the EU in terms of 
DTTB was however challenged during WRC-2012 and WRC-2015, which 
confirmed the allocation of the bands 694-790 MHz to mobile services 
exclusively, confirming African and MENA states position against the EU 
decisions in the field (Lamy, 2014). The details of this decision are addressed in 
the last chapter of this thesis (Section 6.2, Framework Proposition 4).  
Many developing countries have however encountered delays when attempting 
to complete the digital switch-over (Cullel, 2011, Ala-Fossi, 2012, Stirling, 
2012). Several reasons account for the difficulties in implementing the GE06 
and are observable in the three selected country case studies of this thesis 
(ITU, 2012d, Garcia Leiva and Starks, 2009). In fact, only Morocco has 
approved a law on June 17 2015 confirming its commitment to meet the GE06 
deadline for UHF bands (Chambre des Représentants, 2015). Firstly, different 
population densities in developing countries compared to EU countries show 
limited numbers of analogue TV broadcasting channels as a whole than in 
Europe (Stirling, 2012). In such cases, there is less pressure on the regulators 
and the corporations to expand the offer in spectrum (Stirling, 2012). Secondly, 
the technology is not always mature enough in developing countries to run the 
sophisticated transition process (ITU, 2012d). Finally, insufficient financial 
resources and the lack of an adequate regulatory framework may slow down 
the process (Gulati and Yates, 2012). The difficulty to proceed to the DTTB and 
to adopt technological innovation is a recurring concern in spectrum 
management, where most stakeholders deplore the slow regulatory changes, 
not dynamic enough to follow the pace of changing technologies and business 
practices. 
Two new trends in the management of spectrum are addressed in this thesis, 
spectrum trading and technological neutrality. Spectrum trading is advertised by 
the World Bank as a key option for innovative spectrum management. It means 
that the purchaser is allowed to change the use to which the spectrum was 
initially put while maintaining the right to use it (World Bank, 2011:111). El-
Moghazi et al. mention that spectrum trading “usually refers to the part of 
spectrum where users have exclusive license that can be traded to other users. 
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Therefore, users of spectrum are those with the highest valuations for the 
spectrum and instead of the governmental regulators, market forces are 
responsible for the spectrum rights assignment” (2008:3). In such cases, the 
rule of the market takes over the rule of the regulator in spectrum allocation, 
confirming Coase’s avant-gardist advocacy on spectrum management (1959). 
The risk of such possibilities is however to face dominant firms setting 
excessive prices for the traded spectrum. The World Bank emphases 
competition law to overcome such excesses (World Bank, 2011:111). Spectrum 
trading gives the option to the new spectrum owner to trade its spectrum rights 
if it appears that the spectrum is not used in its totality. This links spectrum 
allocation closer to market forces than regulatory control. 
Technological neutrality is another innovative trend in spectrum management. 
According to the World Bank, the principle of neutrality has taken on central 
importance in the constant evolving and expanding ICT world. It mentions that 
“[i]t is linked to the notions of democracy, populism, and decentralization that 
are hallmarks of the digital era: the idea that neither governments, companies, 
nor other gatekeepers should be able to dictate how anyone utilizes these 
technologies” (World Bank, 2011:203). It argues that the fast changing nature of 
ICT technology and markets suggest that regulators should avoid as much as 
possible the dictating of specific technical platforms and instead allow the 
greatest flexibility for the industry innovation and evolution (World Bank, 
2011:203). Technological neutrality means that the allocation of spectrum shall 
not be linked to a defined technology but leaves it to the owner to decide the 
best way to use its acquired spectrum. In both cases of spectrum trading and 
technological neutrality, the owner shall be entitled to flexibility in its use of 
spectrum in order to maximise the efficiency of the spectrum use and not to 
keep it blocked due to restrictive regulations. Both ideas are relatively recent 
and are only at an initial stage of being distinctly outlined and implemented.  
As mentioned earlier, spectrum management is largely coordinated by 
international bodies. However, on regional levels, some areas undertake 
additional commitments through sub-regional telecommunications 
organisations. This is the case of the EU, which action has only been minimal 
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and focused on standard settings (Michalis, 2007:251). The EU has however 
operated through the CEPT14. Originally, CEPT members were the monopoly-
holding postal and telecommunications administrations. Its activities now 
consist of cooperation on commercial, operational, regulatory and technical 
standardisation issues, with a focus on spectrum use via the ECC15 (CEPT, 
2013). The EU developed the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) standards, which contributed to technical spectrum efficiency and also 
supported the creation of a single market in goods and services allowing 
significant profits for telecommunications corporations (Michalis, 2007:251). The 
use of the GSM standard and the subsequent Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) standards for the 3G technologies, which 
were developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) is very interesting, as all three country case studies have selected these 
standards as well, revealing a high market potential for European industries 
using this technology (Buys et al., 2009, Howard and Mazaheri, 2009). The 
issue of standards is discussed extensively in Section 6.2, Framework 
Proposition 1.  
It was argued earlier that USO in the EU follows traditional trends. In what 
concerns spectrum management, the EU is closer to innovative management. 
This is particularly the case in member states promoting competition and 
flexibility to regulate the sector, such as the UK, under the leadership of the 
                                            
 
14
 The CEPT is a Europe-wide grouping comprising of national technical experts. It was founded 
in 1959 by 19 countries and expanded to 48 countries nowadays (CEPT. 2013. All about our 
organisation [Online]. Available: http://www.cept.org/files/1047/CEPT%20Leaflet-
September2015.pdf [Accessed November 5 2015].) In the EU, spectrum management 
provisions need to be consistent with the work of international and regional organisations 
dealing with radio spectrum management such as the ITU and CEPT (EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT & EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2009b. Directive 2009/140/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 20009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services. Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive).) 
15
 The CEPT comprises of three autonomous business committees; the Electronic 
Communications Committee (ECC) primarily develops common policies and regulations in 
electronic communications for Europe, with a primary focus on spectrum use. The Committee 
for ITU policy engages with the CEPT’s engagement with the ITU, except regarding the World 
Radiocommunication Conference and last the European Committee for postal Regulation 
(CERP) deals with postal regulation and European co-ordination (CEPT. 2013. All about our 
organisation [Online]. Available: http://www.cept.org/files/1047/CEPT%20Leaflet-
September2015.pdf [Accessed November 5 2015].) 
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Office of Communications (OFCOM) (Garcia Leiva, 2011, Michalis, 2007:252-
3). Both management ideas are included in the recital, even if the 
implementation is not yet distinctly delineated in the policies themselves. Table 
18 gives the overview of the two management ideas for spectrum policies in the 
EU.  
Table 18 Spectrum Management scope and decisions in the EU 
  Regulation and Article Review of scope 
Technological 
Neutrality 
Recital §34 & §40: Considered, but 
may require transitional rules  
(2009 Better Regulation Directive ) 
 In discussion 
(2013 Telecoms Single Market plan 
(TSM) draft regulation) 
Spectrum 
Trading 
Recital §39 & §40: Considered, but 
may require transitional rules  
(2009 Better Regulation Directive ) 
In discussion  
(2013 Telecoms Single Market plan 
(TSM) draft regulation) 
Source: Author. 
 
Both tradable spectrum rights and technological neutrality are debated within 
the EU. The ECC/CEPT 2011 report on spectrum underlines that some national 
licenses parameters in EU member states allow for partial transfer of usage 
right, according to the frequency allotment, geographical area and duration of 
the licence (ECC and CEPT, 2011). The 2009 Better Regulation Directive 
mentions that NRAs can allow spectrum users to freely transfer or lease their 
usage rights to third parties to allow spectrum valuation by the market 
(2009b:recital(39)). In the EU, the issue of saving spectrum for wireless 
broadband has been mentioned in the Telecoms Single Market plan (TSM) draft 
regulation of September 11 2013 (European Commission, 2013). It foresees the 
possibility of the EC mandating the re-assignment of spectrum for wireless 
broadband through procedures harmonised at the EU level.  
With regards to the technological neutrality, the recital of the 2009 Better 
Regulation Directive also mentions that service and technology-neutrality 
should be the norm in all spectrum bands allocated to electronic 
communications. The recital of the 2009 Directive states that “[f]lexibility in 
spectrum management and access to spectrum should be increased through 
technology and service-neutral authorisations to allow spectrum users to 
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choose the best technologies and services” (2009b:recital(34)). Hence, one of 
the most recent changes in spectrum management is the fact that spectrum 
should not be tied to technology, as it evolves faster than policies. It appears 
that the EU has included both technological neutrality and spectrum trading in 
its 2013 telecommunications law, however, at the moment, they are only 
included in the recital (European Parliament and European Council, 
2009b:(40)). The policy mentions that transitional rules may be additionally 
required to implement these ideas. This shows that for the EU, as well, the 
implementation of technological neutrality and spectrum trading regulation are 
at early stages.  
4.3 Empirical observation of policy diffusion  
This section focuses on all six case studies. The results are presented per 
country to facilitate the contextualisation of the telecommunications sector 
nationally. Each part starts with some information regarding the latest 
developments in telecommunications. The time frame and laws that are 
analysed in this part, correspond to the reviewed telecommunications 
framework dating back to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Earlier 
contextualisation can be found in next empirical chapter (Sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
The reviewed laws in the telecommunications sector were put in place in 1997 
in Morocco (Telecommunications law No.24-96), in 1995 in Jordan 
(Telecommunications law No.13) and in 2003 in Egypt (Telecommunications 
Regulation Law No.10). All three countries have passed legislation allowing for 
full liberalisation of the sector, even if the state interest remains strong. Each of 
the countries has now three main mobile operators, owned fully or partially by 
the state, domestic and foreign corporations. A detailed account of ownership is 
presented in the last chapter of this thesis, when addressing the corporate 
environment in which policy making is taking place in the field of 
telecommunications (Section 6.2, Framework Proposition 1).  
Following the short contextualisation, each sector case is then analysed closely 
according to both selected management ideas and both the product and the 
process. The six cases firstly describe the specificities of the policies according 
to the country and sector, with a particular focus on the chosen management 
ideas. It reviews the laws, programmes and policies, corresponding to an 
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analysis of the product part of policy adoption. To contextualise spectrum 
management cases a simplification of the national spectrum allocation chart for 
UHF and VHF is given. This facilitates the visualisation of the different types of 
allocation16. Following the analysis of the specificity of each case, a few words 
are given so to explain whether there is an interaction between two different 
models, for instance with the EU or with another jurisdiction. This corresponds 
to the analysis of the process. Finally, conclusive remarks are given regarding 
the role of the EU precisely in influencing policy adoption in the case studies. 
Table 19 shows the results of this analytical and methodological exercise. For 
each case and each management idea, the product and process is coded. 
Finally, a total rating is given for each case on the last line. An overview of the 
end results is proposed at the end of this chapter (Section 7.2.1, Table 20, page 
147). The detailed methodology can be found in Chapter 3.  
Table 19 Results of the observation of policy diffusion (detailed) 
 Case 
Study (1) 
Morocco: 
USO 
Case 
Study (2) 
Morocco: 
Spectrum 
Case 
Study (3) 
Jordan: 
USO 
Case 
Study (4) 
Jordan: 
Spectrum 
Case 
Study (5) 
Egypt: 
USO 
Case 
Study (6) 
Egypt: 
Spectrum 
 
Id
e
a
 1
 
Id
e
a
 2
 
Id
e
a
 1
 
Id
e
a
 2
 
Id
e
a
 1
 
Id
e
a
 2
 
Id
e
a
 1
 
Id
e
a
 2
 
Id
e
a
 1
 
Id
e
a
 2
 
Id
e
a
 1
 
Id
e
a
 2
 
Process + + + + + + + + 0 0 0 0 
Product + + 0 - + + 0 0 0 - - - 
Total Product 
& Process 
+ + 0 0 + + 0 0 0 - - - 
TOTAL  + 0 + 0 - - 
Notes: Values: +: high policy adoption; 0: medium policy adoption; -: low policy adoption; na: 
Not Applicable.  
Source: Author. 
                                            
 
16
 Only the main allocations for UHF and VHF are included in the simplified overviews and are 
grouped in six main types: 1. Fixed services (incl. fixed-satellite). 2. Mobile services (incl. 
mobile-satellite). 3. Radiodiffusion (incl. broadcasting satellite). 4. Aeronautical services (incl. 
aeronautical mobile & radionavigation). 5. Space, meteorological & Astronomy Services (incl. 
space operation & research, meteorological aids & satellite and radio astronomy). 6. 
Radiolocation (incl. Radionavigation & satellite, earth exploration & exploration-satellite and 
radiolocation). 
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Table 19 shows that two cases of high policy adoption are observed for USO in 
Morocco and USO in Jordan. Medium policy adoption is also observed in two 
cases, for spectrum management in Morocco and spectrum management in 
Jordan. Finally, the two Egyptian cases of USO and spectrum management are 
coded as low. A remark concerning the framework can be made at this stage. It 
is observed that policy process is often coded as equal or higher than the 
product. This is easily explained by the fact that the telecommunications sector 
is a cross-border sector which needs interaction for its efficient use and 
development. The product instead represents the incorporation of external 
ideas in the domestic policies. This is often more complicated to observe as the 
interaction itself, because external products are not automatically adopted in the 
domestic context. This confirms the importance of studying both aspects of the 
product and process and concludes in full knowledge, as to whether policy 
diffusion has taken place. 
4.3.1 Case studies (1 & 2) Morocco 
In Morocco, the telecommunications sector and the mobile phone subsector 
have experienced a thriving growth of mobile penetration from 8.1% in 2000 to 
120% in 2012 (ITU, 2011b, ITU, 2014). Morocco’s focus on ICT can be traced 
back to the early 2000s and has since then followed European developments 
closely. The support of the ICT sector by the government in Morocco also 
coincides with a change of government head. In fact the new King, Mohamed VI 
succeeded his father King Hassan in 1999. His aspiration to develop ICT and 
commitment to liberalisation reinforced the growth of the sector (ANRT, 2004). 
For instance, 2001 became a thriving year for the sector in Morocco, with the 
organisation of the E-Maroc Symposium in April, and the sale of 35% of Maroc 
Telecom to Vivendi, a French conglomerate (ANRT, 2004, Ibahrine, 2004). The 
ANRT confirmed the “irreversibility” of the ICT development in Morocco to meet 
its full potential in a booming international context and technological 
development. The importance of liberalising the sector and the need to attract 
investors was highlighted by underlining a “fierce competition to attract foreign 
investors”(ANRT, 2004). The Moroccan ICT sector has timewise developed 
similarly to the European ones. For instance, Morocco’s attribution of 4G 
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licences took place in 2015, following France closely in 2011 (ARCEP, 2011) 
and the UK in 2013 (OFCOM, 2013).  
Maroc telecom, also known as Itissalat al Maghrib (IAM) is the incumbent 
operator in Morocco. It was owned completely by the State and operated in 
fixed line until the late 1990s. It started operating in mobile telephony in 1994 
(ANRT, 2007b). The second GSM licence was awarded in 1999 to Meditel, the 
second mobile operator (ANRT, 2007a). A third license was awarded to Wana 
(future Inwi) in 2006, in an effort to develop the telecommunications sector 
(ANRT, 2004, World Bank, 2014a:129). The three operators were awarded 3G 
licenses in 2006. In March 2015, the result of the call to award them three 4G 
licences was released (ANRT, 2015b, ANRT, 2015a). From the 2000s, 
Moroccan’ ICT have been linked to a strong governmental support (ANRT, 
2010). It was developed to become a diversified and modern 
telecommunications network. As Gentzoglanis mentions “[t]he establishment of 
an independent regulatory agency (ANRT), its dynamism, and its highly 
competent personnel has helped to transform the structure and performance of 
Morocco’s telecommunications sector rapidly” (2003:94). Furthermore, the 
decision to meet its regulatory commitment to the GE06 and turn off all 
terrestrial signalisation by June 17 2015 (MINCOM, 2015) illustrates the 
importance that the Moroccan government gives in showing international 
competences in the field. 
Case study (1): USO in Morocco 
In Morocco, the USO provisions were mentioned in the Law n°24-96 of 1997. 
This law defines universal service as a minimum telecommunications service 
consisting of standard quality to an affordable level. Law 24-96 mentions that 
universal service includes services linked to territorial planning and added-value 
services and shall be included in the licenses of the incumbent (MINCOM, 
2007:art.1(21)). This law confirms that licenses shall include USO provisions 
(MINCOM, 2007:art.10). As such, at the launch of the 1997 
Telecommunications review, Maroc Telecom, the incumbent fixed operator was 
designated directly as the universal service provider at national level. However,   
this was soon reviewed and amended after realising that the model based on 
one sole universal service provider was not efficient. An expert from the ANRT 
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mentions that when liberalisation took place in Morocco in 1998, the ANRT 
realised that operators were covering the urban zones, which were the most 
profitable (Expert MO3, 2014, MINCOM, 2007). Hence, Morocco changed its 
USO policy in 2004 and it was further specified in the general guidance notes 
published for the 2006-2008. Morocco decided to introduce a “pay or play” 
mechanism where operators may either contribute to a USF or they can 
participate directly in projects identified by the ANRT as eligible to implement 
USO. Operators may either chose to answer calls from the ANRT or they can 
themselves propose a project, which needs to be reviewed and accepted by the 
ANRT. According to Expert MO5 from the ANRT, the Moroccan “pay or play” 
mechanism gives the choice to operators to decide on their actions. 
Furthermore, this expert states that the USF is managed by the Ministry of 
Finance and not the ANRT, to secure the independence and neutrality of the 
regulator in regards to the fund (Expert MO5, 2014). 
In addition, the Moroccan USO policy planned the creation of a special 
committee to supervise the USO program. It is chaired by the Moroccan Prime 
Minister and consists of a ministerial representation, including the ministries of 
telecommunications, interior affairs, finances, territorial planning and national 
defence. In addition, this committee includes the president of the USO 
department at the ANRT and the General Director of the ANRT, who has a 
consultative voice (MINCOM, 2005: art.10(1)). This committee meets once a 
term and may at all-times consult any other Ministry if needed. Expert MO5 from 
the ANRT, mentions that this represents a “Mini-Government”, which shows the 
importance of the USO policies in Morocco (Expert MO5, 2014). An expert from 
the e-commerce Ministry underlines the high social responsibility of USO to 
answer the basic needs of integration and access of all citizens. He argues that 
this unique Committee “plays a double role, as the social guarantor of citizens in 
precarious situations and the guarantor of USO as a whole” (Expert MO1, 
2014). It can be observed that USO provisions in Morocco are very well 
included into a social discourse and the need to provide basic health and safety 
services to the whole population. The creation of a mini-government and the 
attention taken to provide a transparent and adequate service is a notable 
motivation behind the creation of the Moroccan “Pay and Play” project. The 
concept of social guarantor is used by the EU as well, but in a slightly different 
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approach. The 2002 USO directive defines USO as a set of obligations of the 
member states to protect the consumers (European Parliament and European 
Council, 2002(2)). USO becomes a social right (Batura, 2016:54). This is 
interesting to show a similar institutionalised duty to provide USO to the citizens.  
In the case of USO in Morocco, interactions across models have taken place. 
The “Pay or Play” programme was elaborated after a study in 2002 from a 
Canadian consultancy group, which presented several models to be followed. 
Among others, the Peruvian model was given as well as some European cases. 
Expert MO5 of the ANRT mentions the Latin American experience, well 
renowned at the World Bank and at the ITU, in particular Peru (Expert MO5, 
2014). The Latin American cases in USO have long been advertised by 
academics and international organisations (Carril, 2000, Donoso Abarca, 2002). 
Chile established the Chile’s Fondo de Desarrollo de las Telecomunicaciones in 
1994 and proposed the first competition in 1995 (World Bank, 2011:161). The 
2011 World Bank describes these funds as follows “[c]ompetitive tenders are 
also called reverse auction or minimum-subsidy auction because the qualified 
bidder with the lowest request for a subsidy wins the tender” (World Bank, 
2011:161). The Latin American system, based on competitive tendering, was 
closely integrated in the reviewed USO policies in Morocco. However, the role 
of the EU was also present in the field research and most experts underline the 
use of both Latin American and European models to best adapt their own “pay 
and play” mechanism. Export M05 from the ANRT mentions decidedly that 
thanks to the Latin American and European benchmarks, the 2004 Moroccan 
regulatory review allowed for a re-assessment of the process and the decisions 
to go towards market mechanisms were taken (Expert MO5, 2014). Expert MO3 
of the ANRT also mentions that the Moroccan experience of USO got its 
inspiration from what had been done in Europe and was then broadened to fit 
the Moroccan context (Expert MO3, 2014). This shows that interaction between 
different models took place in Morocco. The EU and other models were used for 
inspiration.  
Regarding mobile telephony, the Moroccan programme grew very differently to 
the ones in the EU. In fact, according to an expert from the ANRT, the 
Moroccan USO focus has directly been put in the GSM network, which is a 
European standard aimed for mobile telephony (Expert MO5, 2014). From 
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2004, a broad USO initiative took place in Morocco to analyse GSM 
penetration. A map analysing the available network infrastructure was produced 
including a detailed geographic map. In 2007 the PACTE project covering 
around 10,000 villages was created (Expert MO5, 2014). Expert MO5 explains 
that the task was given to 4 operators during 4 years and the coverage is close 
to 90% at the moment and covers a broad range of technologies. For instance, 
coverage includes terrestrial technology, such as GSM, 2G, or 3G (Expert MO5, 
2014). Hence, Morocco has applied technological neutrality in its USO 
programs since its start. Expert MO5 of the ANRT mentions that due to 
technological neutrality, the USO PACTE project was described as “voice & 
telephony” services and not specific techniques (Expert MO5, 2014). Hence, the 
ANRT received propositions from a variety of technologies, in particular 
terrestrial and satellite technologies. The awarding of the mandate was difficult 
due to different categories of prices for the proposed technologies. Expert MO5 
mentions that “[g]iving the mandate was not obvious. Satellite and terrestrial 
technologies do not cost the same, they are not comparable. We defined 
selection criteria and the methodological approach. We discussed with each 
operator to explain it all” (Expert MO5, 2014). 
Regarding ultra and ultra-fast broadband as well, the Moroccan and the 
European models differ greatly. According to expert MO5, the PACTE 
programme succeeded in bringing up to 90% of coverage to the whole territory 
and to around 99% of the populated areas. However, much remains to be done 
in terms of infrastructure quality. In particular, the ANRT now receives requests 
to obtain the 3G (Expert MO5, 2014). In this context, an expert from Maroc 
Telecom argues that the USO in Morocco still has many years to go. The 
PACTE territories have almost been totally covered but in practice, several 
areas remain without coverage and in particular, the infrastructure needs to be 
enhanced (Expert MO11, 2014). A review of the telecommunications law, law n° 
121-12 foresees the extension of USO to high and very high speed, such as 3G 
(ANRT, 2012, MINCOM, 2014). In November 2015, this document was still 
pending with the government (Iraqi, 2015). Hence, the “Pay and Play” 
mechanisms focusing on both mobile telephony and broadband internet 
represents a very different approach to the EU model. However, it is apparent 
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that the EU model was used, among other models, to create the most adequate 
programme, even if this led to a divergence of policies.  
Finally, in the case of USO in Morocco it is distinctly observable that both the 
product and the process can be traced back to other models that have been 
used domestically in Morocco. For this case study, the key role of the Latin 
American cases is evident. The role of the EU was also observed. However, its 
model was not integrated in the Moroccan model without questioning. In fact, 
the EU model was assessed and lessons were learned from it, but it was not 
adopting without questioning. Expert MO3 from the ANRT, mentions that the 
fixed telephony infrastructure was already well spread in the EU countries, thus 
USO was less difficult to impose (Expert MO3, 2014). However in Morocco, the 
situation differs as around half of the population lives in the rural world. 
Furthermore the population is well dispersed across the country. According to 
this expert, this represents a typical example of where the model is not 
transferrable as such. He states “[w]e have used the USO concept but we 
adapted it to our needs” (Expert MO3, 2014). It can be observed that in the 
case of USO in Morocco, the policy-makers modelled the available systems to 
their own needs, which, and according to them, succeeded in guaranteeing a 
better exploitation (Expert MO2, 2014).  
Case study (2): Spectrum Management in Morocco 
In Morocco, the law No. 24-96 mentions that the ANRT is responsible together 
with the relevant Telecommunications ministry for the management and the 
monitoring of spectrum. The ANRT is expected to participate  in international, 
regional and domestic meetings to improve regulation and management of 
spectrum (MINCOM, 2007:art.29). The ANRT is also to act as a delegate to the 
Ministry to manage and control the frequency allocations and licenses 
(MINCOM, 2007:art.29). The mobile and fixed services, aeronautical, security 
and radio diffusion services are all managed by the ANRT. The only exception 
concerns the HACA, who manages the TV and FM spectrum in coordination 
with the ANRT (MINCOM, 2003:art.5). In 2012, an agreement was signed 
between the ANRT and the HACA to ensure the assignment of frequencies in 
coordination with each other and with neighbouring countries. This agreement 
came as a step towards the transition to DTTB in Morocco (ANRT and HACA, 
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2012). The DTTB plan was completed on July 22 2015 with the approval by the 
Moroccan chamber of representatives of the law No. 96-14 modifying and 
completing law No. 77-03 regulating audiovisual communications. This 
modification to the audiovisual law aims at meeting the technological changes 
required by the GE06 agreement. MINCOM mentions that this agreement 
reflects the commitment of Morocco to meet its transition deadline of June 17 
2015 for UHF and June 17 2020 for VHF bands (MINCOM, 2015). Figure 4 
shows a simplification of the 2013 Moroccan spectrum allocation chart, which 
does not include the latest transition steps operated by Morocco. It is almost 
identical to that of Egypt on page 145. 
Figure 4 VHF & UHF Spectrum allocation in Morocco 
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In the spectrum management sector, Morocco has shown notable commitment 
to embrace technological advances in parallel to the European peers and at the 
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international level. Technological developments in the EU and in other countries 
are closely watched and assessed. Expert MO3 of the ANRT mentions that 
there is little delay between spectrum management in the EU and in Morocco. 
He gives 4G as an example and mentions that “[w]e are liberating our 4G 
spectrum. The call for tender will be in 2014. We have one year or one and a 
half year delay, but not more with the European Countries” (Expert MO3, 2014). 
The call was published in 2015, with all three operators, Maroc Telecom, 
Meditel and Wana being awarded 4G licences in the bands 800 MHz, 1800 
MHz and 2,6 GHz (ANRT, 2015b, ANRT, 2015a). 
Regarding the two management ideas as well, Morocco is closely linked to 
innovative practices in the field. Morocco applies theoretically technological 
neutrality in the allocation of spectrum. The ANRT underlines that in an effort to 
support growth of the telecommunications sector, mobile operators may use 
several technologies to operate their bandwidth (ANRT, 2004). In practice, 
however tenders are often linked to a certain generation of mobile phones, 
which limits in some ways the scope of technological neutrality. For instance, 
the 2015 tender aimed specifically at the 4G licences, in such cases, the 
technologies linked to 4G may vary, but they must be linked to 4G standards. 
Spectrum trading is also at the centre of discussion in the development of 
telecommunications in Morocco. The Moroccan government is not only thriving 
in the improvement of the mobile sector, it also supports the development of 
ultra-fast broadband internet. In 2012, the ANRT established a 10-year plan to 
develop high-speed broadband networks to the whole population (ANRT, 2012). 
This document shows the sophistication of the ANRT experts in embracing 
innovative solutions to improve ICTs. However, several experts of the ANRT 
mentioned the limits of these reflections, in Morocco as well as in Europe. 
Expert MO7 of the ANRT mentions that “[t]here is a reflexion in Europe on 
unlicensed spectrum, spectrum sharing, and white spaces. It is a reflexion we 
also follow (…) however, it is important to first look at technical conditions and 
then assess how to translate it to our regulation (…) it is still at an early stage at 
the moment, even in developed countries” (Expert MO7, 2014). In Morocco, no 
evidence of the use of spectrum trading in practice was observed, even if the 
discussion is followed by policy-makers. 
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Interaction across jurisdictions in the sector of spectrum management is 
apparent in Morocco. Morocco shows parallelism with European countries in its 
spectrum management decisions and allocation. An expert of the ANRT 
mentions that spectrum management is a sector where the activity is quasi 
identical among countries. He states that frequencies are “colorless, scentless. 
They propagate beyond borders. The use of these resources is the same 
everywhere” (Expert MO3, 2014). Furthermore, this expert states that there are 
international agreements and everybody must follow the ITU rules (Expert MO3, 
2014). The parallelism between European countries and Morocco is more 
obvious with the specific relationship between Morocco and France. One of the 
Experts of the ANRT mentions the close relationship between the ANRT and 
the French National Frequency Agency (ANFR)17 (Expert MO7, 2014). However 
he deplores the lack of resources of the ANRT in comparison to the ANFR, 
which manages the whole spectrum in one single entity, independently from the 
French telecommunications NRA, the Regulatory Authority for Electronic 
Communications and Postal Services (ARCEP). Expert MO7 mentions the level 
of expertise of the ANFR, in France, is an advantage. He mentions that “[a]t the 
ANFR, there are experts working specifically on the national spectrum and 
others on international management. It is very efficient in terms of 
representation at conferences, but it has a cost and of course this cost is 
justified for France, but concerning Morocco, we cannot afford the same means” 
(Expert MO7, 2014).  
Despite not having the same means as France as mentions Expert MO7, it 
appears that Morocco is close to the European developments in the sector. In 
many ways, Morocco has shown commitment to compete with the European 
peers and also at the international level. Moroccan experts from the ANRT 
underlined the importance to tackle future frequency needs and specified the 
use of British consultancy groups assessing the potential need in audiovisual 
                                            
 
17
 In France, the ANFR manages the spectrum globally, in particular regarding international 
coordination. In addition, the ANFR works in coordination with the French Ministries who 
manage some parts of the spectrum as well, for their own needs, such as the Ministries of 
Defence, Civil Aviation or Meteorology. In addition, it coordinates spectrum with the High 
Audiovisual Council for audiovisual spectrum needs and ARCEP for electronic communications 
(ARCEP. 2014. Les Fréquences en France. Grands Dossiers [Online]. Available: 
http://www.arcep.fr/?id=8807 [Accessed Oct. 23 2015].) 
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and mobile sectors by 2025 (Expert MO7, 2014). To conclude, in the case of 
spectrum management in Morocco, a noticeable parallelism to what is taking 
place in Europe is observed. The European systems and regulatory innovations 
are closely watched. Technological neutrality is embraced in theory, even if in 
practice, the focus on 4G technologies shows ambiguity with this principle. This 
is however the case in Europe as well. Regarding spectrum trading, the concept 
is used in discussions within the ANRT. However, it is still at an early stage. 
This is similar to the EU as well, where the application of the concept has not 
been fixed in policies yet. 
4.3.2 Case studies (3 & 4) Jordan 
In Jordan, as in Morocco, a booming growth of the ICT and mobile phones and 
internet was observed in the last decades. Mobile phone penetration increased 
from 8.1% in 2000 to 128.2% in 2012 (ITU, 2011b, ITU, 2014). Progressive 
reform of the ICT and postal sectors started in 1994. In 1995, the 
Telecommunications Law No.13 was passed and the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Commission (TRC) was established. Similarly to Morocco, the 
accession to power of King Abdullah II following his father in 1999 brought a 
generation of state officials putting the development of the ICT at the core of 
their agenda. Major initiatives were undertaken to build an ICT industry to 
create employment and spread social and economic development (Westrup and 
Al-Jaghoub, 2007:12, Mofleh et al., 2008:4, Kulchitsky, 2004:35). In Jordan, a 
major review of the Telecommunications law took place in 1995 and was 
amended in 2002. It was supposed to be reviewed in 2015  (INTAJ, 2012:9), 
however, Expert JO3 confirmed that the MCIT withdrew the new 
Telecommunications Act, stressing that there was no need at the moment for a 
new law to govern the sector, and that the current law is practical and 
sufficiently suitable for the sector (Expert JO3, 2014). Changes in the 
constitution in 2011, following the political turmoil in the region have affected the 
sector without directly amending the telecommunications law (Kingdom of 
Jordan, 2011). This is the case concerning the dependence of the TRC to other 
government bodies. The TRC is now directly reporting to the Ministry of 
Telecommunications, instead of reporting to the President (Expert JO3, 2014).  
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Jordan is a case with a determined focus on competition and regulatory 
innovativeness as is Morocco. Its desire to outperform other major players in 
the region has been described by Ciborra and Navarra who argue that Jordan 
may have become a textbook case for its vision to become the Singapore or 
Bangalore of the Middle East in the adoption of ICT (2005:145). In 1995, Jordan 
had become the first country in the Arab region to enact a modern telecoms law 
and to establish an independent regulatory body (INTAJ, 2012:10). For 
instance, Jordan Telecommunications Company (JTC), the incumbent phone 
operator, owned by the government was progressively reformed to meet 
liberalisation standards. By 2008, the government had removed all ownership. A 
majority of shares were sold to the Orange Jordan Group (Orange Jordan, 
2008:49). The first mobile license in Jordan was granted in 1994 to Fastlink, 
which was then acquired by the Kuwaiti group Zain in 2003 (Zain, 2014). In 
1999, JTC was granted the second license to provide mobile services and 
became Orange mobile a year later (TRC, 2009a, Orange Jordan, 2014:18). A 
third mobile operator, Umniah, was licensed in 2004  (TRC, 2009a). It was 
acquired by Batelco, a Bahraini consortium in 2006 (Batelco, 2013:61). The 
focus on competition and the avant-gardist liberalisation of the sector is 
adequate to Jordan. However, a weak economy and infrastructure coupled with 
a difficult geopolitical situation led to smaller steps in its market-oriented policies 
in the field.  
Case study (3): USO in Jordan 
In Jordan, the USO provisions are mentioned in the Telecommunications law 
No. 13 of 1995. In 2004 a general government policy for Universal Service was 
published by the Government, which was followed by several consultations 
undertaken by the TRC concerning the overall principles of USO and the 
content of the regulations (TRC, 2006:1). This consultative work was 
materialised in an Information Memorandum on USO published in 2006 by the 
TRC (TRC, 2006). The government also published several statements on USO, 
which clarify Jordan’s position in the field (MOICT, 2007, MOICT, 2011). The 
2013 National Strategy of Jordan foresees the revision of USO policy from 
December 2014 to ensure the correct balance between the freedom of 
operators to offer competing services and the need to ensure affordability and 
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availability of services across Jordan (MOICT, 2013:27-8). The TRC and 
MOICT formed a committee to review the USO policy, however Expert JO8 
confirmed that no official outputs would be published before the beginning of 
2016 (Expert JO8, 2014). Thus the output of this review is not included in this 
thesis.  
The Telecommunications law No.13 is not very specific when concerning USO. 
The first chapter of the law mentions that the universality of service refers to the 
provision of a minimum set of ICT services in areas and communities. The 
facilitation of the provision and use of such services are delineated by the terms 
and conditions specified and modified as needed by the Commission (TRC, 
1995:Art.2). The 2004 government policy on USO gives more precise 
information. It states that “[a] universal ‘service’ obligation or a universal 
‘access’ obligation is a requirement placed upon telecommunications licensees 
to serve particular geographic areas or groups of citizens where it may be 
perceived that without the imposition of the requirement those areas or groups 
would not be given the opportunity to take service” (MOICT, 2004:Art.1.1). This 
definition makes a difference between Universal Access and Universal Service 
“to the extent that universal access may be met by the provision of service to 
practical centralised location in a geographic region, for example to payphones 
or to community centres, rather than through the provision of service directly to 
individual homes or premises” (MOICT, 2004:Art.1.1). The Jordanian USO 
framework focuses on connecting the population rather than territories. It 
mentions that USO shall be available in all municipalities and populated areas 
with a population of 300 or more permanent inhabitants. Exceptions may be 
delivered upon request (MOICT, 2004:Art.1.6.1). This law foresees that USO 
provisions are based on access and there is no decision taken regarding the 
use of a specific technology to deliver USO.  
In practice, there is one universal service provider in Jordan and it is selected 
by the TRC. The selected operator is JTC and USO is based on fixed telephony 
services. Telecommunications law No.13 mentions that one of the TRC’s role is 
to select licensed operator(s) to be Universal Service Provider (MOICT, 
2004:Art.1.4(c)). In fact, the 2004 Government policy foresees that until there is 
effective competition to the fixed operator, JTC will continue to be the USO 
provider in all geographic areas and will continue to bear the entire cost of the 
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USO under the terms of licence (MOICT, 2004:Art.1.8). This was still the case 
during the field research conducted in April 2014. In Jordan, the possibility to 
establish a universal service fund exists. Art.86 mentions that a fund may be 
established to increase the universality of telecommunications and information 
technology services and contribute to the expansion and development of 
infrastructure of these services (TRC, 1995:Art.86). However, this was never 
implemented in practice. As such no fund has been established to cover the 
fees of the fixed telephony USO provider.  
Mobile phones and broadband internet are not included at the moment, in the 
Jordanian definition of USO. The 2004 Government Policy on USO mentions 
that Universal service shall include the Basic Public Telephone Service, 
comprising of minimum necessary standards for customers to make and receive 
local, national and international calls supporting speech, facsimile and data 
communications sufficient for functional access to internet services. Functional 
internet access shall be made available and be equivalent in data rate, reliability 
and continuity of service to that used by a majority of subscribers. This shall 
take into account technical factors that may limit the performance of such 
technologies in certain geographic locations (MOICT, 2004:Art.1.5). An 
interesting feature of this article is that the concept of optimal technology may 
be determined by the TRC, hence leaving the possibility to challenge or refresh 
the position on USO (MOICT, 2004:Art.1.5). The frequency of reviewing the law 
is planned for every four years (MOICT, 2011:art.2.6.1).  
While conducting the field research in Jordan, the decision to include mobile 
telephony and broadband internet in the USO scope was being debated. The 
interviewed experts from the TRC confirmed the fact that neither mobile 
telephony nor broadband services shall be included (Expert JO7, 2014, Expert 
JO8, 2014). This is surprising, as the 2011 statement of the government 
mentions that mobile telephony and broadband internet access should now be 
the basic communications services for the purpose of universal service and that 
if within the next two years market forces do not make broadband internet 
access with a download speed of 1 Mb/s. available on non-time-related tariffs, 
measures will be taken (MOICT, 2011:art.2.6.1). Expert JO7 underlined that the 
decision not to include the broadband and mobile market telephony in USO was 
taken, because “[t]he current policy definition is limiting towards USO (…) In 
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general, current USO policies only includes basic telephony services and 
directory services” (Expert JO7, 2014). This opinion was, however, not shared 
by a second expert who mentioned that actually the USO definition as it exists 
could include broadband internet as well, as the definition is not really precise. 
However, he mentioned that the decision not to include both the mobile and 
broadband services in the definition was taken by the TRC and the government, 
with the reasoning that such services shall result from a private choice of the 
consumer and not from a service given by the government (Expert JO8, 2014). 
In the case of USO in Jordan, the interaction with external models is almost 
uniquely focused on the EU. Several experts mentioned their will to follow EU 
legislation in the field (JO6, 2014). It was straightforward from the interviews 
that important interactions existed between the development of the Jordanian’s 
legislation and the EU model. For instance, the existence of a 
Telecommunications twinning between the Jordanian TRC and two European 
NRAs was often mentioned to confirm interlinkages between both regions (JO2, 
2014, JO3, 2014). The position to leave mobile and broadband services to the 
consumer as a private choice is very close to the EU position, where reviews of 
USO also concluded that broadband and mobile telephony needed not to be in 
scope for the USO (European Commission, 2011:6). An expert from the Ministry 
of Telecommunications says that the issue of inserting broadband services in 
the USO is an argument they have with the TRC, however, this expert states 
that “[t]his is a concern, as even in the EU, it (broadband) is not included, so 
why should we?” (Expert JO1, 2014). It can be observed that in the case of 
USO in Jordan, the development of the policy has taken a very similar stance to 
that of the EU. During the 2013 review, neither mobile phones nor broadband 
internet were included in the USO scope, which is confirming the EU position in 
this regard.  
Case study (4): Spectrum Management in Jordan 
In Jordan, the MoICT enables the TRC to prepare the national plan for 
frequency allocation and national register of frequency assignment. Spectrum 
provisions are included in chapter V of the Telecommunications Law No.13. It is 
described as a national resource, the use of which shall be regulated by the 
Commission in accordance with the Law. It further specifies that the TRC 
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prepares the tables, plans and registers that are necessary for this purpose 
(TRC, 1995:Art.30). In fact, Jordan has had an avant-gardist focus on its 
spectrum management since the early 2000s. The 2003 Policy Statement 
launched the National Broadband Network and the e-government programme 
(MOICT, 2011). It was followed by the 2007 Policy Statement on unified 
licences and reviewed market dominance. The number of telecommunications 
licenses rose and wireless operators received frequency bands (MOICT, 
2011:6). In 2011, a government statement promoted the development of 
quantity and quality of service, underlining the key role of spectrum to improve 
the development of the telecommunications market (MOICT, 2011:Art.2.5.3). 
The statement foresees that the TRC uses market-based valuations for 
spectrum, such as auctions and administrative incentive pricing. The TRC is 
also entitled to take prompt, but proportionate, steps to investigate interference 
complaints, stop illegal spectrum use and address other interference issues 
(MOICT, 2011:Art.2.5.3). It can be observed that in this case the TRC is 
delegated by the MoICT to both run auctions and is allowed to investigate 
interference complaints and illegal spectrum use. However, according to Sweis 
and Baslan, the awarding of spectrum is not as transparent as it could be, as a 
rejection to award spectrum does not need to be documented (2013:52).  
It is important to recall that spectrum management in Jordan is also closely 
linked to military control, even if the country is a remarkable supporter of 
competition in the field. In fact, the 1995 Telecommunications law No.13 
mentions that while no person may use any electromagnetic waves below 3’000 
gigahertz transmittable in space without obtaining a license, the Jordanian 
Armed Forces and Security Departments, in coordination with the TRC may use 
Radio Frequencies allocated and assigned for their use without a license (TRC, 
1995:Art.31). The 2013 National ICT Strategy also mentions that a review of 
spectrum use shall include from October 2016 an agreement with the military on 
how to make use of freed spectrum in specific cases. Such written agreement 
shall define the circumstances and duration of when spectrum can be recovered 
by the military (MOICT, 2013:28). This delineates a notable weight of the 
military in spectrum allocation. Figure 5 show the 2009 VHF and UHF spectrum 
allocation in Jordan. While it is similar to Morocco, it can be observed that 
spectrum between 170 MHz and 230 MHz is shared between TV and fixed and 
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mobile operators, which is not the case in Morocco, where the band is uniquely 
given to TV broadcasting (TRC, 2009b, ANRT, 2013). This confirms that Jordan 
has had an early interest in harmonising and opening up spectrum bands for 
private use since the late 2000s (MOICT and TRC, 2008). 
Figure 5 VHF & UHF Spectrum allocation in Jordan 
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Both technological neutrality and spectrum refarming have been mentioned and 
underlined in a series of government statements and policies (MOICT and TRC, 
2008, MOICT, 2007). The 2007 Statement of Government mentions that the 
TRC adopts wherever possible advanced spectrum management principles, 
including a technology and service neutral approach to spectrum; spectrum 
reuse; and spectrum sharing (MOICT, 2007:art.68(f)). It also mentions that the 
TRC awards spectrum according to the market demand, using auctions and 
possible secondary trading when appropriate (MOICT, 2007:art.68(j)). An expert 
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of the TRC mentions that Jordan is in line with the ITU and neighbouring 
countries and has now acquired a “modern spectrum management tool”. He 
adds that Jordanian policy includes the questions of reframing, white spaces 
(Expert JO4, 2014). The 2013 National ICT Strategy mentions that spectrum 
management needs to be reviewed starting in July 2014, to further develop the 
use of advanced spectrum management principles including spectrum re-use, 
spectrum sharing, and the potential for secondary spectrum markets (MOICT, 
2013:28). This shows that the Jordanian spectrum management policies are 
very well in line with EU and international practices in the sector.  
However, some experts from the corporate sector deplore the fact that the TRC 
and the Ministry do not implement their regulation. The expert of Zain for 
instance mentions that the TRC and the government had told the operators that 
they would be committed to implement technological neutrality (Expert JO9, 
2014). However, this did not take place in practice. He mentions that, 
technological neutrality was not implemented so far and that “nothing can be 
done here. The restrictions force you to keep the same allocation and 
technologies. We can’t mix the bands. We cannot provide any other service, 
and this is a problem” (Expert JO9, 2014). This expert argues that if this has 
been the case so far, it is because the government get more fees of selling new 
bands rather than implementing technological neutrality on the existing 
allocation (Expert JO9, 2014). This shows a discrepancy between regulation 
provisions and implementation. Jordan is very well aligned in terms of policies, 
but shows limitations in the implementation of certain policies. For instance the 
digital switch-over has not yet taken place in Jordan and as such, the liberation 
of more bandwidth, has not yet been possible.  
The 2013 National ICT Strategy mentions that starting from January 2015 and 
for a duration of six month a review concerning spectrum management must be 
implemented to identify what additional spectrum could be freed up by switching 
to digital transmission (MOICT, 2013:28). Effectively, expert JO5 of the TRC 
mentions that even if they do discuss white spaces and reframing, the technical 
context does not allow the implementation of such management ideas. He 
further mentions that technological neutrality is not applied in Jordan and will 
probably not be implemented soon, as it depends on how intensely the 
operators would push for this topic and it does not seem like an urgent concern 
137 
 
to them at the moment. To him, this can be explained because of the size of the 
Jordanian market which is very small and not pushing enough in this direction 
(Expert JO5, 2014). In this case a discrepancy is observed between the policies 
in terms of spectrum management, which are showing a close parallelism to 
international and European best practice in the sector and the practical context, 
which is not yet ready to implement such ideas.  
Regarding interactions between different models and the role of the EU, it was 
observed in the case of Jordanian spectrum management, that the policy 
development in the sector is closely linked to international practice in the field, 
due to its cross-border characteristic. One of the heads of the TRC mentions 
that spectrum management is not a national issue and that the ITU plays a very 
important role in this case (Expert JO4, 2014). This expert mentions that “[t]he 
planning is in line with the ITU and in coordination with the neighbouring 
countries” (Expert JO4, 2014). However, it appears that much attention is drawn 
towards the EU, as a key benchmark, due to its technical expertise and 
consequent market dominance. Expert JO5 from the TRC mentions that Jordan 
has to follow the biggest markets in the region, as it makes more sense from a 
technological and also geostrategic point of view. This expert mentions that the 
TRC does benchmarking with the EU in the spectrum management area, in 
particular concerning spectrum pricing, spectrum planning, allocation and 
licensing practices. This expert mentions that “[w]e get the most useful 
information from the EU, because we are allocated into the same region 1 and 
the technologies we use originate from the EU, such as GSM, UMTS. It makes 
more sense to follow the EU rather than the US in this aspect” (Expert JO5, 
2014). In this case, it is apparent that management ideas, technological 
neutrality and spectrum trading are included in Jordanian policies. The role of 
the EU in this context is also confirmed. 
4.3.3 Case studies (5 & 6) Egypt  
Telecommunications services in Egypt have followed an exponential growth as 
in Jordan and Morocco. Mobile penetration in Egypt has risen from 1.9% in 
2000 to 119.9% in 2012 (ITU, 2011b, ITU, 2014). The Telecommunications law 
No.10 was put in place in 2003 and established the NRA. Developments in the 
telecommunications sector in Egypt have been characterised by avant-gardist 
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policy reforms, such as the launch in 2007 of 3G mobile services, where Egypt 
was the first African country to do so (NTRA, 2008). Egypt has also seriously 
considered implementing unified licences for both fixed and mobile services18, 
this project has however been put on hold until further notice (Expert EG5, 
2014). This shows also the weakness of the Egyptian telecommunications 
market, marked by backwards policy structures, with a notable involvement of 
the state in all aspects of telecommunications services paralysing potential 
reforms.  
In Egypt, dynamic development of the sector mostly took place between 1998 
and 2011, illustrated by two changing political orientation of the country. The 
renewed dynamism of the sector can be found in the architect of the new ICT 
Ministry founded in 1998, Dr Ahmed Nazif, who later became prime minister of 
Egypt in 2004, until his cabinet was dismissed in 2011 by President Hosni 
Mubarak following the 2011 political events (Abdulla, 2007:19, NTRA, 2007:1).  
Abdullah argues that Nazif’s experience as former CEO of a large private 
corporation and a former professor of computer engineering gave him impetus 
to steer the MCIT towards deregulation and privatisation of mobile telephony 
and internet services in Egypt (2007:19). The dynamism of the 
telecommunications sector in Egypt decreased after 2011 following the political 
turmoil in the region. The expert of Vodafone said that before 2011, it was a 
different world and the telecommunications sector underwent important 
changes, largely undertaken by the action of Dr Ahmed Nazif (Expert EG5, 
2014). The 2011 political upheavals shed a paralysing light on the 
developments of the sector. This had an impact on the quality of the field 
research. Several experts did not feel confident to discuss personal views on 
                                            
 
18
 A unified license for both mobile and fixed phone services permits the licensee to offer a full 
range of services, via any technology platform. Ideally, in such cases, the spectrum allocated 
could be used for different services by the same phone company. This change in authorisation 
regimes is notably due to the convergence of fixed and mobile services and technological 
advances, which have eroded traditional market boundaries and have heightened the 
importance of neutrality and flexibility in authorisation regimes. Unified licenses are likely to 
produce a rebalancing of phone companies in Egypt as once the unified license is established, 
Telecom Egypt will be capable of competing with the three existing mobile phone companies, 
thus rebalancing the profits and market strategies (WORLD BANK. 2011. Telecommunications 
regulation handbook; 10th Anniversary Edition [Online]. Available: 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/reg/D-REG-TRH.01-2011-PDF-E.pdf [Accessed August 8 
2015].) 
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the sector and most official interviews confirmed the governmental view on the 
subject. It needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the gathered 
data. 
In Egypt, the extensive role of the state in phone companies can be easily 
observed when analysing ownership of fixed and mobile companies. The fixed 
service operator is Telecom Egypt (TE) and is owned in majority by the 
government (Telecom Egypt, 2014). Similarly to both Morocco and Jordan the 
mobile phone landscape is shared by three mobile phone operators. MobiNil is 
the main player in the field. It received its licence in 1997 and a 94% share was 
bought by the French Orange Group in 2012 (Mobinil, 2012). The second 
mobile telephony player received its mobile licence in 1998 under the name of 
ClickGSM. Its majority shareholding was bought by the British group Vodafone 
in 2007 (55%). The remaining 45% of the company are owned by the Egyptian 
government (Telecom Egypt, 2010:30). In 2006, a third mobile license was 
awarded to the Emirati company Etisalat, which owns 66% of the company. 
Furthermore, shares of Etisalat are owned by the Egyptian National Post 
Authority (20%) and the National Bank of Egypt (20%) (Oxford Business Group, 
2011). In Egypt, the government is involved in two out of three mobile 
companies, plus the fixed line company, showing the close governmental 
involvement in the telecommunications sector. This has led to issues of 
transparency or lack thereof, favouritism and stagnation of the market.  
Case study (5): USO in Egypt 
Two articles mention USO in the Telecommunications law No.10, however, their 
scope is relatively narrow and in both cases, USO is not distinctly described. 
Firstly, the law states that telecommunications services shall be compliant with 
the provision of Universal Service (NTRA, 2003:Art.2). Secondly, the 
Telecommunications Law No.10 mentions that when granting licences, one of 
the obligations includes the consideration of USO (NTRA, 2003:Art.25). This 
means, that in Egypt, the provisions of USO may be given to operators through 
the awarding of the license, which is monitored by the NTRA. The substance of 
USO is to be found in the 2005 regulation published by the NTRA, which 
focuses on implementation, funding, scope and aims of USO (NTRA, 2005). 
This regulation is published in Arabic and no official translation is available. As 
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such, it was translated by a bilingual academic researcher specifically for the 
use of this research (NTRA, 2005). To complement the 2005 USO regulation 
and cross-check the English translation, several documents and 
communications are useful. The NTRA released a publication on USO in 2006. 
In addition, less formal publications are available such as the USO webpage of 
the NTRA website (NTRA, 2014a) and an informal summary received by one of 
the NTRA employees directly during the field research (NTRA, 2014b). It is 
available upon request.   
USO in Egypt follows two different paths. On one side, USO in the 
telecommunications law is undefined and left for the NTRA to decide. The 2014 
communication received during the field research, confirms that “unlike what 
happens in EU Countries (…), where the regulatory framework clearly defines 
content, features and scope of the universal service, as well as the procedures 
to identify the operator who is obliged to provide it, the Egyptian Law does not 
impose direct Universal Services Obligations” (NTRA, 2014b). Hence, the 
Telecommunications law does not define and neither does it impose directly 
USO, but indirectly entitles the NTRA, notably through the licenses, to detail 
such requirements onto designated operators (NTRA, 2014b). In fact the 2014 
communication underlines that the law provides leeway to the NTRA to include 
a number of provisions in the license and may as such introduce USO for the 
incumbent, in this case Telecom Egypt (NTRA, 2014b). However, the policy 
also mentions that the situation is not fixed and depending on the development 
of the market and new technologies, this situation may be reassessed (NTRA, 
2005). Expert EG5 from Vodafone confirms that in Egypt, TE is not the USO 
provider, as no USO provider exists as such in Egypt (EG5, 2014).  
On the other side, several communications and publications define USO closely 
to the EU policies in the field and propose a clear definition and scope. USO is 
described as an inevitable right to all citizens, with the aim of promoting political, 
economic and cultural cohesion leading to economic development (NTRA, 
2006:2). These policies underline the necessity to provide basic and affordable 
public telecommunications services to all citizens, in economically non-feasible 
regions, including, access to public telecommunications networks being local, 
national or international, including fax and data services with speed rates that 
allow access to the internet (NTRA, 2006:2, NTRA, 2005). In this context a fund 
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exists to cover infrastructure projects, reallocation of the frequency spectrum, 
national projects and indemnifying telecommunications companies for price 
differences between the approved economical price for the service and that 
which may be determined by the state in favour of the user (NTRA, 2003:Art.9). 
This fund consists of the contributions of operators and providers in the 
communications networks. The percentage of contributions in the fund reaches 
1% of the totality of the revenues (NTRA, 2005). However, Expert EG5 of the 
NTRTA states that USO contributions were mentioned in the telecoms licenses 
but were never requested by the government due to the amount of investment 
the telecommunications companies were already spending in the sector. This 
changed in 2012, when the government asked for a participation of 0.025% of 
the revenue (Expert EG5, 2014).  
USO projects funded by the USO funds only recently took life in Egypt. The 
results of calls to build smart IT cities in the South Sinai Governorate and the 
North Sinai Governorate were published in 2014 (NTRA, 2014a). The 
implementation of the USO project is very local and linked to few uncovered 
areas. Expert EG3 mentions that these calls focus on creating business friendly 
smart cities (Expert EG3, 2014). This type of project, based on infrastructure 
building of smart IT cities, is not a typical form of USO and an Expert from 
Cullen International mentions that according to him, this does not conform to 
USO policies in a European sense (EU20, 2014). However, when discussing 
with the corporate companies about the concept of smart cities, they did not 
understand the concept and Expert EG5 from Vodafone mentioned that the call 
had been specifically aimed at providing mobile phone coverage to three cities 
in South Sinai and no mention of smart cities as an objective was published in 
any way (EG5, 2014). Wadi Feran was allocated to Vodafone Egypt, Sarabeet 
Elkhadem to MobiNil and Wadi Soaal to Etisalat Misr. The rights are allocated 
via the USO fund (EG5, 2014). The misunderstanding between the experience 
of the corporate sector in USO and the discourse of the NRA is revealing in the 
Egyptian case and shows a grey area between what the TRC wishes to 
achieve, the Smart Cities, and the completion of the project, which is so far 
linked to the service provision of mobile services in three cities of South Sinai.  
In Egypt, both the use of mobile phone and internet broadband are not 
adequate to analyse the development of the sector. In the theoretical concept of 
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smart cities, both mobile phones and internet broadband are included. It is 
however, not a typical form of USO. It is difficult to conclude that interactions 
with external models have led to this result. The focus on smart cities is very 
different to the EU, Moroccan and Jordanian models. In general, USO in Egypt 
does not follow the regional trends in the field. An expert of the NTRA mentions 
that one of the first aims of Egypt in terms of USO is to make people understand 
that national broadband projects are not only about the connection itself, but 
about the ecosystem beyond the connectivity (Expert EG3, 2014). This echoes 
the 2011 National Broadband strategy emphasising the need to analyse the 
requirements of the broadband ecosystem in Egypt (NTRA and MCIT, 2011:10), 
illustrating a different approach to implement USO than the EU. 
Nevertheless, interaction between the models exists with the EU. However, as 
for Morocco, Egyptian policy-makers did not feel that the EU model was 
adequate to the Egyptian context (Expert EG3, 2014). He mentions that “[i]f you 
look at the EU countries, you see that there is only obligation on the incumbent. 
We believe in other things. We finance projects from the USF for areas where 
there is no economic feasibilities to build networks, for example in Sinai, in the 
desert. That is where we can use USO to provide services, which would not be 
provided if it weren’t for the USF” (Expert EG3, 2014). The Vodafone Expert 
also mentions that Egypt is a particular place in terms of population, where 7% 
of the land is inhabited and thus, it does not make sense to insist for coverage 
in the whole territory (Expert EG5, 2014). He is also very straightforward in 
terms of the limitation of the EU model and mentions that the EU model is 
based on subsidies for the fixed line, which is not something applicable to 
Egypt. In this case study, it is observed that even if the adopted law in 2003 
mentions USO and is further outlined in the 2005 regulation, the implementation 
of USO projects has actually not taken place until recently. The USO call to 
provide mobile services in South Sinai was only published in 2014 and does not 
resemble other known projects in the area. However, as mentions Expert EG5 
from Vodafone, Egypt is only in the first years of realization of USO projects, 
and it is still too early to come to any conclusion (Expert EG5, 2014).  
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Case study (6): Spectrum Management in Egypt 
Chapter 4 of the Telecommunications regulation law No.10 deals with frequency 
spectrum management and usage licensing, stating that frequency spectrum is 
a limited natural resource and the NTRA is the entity responsible for regulating 
and managing all matters related to it in accordance with the provisions of this 
law (NTRA, 2003:Art.49). The NTRA shall set the frequency spectrum plan to 
realize its optimum use in accordance with the ITU (NTRA, 2003:Art.50). The 
focus on spectrum and the establishment of broadband in Egypt has been 
substantial in the last decade. In 2004, the “Broadband initiative” was launched 
as part of the e-access program of the information Society Initiative announced 
by former President Mubarak in December 2003 at the WSIS in Geneva (NTRA, 
2007:1, MCIT, 2003). It was then reviewed in 2006 and 2007 focusing on 
continuous improvement and adjustment of the service and the liberalisation of 
the sector (NTRA and MCIT, 2011:10). It focused on several technical and 
infrastructure developments, but also aimed at spreading the awareness of the 
benefits of broadband to the public, similarly to the USO projects (NTRA, 
2009:5). This idea of an ecosystem of technologies is embodied clearly in the 
Smart Village built in the outskirts of Cairo. Both the MCIT and NTRA are based 
there, in addition to all mobile phone operators and other IT industries present 
in Egypt such as Intel, Hewlett Packard, IB, Siemens, Microsoft and Oracle 
(Abdulla, 2007:42).  
One of the major characteristics of the Egyptian spectrum allocation system is 
the role of the military. In Egypt, the Ministry and regulators co-manage the 
spectrum together; however a substantial amount of spectrum is controlled by 
the army, which makes it difficult to reform the sector. The Frequency 
Regulation Committee is headed by the NTRA spectrum regulation chairman. 
This Committee also includes representatives of the Ministry of Defense and 
Military Production and the Affairs of State facilities, the Ministries of the Interior 
and of the Communications and Information Technology and a representative of 
Radio & TV Union (NTRA, 2015). The telecommunications regulation law No.10 
mentions that licenses shall be issued with due consideration to the 
requirements of the Armed Forces and National Security Entities (NTRA, 
2003:Art.51). The law also mentions that the NTRA shall have the right to use 
all the means, to detect unauthorised frequency in coordination with the Armed 
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Forces and National Security Entities (NTRA, 2003:Art.55). As Abdulla 
mentions, the spectrum allocation process in Egypt is very politicised and 
transparency is limited in that regard (2013:59). The expert from Vodafone 
mentions that the problem with spectrum in Egypt is the control of the army. He 
mentions that “[t]he army controls the spectrum and the Ministry and Regulators 
co-manage it but cannot do anything without the army approval” (Expert EG5, 
2014). This both represents a lack of transparency and accountability and leads 
to inefficient allocation and regulatory practices.  
In Egypt, the digital switch-over has not yet taken place. In addition, there is no 
spectrum shortage in Egypt. As such, there is not much pressure for changes of 
the situation. The expert from Vodafone mentions that even in the context of 
military control of spectrum, there is no real issue and no shortage of spectrum, 
similarly to Jordan (Expert EG5, 2014).  In this case, there is no significant 
internal pressure towards changes in spectrum management, due to the 
availability of spectrum for the main Egyptian stakeholders. Thus, in terms of 
the pressures of the market, in Egypt as in Jordan, the pressure of allocating 
spectrum is less than in some EU countries. Expert EG5 from Vodafone 
mentions that “[f]or the existing voice and data needs, the spectrum we have is 
enough” (Expert EG5, 2014). Figure 6  shows the 2004 VHF and UHF spectrum 
allocation in Egypt. It is almost exactly similar to the Moroccan one. The digital 
switch-over has not yet taken place in Egypt. 
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Figure 6 VHF & UHF Spectrum allocation in Egypt 
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In Egypt, technological neutrality and spectrum trading are discussed in the 
context of the broadband initiative. One of the heads of the NTRA mentions that 
spectrum management is a very important and complex sector which needs 
urgent optimisation. This expert mentions that they do look at EU topics such as 
spectrum trading, technological neutrality, but they need to come out with a 
clear strategy of what they want to do with the resources and how to manage 
them first. This expert mentions that the NTRA is planning the digital switch-
over around 2016 and infrastructure shall be built to become the backbone to 
absorb the whole capacity of bandwidth (Expert EG3, 2014). He mentions that 
spectrum management “needs dynamic resources allocation, recycling; we 
need to assess how we can free the spectrum” (Expert EG3, 2014). He 
mentions how important it is to organise and plan the migration from analog to 
digital, in order to free spectrum management for newer technologies, in 
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particular the 4G (Expert EG3, 2014). The use of technological neutrality and 
spectrum trading in internal discussions to develop the sector is visible in Egypt. 
However, the sector is not yet ready to implement such ideas. Expert EG5 from 
Vodafone mentions that current EU concerns, such as spectrum trading or 
technological neutrality are not the priority in Egypt. He mentions that “[w]e are 
very far from it. We are still dealing with issues such as auctions and whether 
there will be a frequency diagnostic” (Expert EG5, 2014). It can be observed 
that in the case of spectrum, both technological neutrality and spectrum trading 
are not part of the Egyptian priorities, even if they are discussed domestically. 
Interaction of Egypt with other models exists. The NTRA 2007 publication 
mentions that Egypt has actively participated in all ITU sectors (NTRA, 2007:9). 
The interaction with EU models was also observed, however, the sector is 
paralysed for several reasons. These reasons include the close government 
control in the field and the general instability of the climate in the country. Expert 
EG5 from Vodafone deplores that Egypt is not following international 
agreements as it should. He mentions that “[w]e have been members of the 
WTO for years and we have obligations to deregulate the market, but we are 
now nine years late” (Expert EG5, 2014). For several experts of the Egyptian 
telecommunications sector, the paralysis with spectrum policies is neither due in 
majority to the army control nor the availability of spectrum, but it is the quality 
of infrastructure, which cannot cope with newer technologies. Expert EG5 
mentions that to rent the infrastructure they pay 10 times more than in Holland 
and the service is minimal (Expert EG5, 2014). In this case, state monopoly is a 
problem in terms of infrastructure provision and may slow down policy changes. 
Hence he mentions that things will change only when Egypt gets a permanent 
cabinet and adds “until then it is difficult to make any plans happen” (Expert 
EG5, 2014). Hence, interaction with the EU and international fora has taken 
place. Experts in the sector are aware of management trends in the field. 
However, the government control in the field, linked with the general instability 
in the country, has created a certain paralysis of policy innovations. The recent 
elaboration of the unified license however, shows how avant-gardist Egypt can 
be in the sector. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed all six case studies in detail. An analysis of the USO and 
spectrum management policies was given for the three countries based on a 
selection of laws and policies and expert interviews gathered during field 
research. The two sectors were analysed according to two management ideas, 
each outlined by characteristics of product and process. Table 19 on page 119 
gave the detailed outcome of the chapter’s analysis. Based on the results of 
Table 19, Table 20 only gives the overview of the results, which allows for more 
clarity.  
Table 20 Results of the observation of policy diffusion (overview) 
 Case 
Study (1) 
Morocco: 
USO 
Case 
Study (2) 
Morocco: 
Spectrum 
Case 
Study (3) 
Jordan: 
USO 
Case 
Study (4) 
Jordan: 
Spectrum 
Case 
Study (5) 
Egypt: 
USO 
Case 
Study (6) 
Egypt 
Spectrum 
Idea 1 + 0 + 0 0 - 
Idea 2 + 0 + 0 - - 
TOTAL + 0 + 0 - - 
Notes: Values: +: high policy adoption; 0: medium policy adoption; -: low policy adoption; na: 
Not Applicable. 
Source: Author. 
 
Both the detailed version of Table 19 and the overview version of Table 20 
illustrate the main findings of this chapter. Empirically, this framework shows 
that high policy adoption is observed in two cases: USO in Morocco (case 1) 
and USO in Jordan (case 3). Medium policy adoption is observed in two cases: 
spectrum management in Morocco (case 2) and spectrum management in 
Jordan (case 4). Finally, low policy adoption is observed in the two remaining 
cases: USO in Egypt (case 5) and spectrum management in Egypt (case 6). 
Two main observations can be made based on this table. Firstly, Egypt scores 
lower than Morocco and Jordan in both sectors. This suggests that a state-level 
difference between the three country cases exist. This is discussed in detail in 
the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter 5). Secondly, the table shows that in 
Morocco and Jordan, USO policies are more significantly adopted than 
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spectrum policies. This suggests that a sector difference may be at play in 
these cases. The last empirical chapter discusses this issue (Chapter 6).  
High policy adoption is observed in the Moroccan USO model (case 1). In this 
case, the influence of the European model was observed, but also that of other 
actors in the field. This empirical research showed that other models were 
discussed such as the Peruvian one. In addition, it was made clear in the 
interviews that the Moroccan USO model had been modelled and shaped 
according to the Moroccan needs and capacity. The USO model in fact includes 
both mobile telephony and internet as opposed to the EU model. It is described 
by most Moroccan Experts of this research as an efficient mechanism adapted 
to the Moroccan context. Hence a focus on performance is apparent. It can be 
observed that policy adoption has taken place in this case, but it has not led to a 
convergence of policies with the EU, but to an adapted model based on 
different influences to fit the Moroccan context.  
High policy diffusion is observed in the Jordanian USO model (case 3) as well. 
In this case, the observation of other models is perceptible as well. However, 
there is a focus on the EU uniquely. The decision not to include mobile phones 
and broadband internet in the USO definition is very similar to the EU decisions 
in this sector. The Jordanian USO is based on one fixed telephony USO 
provider, JTC, now part of the Orange group. There is no specific interest in 
efficiency and as Expert JO1 from the Ministry of telecommunications states 
“[r]ight now, we have a USO policy, but to be frank with you, it isn’t as effective 
and efficient as it is supposed to be” (Expert JO1, 2014). There are remarkable 
parallels between the EU model and the Jordanian ones, despite differences in 
the domestic contexts.  
Medium policy adoption is observed in the Moroccan spectrum management 
model (case 2). In this case, it is apparent that a close observation of the EU 
model is taking place. Several experts mentioned that being part of the ITU 
Region 1 together with the EU, has often led Morocco to adopt European 
technological norms and practices. One of the experts of the ANRT mentions 
that “[t]he EU develops norms in relation to this (Region 1) spectrum area, 
Morocco as a member of this region, needs to take them into account” (Expert 
MO7, 2014). Technological neutrality is included in Moroccan legislation. The 
implementation of spectrum trading is however more difficult to observe. 
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Several experts mention that this reflexion is followed by Morocco, as it is in 
Europe. However, in both cases, it is at early stages still (Expert MO7, 2014).  
Medium policy adoption is observed in the Jordanian spectrum management 
model (case 4) as well. In this case, the focus on the EU is straightforward. 
Expert JO5 from the TRC mentions that Jordan follows the biggest markets in 
the region. It states that the TRC uses the EU to do benchmarking concerning 
spectrum pricing, spectrum planning, allocation and licensing practices. In that 
regard, the ITU allocation (Region 1) pushes the TRC to look at the EU models 
and technologies, rather than the US (Expert JO5, 2014). Technological 
neutrality has been included in the license since 2007. Concerning the 
questions of spectrum trading, the policies include them but technologically the 
country is not yet capable of implementing such a policy fully. This leads us to 
observe the process of diffusion, but the observation of the diffused laws 
themselves is less obvious. 
Finally, two results show low policy adoption in the cases of Egypt. In the case 
of Egyptian USO policies (Case 5), both in terms of product and process, the 
links between the EU and Egypt are only limited. The scope of USO has been 
narrow, until the recent calls to provide mobile telephony in three cities of South 
Sinai. Such programmes are not standard in terms of USO projects. In this case 
policy adoption is not taking place extensively. The EU model is addressed by 
the policy makers, but it is not taken into consideration due to its inadequacy 
with the Egyptian context. The second case refers to Egyptian Spectrum 
Management policies (Case 6). It appears that spectrum management policies 
are limited by several factors, including the control of the military over the 
regulatory authority, the availability of spectrum, which does not require urgent 
changes in management and the delay in technological development, which 
does not allow for the adoption of EU trends at the moment. In this case, it 
appears that Egypt is aware of trends in the field, however, the domestic 
context does not allow for policy changes to take place significantly. In both the 
Egyptian cases, policy diffusion takes place to a limited extent.  
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5 CHAPTER 5 – Conditions leading to policy adoption 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the second empirical step of this thesis and answers the 
first sub-question: under which conditions does a state adopt a policy that 
originated elsewhere. It explores the conditions under which policy adoption 
occurs. This thesis argues that the conditions leading to policy diffusion are 
linked to different degrees of vulnerability of the adopting countries to external 
actors (Section 2.3). This vulnerability is defined by four variables, which reveal 
the levels of governance and market openness of a state and its political and 
market interconnectedness with external actors. The focus on vulnerability to 
external actors is based on two statements. Firstly, that states engage in policy 
diffusion because of the similarity of problems, forcing them to look abroad for 
potential inspiration (Majone, 1991:103, Rose, 1991:7) and secondly, due to the 
interdependence of decision-making abroad and domestically (Gray, 
1973:1176, Gilardi, 2010:660). Their measurements are based on statistics 
from the OECD and the World Bank statistical databank and on indexes from 
two different research initiatives; namely the World Bank’s WGI and the 
Bertelsmann Foundation’s BTI.  
The four variables are governance openness, which is defined as the degree to 
which a country is taking into account the rule of law and the work of regulatory 
authorities; market openness, which is described as the reliance on national 
and international market forces to regulate the economy; political 
interconnectedness, which is defined according to the political reliance on 
external countries, in terms of foreign aid. Finally, market interconnectedness is 
defined as the degree of international trade interdependence, in terms of the 
importance of the private sector in the domestic economy and the role of FDI. 
Figure 1 illustrates the two opposing hypothesis regarding conditions leading to 
policy adoption (H₁ High and H₂ Low) (firstly shown in Section 1.4, page 22). 
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Figure 1  Conditions leading to policy diffusion 
Low  High 
Governance openness Governance openness 
Market openness Market openness 
Political interconnectedness Political interconnectedness 
Market interconnectedness Market interconnectedness 
  
LOW Policy diffusion  HIGH Policy Diffusion 
(H₂ Low) (H₁ High) 
Source: Author. 
 
Figure 1 outlines the two first hypotheses that are assessed in this chapter. The 
first hypothesis (H₁ High) proposes that the higher the degree of governance 
and market openness, political and market interconnectedness, the higher the 
probability of policy diffusion taking place. It also outlines the second hypothesis 
(H₂ Low). It states that the lower the degree of governance and market 
openness, political and market interconnectedness, the lower the probability of 
policy diffusion taking place.  
Based on these two hypotheses the assumptions of the country case studies 
were defined in Section 1.5.1. It is argued that due to the linkage of Jordan and 
Morocco to external partners, for instance regarding trade with the EU for 
Morocco and Jordan, such countries are likely to engage in policy adoption 
more readily than Egypt, which is on all points more autonomous then both 
Morocco and Jordan (Table 2, page 28). Figure 2 illustrates this relationship 
(firstly shown in Section 1.5.1, page 29). 
Figure 2 Country-cases assumptions 
Low  High 
Governance openness Governance openness 
Market openness Market openness 
Political interconnectedness Political interconnectedness 
Market interconnectedness Market interconnectedness 
  
EGYPT  MOROCCO 
 JORDAN 
Source: Author. 
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The idea that Morocco and Jordan are more likely to adopt policies that 
originated externally than Egypt has been already put forward in the previous 
chapter (Sections 4.3 and 4.4). It was observed that in both Jordan and 
Morocco, policy adoption cases were more systematically observable than was 
the case for Egypt. This suggests that a country level difference exists between 
the three country cases. This proposition is addressed in this chapter’s analysis. 
To understand the validity of the four variables described above, it is important 
first, to introduce certain aspects of political economy and regulatory 
governance key to Arab countries as a whole and in particular to Morocco, 
Jordan and Egypt. These states have gone through different phases since they 
obtained independence from colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s. Various 
economic and regulatory reforms have restructured the relationship between 
the state, the citizens and the market. In fact, telecommunications is a case in 
point to illustrate how governments have gone through a transformation over 
the last sixty years. The aim of this chapter is not to propose an in-depth 
analysis of the development of the state-market relationship in the Middle East 
since independence. However, it clarifies several parameters that need to be 
taken into account when addressing current regulatory developments in the 
Arab world and particularly in the three country case studies selected.  
To do so, this chapter is divided as follows. The first section focuses on the 
contextualisation of the MENA region with the aim of bringing a historical and 
political economy background to the four selected variables of governance and 
market openness and political and market interconnectedness. It supports the 
understanding of current trends in state-market and domestic-foreign 
relationships. This part focuses on the timeframe since the independence of 
MENA countries to the 1980s and 1990s, where major economic and structural 
reforms were undertaken in MENA countries. The second section of this 
chapter deepens the understanding of the three country case studies of this 
thesis since the 1980s and 1990s. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco are described as 
using the trends explained in the first section, but mostly focusing on the turning 
point represented by the adjustment measures that these countries underwent 
before the millennium. The third section of this chapter focuses closely on the 
selected states variables since the years 2000s. It discusses the state variables 
framework in light of the contextual regional backgrounds.  
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5.2 Contextualising the MENA experience 
This part addresses the MENA context generally. It is divided into four sub-
sections, with each of them contextualising one of the four selected variables 
used in this framework. In practice, all four parts are linked with each other, but 
the identification of few characteristics for each variable supports the analysis of 
this chapter. The first subpart describes the context of governance in MENA 
countries. It relates to the variable of governance openness. This is 
characterised in the Arab world by the expansion of the bureaucracy, which 
took place after independence. Ayubi describes bureaucratic growth as a 
mixture of the expansion of the state’s role in society, the tendency for 
bureaucratic organisations to expand and the inertia to dissolve organisations or 
reduce their scope once established (Ayubi, 1995:289). The presence of this 
bureaucracy and inertia of its institutions is key in the MENA region and can still 
be observed to some extent nowadays.  
The second subpart links the expansion of bureaucracy to state-led economies, 
which is a widespread feature of MENA countries. It aims to contextualise the 
second variable of this framework, that of market openness. In MENA countries 
economic development has been linked in many ways to the expansion of 
state’s bureaucracies post-independence. Alavi argues that “[t]he state in the 
post-colonial society directly appropriates a very large part of the economic 
surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name 
of promoting economic development” (1979:42). This illustrates how economic 
activity has been channelled in the MENA countries post-independence. Both 
the bureaucratic expansion and the features of state-led economies, which are 
typical of MENA systems, have had a wide-ranging impact, which is discussed 
in more detail below. 
The third subpart of this section reviews the concept of economic dependence 
and particularly the concept of rentier states. It underlines the fact that several 
MENA countries have built their economies on non-domestically produced 
income. This is linked to the variable on political interconnectedness. Rentier 
economies render the states highly dependent on external developments. This 
has had important historical consequences, which are relevant to this 
contextualisation for several reasons. First of all, as the vulnerability of adopting 
states to foreign influence is discussed, rentier economies present an 
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appropriate study case. It also shows who are the main regional and 
international actors in the MENA region and which events have affected the 
economies of Arab countries. Jordan is a case in point as it is often classified as 
a non-oil rentier economy (Anani and Khalaf, 1989, Rivlin, 2013) and bases 
large parts of its economy on non-domestically produced income. This makes 
the country highly vulnerable to foreign influence. Egypt and Morocco also 
present some characteristics of rentier economies (Rivlin, 2013). This is notably 
the case due to labour remittances from nationals working in Gulf States or the 
sale of fossil energy, such as phosphates in Morocco. 
To finalise this contextualisation, the fourth subpart focuses on the fiscal crisis 
of the MENA states and the move towards restructuring measures enforced by 
international lenders and their financial bodies such as the World Bank and the 
IMF. This is linked to the variable of market interconnectedness. Such reforms 
became widespread after the 1980s’ recessions.  Morocco engaged with major 
structural adjustment programmes in 1983, Jordan in 1989 and Egypt in 1991. 
These measures have enforced principles, such austerity, cutting off subsidies, 
liberalisation and privatisation and often resulted in traumatic experiences, 
creating widespread social unrest and unsatisfactory results (Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya, 2005, Easterly, 2005). These measures altered the MENA’s 
economic systems dramatically. This provides an adequate contextual 
background to the variable of market interconnectedness and the reliance on 
FDI in MENA countries.  
Bureaucratic expansion post-independence 
The expansion of the state in MENA countries occurred immediately after the 
independence from the colonial powers. Ayubi mentions that it was led by a 
variety of factors including a historically centralised tradition reinforced by 
colonial rule. It was also a consequence of a huge expansion in the area of 
formal education and its links to public types of employment. The presence of 
weak entrepreneurial elites also supported an exceptionally important role of the 
state (Ayubi, 1988). The expansion of the state has been a broad phenomenon, 
regardless of size, colonial legacy or ideology. Chatelus and Schemeil mention 
that public sector expansion has been one of the main vehicles used by state 
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elite to create a unified state (Chatelus and Schemeil, 1984). Large states 
became characteristic of the MENA countries post-independence. 
Ayubi mentions that the process of bureaucratisation that swept through the 
Arab World since 1950s can be measured by the expansion in public bodies, 
such as the numbers of administrative units, personnel and expenditures. It can 
also be seen as an orientation whereby the administrative and technical aims 
dominate the social ones, which leads to centralisation, hierarchy and control 
(1995:296). Amin analysed the different types of enterprises under state-control 
and mentions that the public sector by the late 1950s rarely extended beyond 
irrigation works and public utilities. However, by mid-1960s, agriculture, oil, 
retail trade, housing and small-scale industry had become predominant in 
several countries of the MENA region (1980:84). However, the expansion of the 
state post-war has not only been a characteristic of lesser developed countries. 
In fact, Jackson’s study on bureaucracy focuses on the post-war post-industrial 
society. He mentions that “[i]n the post-war post-industrial society, the range of 
government activities has been rapidly extended to include an expansion of the 
welfare state, protection of the environment and consumers, regulation of 
industry and the military complex” (1982:3). As such, the expansion of the 
bureaucracy was not a uniquely MENA phenomenon and in several ways, post-
industrial countries also experienced an extension of the civil servants. This is 
even clearer with the nationalisation of industries post-war, such as 
telecommunications, which took place in both developing and more developed 
countries. 
In the 1970s however, it became apparent that strategies of development 
through large administrations were unable to solve problems as planned. It 
became apparent that bureaucratic expansion was dysfunctional, outweighing 
its positive aims (Ayubi, 1995:313). Ayubi mentions that “[a] relative growth in 
gross national product (GNP) in the 1950s and 1960s was soon to decline from 
the early part of the 1970s in most of the non-oil exporting countries, while 
many basic needs remained unsatisfied” (1995:313). The financial and 
economic malfunctioning of both state intervention and public-enterprise sectors 
from the 1970s has also been outlined by Richards and Waterbury (1998:205). 
Hence, while at the start, bureaucracy could be seen as an instrument of 
modernisation and development, it nonetheless became soon too large to 
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absorb all resources and penalised private enterprises (Ayubi, 1995:309). In 
fact, before becoming redundant the development of a state-led growth 
economy brought a series of successes which are underlined below. It 
nonetheless reached its limits in a difficult economic context.  
State-led economies 
Bureaucratic growth and state-led economy grew hand in hand in MENA 
countries post-independence. Bureaucratic expansion slowly reached its 
dysfunctional peak. It is nonetheless important to remember that such a system 
also led to several successes and created positive socio-economic effects for 
several years and even decades, notably in terms of employment (Richards and 
Waterbury, 1998, Richard Adams and Page, 2003). El-Said and Harrigan 
underline the value of this social contract, where the government provided 
social welfare in return for loyalty from the population for the political regimes in 
power (2014:101). The expansion of the state post-independence has been 
referred to as the emergence of the “patron state”, where the state both 
embraced the role of the business entrepreneur and the provider (Harik, 1992). 
Harik mentions that the rise of the state to the position of major businessman 
was achieved by assuming greater economic initiative and was maintained by 
mass mobilisation and bureaucratic regulation (1992:1-2). The successes of the 
MENA expansive states should not be underestimated and the difficult context 
in which it developed also put pressures on MENA states to cope with the 
environment. Richards and Waterbury argue that state-led growth achieved a 
great deal and that was “no mean achievement considering the rapidity of 
population growth, the heavy burden of defense expenditures, the limited 
natural resources base apart from oil, the initially low levels of literacy, and the 
perennial political instability of the region” (1998:205). The successes of 
expanded bureaucracy brought at first solutions for several of the weaknesses 
inherited post-independence.  
This phase of expanded bureaucracy and state-led economy is illustrated by the 
nationalisation process of telecommunications. While the years before 
independence were characterised by the ownership of telephone companies by 
foreign governments or firms, it increasingly represented the embodiment of 
foreign intervention in domestic affairs. Noll argues that there is no wonder that 
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the first act after independence was to nationalise firms, which embodied 
foreign inference in domestic affairs and to hold them under the newly formed 
domestic government (2000:8). He argues that developing countries decided to 
implement strategies escaping from colonial influences. Therefore, 
infrastructural industries such as telecommunications, which were important and 
visible, represented a source of anticolonial resentment and were quickly 
nationalised (2000:8). Foreign ownership became a natural target to be 
abolished after independence. The nationalisation of telecommunication 
services was not unusual in that time and neither was it uniquely taking place in 
developing countries. All colonial powers, such as Britain, France, Portugal and 
Spain were using nationalised telecommunications models (Bauer, 2010c). This 
reiterates the idea that the expansion of the bureaucracy post-war, was actually 
not only a characteristic of developing countries and but also more developed 
and industrialised countries followed this path (Michalis, 2007, Simpson, 2008). 
These strategies were followed with relative success until the end of the 1980s.  
The successes of monopolies confirm Jackson’s idea that “there is nothing 
straightforward about the concept of public sector efficiency (…) much of this 
discussion about public sector efficiency applies with equal force to the private 
sector of an economy” (1982:210). In Europe, monopolies, such as the ones in 
the telecommunications sector did not underperform and did not prevent growth 
(Joskow, 1998, Snow, 1985). Hence, the direct phase following the 
nationalisation of the telecommunications sector, developing countries 
experienced a short term increase in investment. Moreover, Galal mentions that 
state ownership was often preferred to private ownership due to insufficient 
knowledge about the future impact of reform, the lack of experience in 
regulating private monopolies and the fear among producers that assets could 
be expropriated through under-pricing of output, taxation of profit or outright 
nationalisation (1999:133). However, this did not prove efficient in the longer 
term and the state industries were in fact only seldom competitive and suffered 
both from price and technical inefficiencies. The telecommunications sector 
soon experienced a deterioration of its services and infrastructure (Wallsten, 
2001). This coupled with domestic-price distortions led to both a wrong set of 
produced items and the marginalisation of infant industries (Richards and 
Waterbury, 1998:205). The telecommunications sector is a case in point to 
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show the move from nationalisation to privatisation, experiencing different 
phases from relative success to slow decline in performance and efficiency.   
Rentier economies and the role of foreign aid 
MENA economies post-independence were characterised by an intense 
centralised power of the state and a heavy bureaucracy. This picture needs to 
be complemented by the rising economic dependence and vulnerability to 
external actors that MENA countries have increasingly shown post-
independence. This dependence is most distinctly observed through the 
growing needs in borrowing from foreign governments and international 
financial markets to feed the citizens, maintain the welfare state and keep up 
with production (Harik, 1992:2). This rising financial hole in MENA countries led 
to an increasing dependence on advanced industrialised nations, instead of 
successfully reaching autonomy from them (Harik, 1992:2). The reliance on 
foreign aid and external borrowing to maintain the level of the state is key to 
most MENA economies and has had a key role in the fiscal and budget crisis of 
the states post-1970s. 
The use of the concept of rentier economies gives additional clarity to the 
increasing dependence on external actors. A rentier states economy relies on 
foreign rent to support the population and the economy. Foreign rent is usually 
described as revenues from the export of energy resources such as oil, in the 
case of rentier states. However, foreign rent can also relate to foreign aid or 
labour remittances, which is more generally included in the concept of rentier 
economies (Luciani, 1987:69-75). Foreign aid and debt write-offs may also be 
considered as types of rental income (Rivlin, 2001:65). These different forms of 
rent share the same characteristic namely that they emanate from foreign 
sources and are not generated through domestic production (Chaudhry, 2007). 
In rentier economies the role of the state as a recipient and dispenser of rent is 
smaller than in a rentier state. However both remain closely linked. In fact, 
expatriate worker remittances and economic aid in MENA countries are often 
directly or indirectly resulting from the areas’ oil wealth (Brand, 1992:168-9). 
Jordan illustrates this interlinkage between oil states and rentier economies.  It 
is commonly referred to as a “non-oil-producing oil economy”, where most of the 
gross domestic expenditure is estimated to have derived from direct grants and 
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budget support loans from the neighbouring oil-exporting countries (Anani and 
Khalaf, 1989:211). The case of Jordan is explained in further detail in next part 
(Section 5.3.2). 
One of the main consequences of such economies is that rentier economies are 
vulnerable to economic and political development of countries on which they 
depend. This dependence may be on richer oil or non-oil states in the region, 
countries outside the region or international financial organisations, such as the 
IMF or World Bank (Okruhlik, 1999). These sources of income are unstable and 
depend on economic and political conditions abroad. In fact, regional and 
international developments in the 1970s and 1980s had a direct impact on the 
economies of the MENA countries. In many ways, the fluctuation in oil prices 
and the different armed conflicts of the area contributed to the acceleration of 
the fiscal and budget crisis of several Arab countries and ultimately led them to 
restructure the economy following the principles of the IMF, World Bank and 
major lenders. As Richards and Waterbury mention, the reliance on external 
sources of investment finally led to the accumulation of large external debts, 
including, foreign borrowing and aid from the US, the EU and capital-surplus oil 
exporters of the Gulf (1998:206). The deficiencies of the large bureaucratic and 
state-led economies in MENA countries led to major restructuring of the 
economies, of which impact is still visible nowadays. 
Declining performances and the path towards restructuring  
The 1980s represented a challenging environment and most Arab borrowers 
experienced a major increase in foreign debt. The collapse of oil prices in early 
1980s let the oil-rich Arab states decrease their aid to other Arab states. 
Countries were increasingly forced to borrow more in order to finance important 
investments (Rivlin, 2001:70). Richards and Waterbury underline the failure of 
state-led growth to close the twin gaps between domestic savings and 
investment and between exports and imports that contributed to accumulation 
of large foreign debts (1998:207). Progressively, Arab countries followed the 
path of liberalisation and privatisation, representing a prominent change to the 
era of centralised-economy and bureaucratic expansion of the previous 
decades.  
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The crisis of the 1970s and 1980s created a radical change in political 
economy. Particularly, state-led economies gradually embarked in the trend 
towards fiscal, monetary and international trade balances. Cook also argues 
that the accelerated interest in liberalisation undoubtedly arose from the 
perceived failures of state control and intervention (1986:1). The large debts 
that countries in the MENA gradually confronted narrowed their leeway. The 
influence of lending agencies became core to the policy process (Richards and 
Waterbury, 1998:207). Facing collapsing economies, developing countries were 
forced to adopt regulatory measures following external pressures providing 
short-term rescue (El-Said and Harrigan, 2014). In all three countries of this 
research, both the debt and the burden of financing it rose sharply until all three 
were deeply engaged in structural adjustment programs. 
The case of telecommunications sector again illustrates the crisis of the state 
convincingly.  Noll argues that the growing inefficiency of nationalised telephone 
companies being strengthened by high number of employees and the use of 
telecommunications revenues for government budget, led to a lack of 
investment funds (2000:10-2). The lack of cash flow in such an investment 
intensive sector gave no chance for the sector to overcome its crisis. Regulatory 
and legal institutions proved incapable of providing credible commitments for 
potential investors and finally, legal restrictions on FDI exacerbated the 
problems of attracting capital (Joskow, 1998:2). Joskow underlines the risks of 
using infrastructure sectors to pursue a variety of social and political goals. He 
mentions the risks of corruption, poor performance and management, which 
siphoned off revenues and increased the costs (1998:2). These various issues 
led to a phase of deep structural reforms.  
Hence, the process of reform in MENA countries did not result from pressures 
of the native entrepreneurs but corresponded to the fiscal crisis of the state 
reinforced by the pressure from the international community such as the IMF 
and World Bank and main lenders to embrace restructuring measures (Ayubi, 
1995:313). Cook in particular mentions that while in some cases the changes 
toward industrial developments generated from within the governments 
themselves, by far the most prominent pressure had arisen externally through 
industrialised country governments and international agencies (1986:1). Several 
authors underline the fact that the rescue programmes of the IMF and World 
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Bank were in fact the only options available for developing countries at the time 
(Ayubi, 1995:313, George and Sabelli, 1994:220). Such measures were 
criticised as reflecting the interests of industrial states, such as the US, and 
lending agencies, including the IMF, World Band and United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), underlining the enforcement measures 
approximating coercion, from loans to military force (Harik, 1992:13, Richards et 
al., 2013:228, Pitcher, 2012). Such reforms did not reflect a cheerful experience 
and neither were they principally led by poor performance but due to fiscal and 
budgetary pressures of the states (El-Said and Harrigan, 2014, El-Ghonemy, 
1998). They nonetheless represented a turning point for economies and 
institutions of the MENA region, which embraced the late 1990s and early 
2000s as part of a neoliberal order led by international financial and economic 
such as the WTO. 
The telecommunications sector represents again a case in point to illustrate the 
economic and governance changes in MENA countries following the 1980s and 
1990s restructuring measures. The telecommunications underwent the 
experience of the neoliberal reforms, confirmed by the entry into force in 1998 
of the WTO liberalisation agreement on Basic Telecommunications. The 
telecommunications sector increasingly evolved from a system based on state-
led economy to a deregulated sector, marked by the creation of NRAs and the 
role of the international community (Simpson, 2008, Humphreys and Simpson, 
2008). Hence this sector embodies adequately a move from a state-owned 
towards mostly privatised and deregulated sector, having gone through a 
variety of phases of centralisation, deterioration, adjustment and competition 
(Sharma and Lawrence, 2015). In most cases, it reflects a sector where the 
government, corporate and international interests intertwine, with only little 
mention and involvement of the citizens.  
5.3 Background of the three country case studies  
The above part outlined the key role of the state post-Independence until the 
turning point in the 1980s and 1990s. A broad bureaucracy aimed at fulfilling 
several key socioeconomic aims, such as employment. The role of the public 
sector as a source of employment is visible in the traditional route in MENA 
countries from graduate studies to positions as civil servants (Ayubi, 1988). 
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Another typical employer in MENA countries is the military. Rivlin underlines the 
role of the military in providing employment and military services and 
maintaining military-types of government, such as in Egypt (2013:22). He 
mentions that “[t]he large size of armies and security forces means that the 
state has an overwhelming monopoly of force, something that limits opposition 
to regimes in the Arab world” (2013:22). The role of the military, as an 
employment provider, but also a controlling faction involved within the 
government and policy-making is also key in these countries, and is 
characteristic of the telecommunications sector, due to its potential use to 
control and censor the population (Noam, 2010). The system based on large 
bureaucracies was gradually put under pressure, with an inefficient, costly and 
oversized government to finance. The fiscal and budgetary crisis of Arab States 
in the 1970s and 1980s and the consequent restructuration of MENA 
economies, under the Washington Consensus principles, have created difficult 
and sometimes traumatic transitions towards liberalisation and privatisation.  
The focus of this section is on the turning point of the fiscal crisis in the 1970s 
until the end of 1990s, so to understand with more clarity the origins of the 
political and economic trends of the case countries in the 21st century. The 
1980s brought key changes to the MENA region with drastic restructuring 
measures, observed in the implementation of rapid economic reform, 
liberalisation and transition (El-Said and Harrigan, 2014:100). This section firstly 
presents Egypt due to its key role as an economic and political leader in the 
Arab World. Secondly, the Jordanian case is presented due to its proximity with 
Egypt and the similar geostrategic context of both countries. Finally, Morocco’s 
case is given, representing a third scenario, slightly more detached from the 
geostrategic challenges of Egypt and Jordan, but nonetheless following similar 
trends. 
5.3.1 Egypt 
Egypt is one of the largest countries in terms of both population and economy. 
Despite being relatively poor, it has been an example of avant-gardist 
institutional trends, such as bureaucratic expansion, trade and liberalisation 
(Ghoneim, 2012). It has had a key role as a political and economic leader in the 
MENA area since Independence. Rivlin mentions that Egypt’s political influence 
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within the Arab world and in the Middle East as a whole has been considerable 
“[a]s a result, the economic policies that it follows are something of a 
weathervane for Arab countries” (2013:95). Egypt was a champion of the public 
sectors in the 1950s and 1960s. It also became the architect of the non-aligned 
movement, being the leader of a bloc of independent nations detached from 
both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact (Osman, 
2011:59). The influence of Egypt in the area during the Cold War was extremely 
important, as Egypt championed the idea of a Grand Arab Nation.  
However, the suffocating bureaucracy contributed to the failure of the project 
and led to a strategic re-orientation from the 1970s to the 2000s from the USSR 
to the US doctrine (Osman, 2011:77-9). This movement from the influence of 
socialism to the capitalist doctrine was observed and Egypt became a leading 
country in the Arab world experimenting with economic liberalisation and 
privatisation from the mid-1970s. However, Ayubi mentions that if it is true that 
Egypt was the first country in starting such reforms it was not the first one in 
implementing them and it took almost two full decades for the process of 
restructuring and privatisation to be achieved (1995:339). In fact, despite being 
a champion in initiating reforms and restructuration, the predominance of the 
state in Egyptian social, economic and political sectors has remained deeply 
marked (Rivlin, 2013:95). Ayubi mentions that “although domestic capital has 
welcomed the new policies, and while international capital has encouraged it, 
privatisation in Egypt is still basically a public policy pursued by the state for its 
own purposes” (1995:340). This shows a continued dominant role of the state, 
where privatisation has not necessarily involved a retreat from the government, 
but a reshaping of its influence. 
Ayubi mentions that the implementation of structural reform remained very slow 
because of the government’s apprehension over the political risks of radical 
restructuring (1995:346). In fact, reforms of the 1970s were defeated by food 
riots in 1977. Rivlin argues that these riots have affected Egyptian policymaking 
ever since. He argues that “they made the government unwilling to take steps 
that would reduce the living standards of the poor, urban areas; and they made 
it impossible for the government to implement the reforms contained in the 
agreement” (Rivlin, 2001:101). Furthermore, in Egypt, former military and 
intelligence officers remained very close to the policies of the Infitah or “opening 
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up”, securing their role in the Egyptian state and economy (Marshall, 2015). The 
promise of the emergence of a new upper class of merchants remained empty, 
with the 1974’s opening up reforms enriching leading figures and political allies 
and friends, without improving the situation of the society (Osman, 2011:137). 
Rivlin mentions that Egypt’s economy paid a heavy price for maintaining the 
regime in power, specifying that “[c]lose links between favoured 
businesspeople, the military, senior military officers, and politicians, combined 
with a vast bureaucracy, provide a system of patronage while stifling much 
private initiative and political freedom” (Rivlin, 2013:117). In Egypt, the influence 
of the military in the government and the economy is still perceptible nowadays. 
The gradual move away from the Soviet model to the US one did not take place 
without political turmoil in the MENA region. The process included securing 
peace with Israel, a highly contentious issue in the region. Following the 1978 
Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt, Gulf states stopped all 
concessional loans to Egypt in retaliation. These loans were taken over by 
Western Donors, deepening the changes in balance of power in the region 
(Rivlin, 2001:102, Ayubi, 1995:342). However, Egypt could not compensate 
completely its lack of foreign capital. From the 1980s, a large bureaucracy 
coupled with political instability of the region and Egypt’s division with the rest of 
the Arab World led to a crisis of fiscal and budgetary deficit (World Bank, 2004). 
The dependence on foreign capital was exacerbated with the 1990-1991 Gulf 
crisis. However, Egypt was unusually forgiven of debts, leading to a favourable 
atmosphere among the members of the political elite for accepting conditionality 
formula (Hinnebush, 1993). In exchange for massive debt relief, the government 
adopted a reasonably conventional stabilisation and structural adjustment 
package endorsed by the IMF (Richards et al., 2013:249). In 1999 more than 
USD 2 billion were written off, followed by more than USD 10million in 1990 
(World Bank, 2015e). Rivlin mostly argues that these debt write-offs were 
political acts designed to reward Egypt for its support for Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait (2001:67-8). Egypt’s economy 
underwent drastic reforms with the hope to compensate high unemployment, 
fiscal and trade deficits.   
Despite the planned reform, Egypt’s economy did not perform in the 1990s. The 
privatisation process did not follow a transparent path, as regime insiders did 
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extremely well, resembling nomenklatura privatisations of the former Soviet 
Union, where insiders closely connected to the state apparatus gathered most 
of the benefits (Loewe, 2013). Following the years of privatisation from the 1991 
to 2004, Egypt engaged into technocratic reforms, with a new technocratic 
government put in place under President Mubarak to accelerate economic 
reforms. This produced a recovery of economic reforms and success, notably 
with the deflation of the Egyptian pound that increased exports in 2003 (World 
Bank, 2004). However the social contract of the state remained under pressure. 
Job creation lagged behind and failed to meet the rapidly rising number of 
young job seekers (World Bank, 2004). The 2000s, despite the economic 
restructuration and privatisation efforts undertaken by the government did not lift 
up to their promise and left Egypt in a complex decade which would be marked 
by phases of political and economic turmoil and paralysis.  
5.3.2 Jordan 
Jordan may not be a champion in pioneering measures as is Egypt, but it is 
indeed a case in point regarding the role of the IMF and structural reforms in the 
country in the 1980s. Jordan is in many ways very different to Egypt. It is a 
small economy and it does not possess remarkable natural resources, except 
for phosphate and potash. Hence, Jordan’s economy is built on a narrow 
productive base. It is heavily reliant on emigrant remittances and foreign aid 
(Alon, 2010). The role of the government since Jordan’s independence has 
been quite extensive, even if subtle at times (Choucair, 2006). Ayubi mentions 
that “[i]n spite of adopting a formally ‘open’ and ‘liberal’ economic policy, the 
government’s involvement in the Jordanian economy has been very substantial” 
(1995:367). Brand also mentions that Jordan has traditionally been viewed as a 
free-market economy, which did not follow the Arab-socialist or state-capitalist 
experiments of the 1950s and 1960s. However she underlines that it is 
inaccurate to think that the state only played a minor role (1992:170). The 
Jordanian industrial activity has been initiated by the government in several 
ways. 
However in Jordan, the rationale has been very different from the one in Egypt. 
Jordan has had to embark later on than countries such as Egypt in a process of 
state-building. Hence, several state-led economic decisions have been taken in 
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this objective (Brand, 1992:168, Chatelus and Schemeil, 1984). Ayubi mentions 
that “[t]he Jordanian royal family has had to impart ‘substance’ to an otherwise 
artificial state that lacks any really distinct geographical or human base, by 
emphasising in particular the process of institution-building” (1995:367). This 
confirms the argument of Chatelus and Schemeil that embarking on an 
industrialisation programme in Jordan has been the result of a state-building 
process (1984). Jordan has since Independence had to juggle with small 
resources and a relatively heterogeneous population in a generally unstable 
area. Its political and economic development took a largely different path to that 
of Egypt.   
Jordan has had an important role in an unstable region, characterised by 
political uncertainty and wars with international ramifications. All these aspects 
need to be taken into account to consider the evolution of the Jordanian state. 
In fact, the role of Jordan as a buffer state has impacted the country 
extensively. Jordan has a central location at the heart of the Middle East and 
has long been a key trading post between Asia and Europe (Vivekanand and 
Kollar, 1997:157). The regional political instability since the Second World War 
has deeply accentuated Jordan’s buffer state role in the eyes of the 
international community. Jordan’s role in the middle of the turmoil has been 
marked by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which dramatically shaped Jordan’s 
future, including changes of territorial borders, and the large movements of 
refugees (Westrup and Al-Jaghoub, 2007:11, Ayubi, 1995:367). Balancing a 
process of state-building and a key role as a buffer state under close scrutiny of 
the international community has been a difficult exercise for Jordan. Rivlin 
mentions that “[m]anaging the economy, like managing Jordan’s foreign policy, 
has been a matter of tightrope walking” (2001:112). He adds that the country’s 
crucial geopolitical situation has enabled it to extract a form of rent from the 
international system, mainly in the form of economic and military aid from 
Western Europe, the US, and Japan (2001:113). The role of Jordan as a buffer 
state in the region has been paralleled to high levels of foreign aid and rents, 
accentuating its reliance on external sources of income, rather than developing 
its own capacity.  
Jordan is often characterised as a rentier economy. Its economy is built on a 
narrow productive base, which renders it very vulnerable to economic and 
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political development in the Gulf, regionally and internationally. Jordan is 
particularly sensitive to foreign aid and as Wilson argues, Jordan has always 
been aware of the political role of aid. Wilson mentions that “U.S. aid has a 
political price in any case, a fact of which Jordan is well aware” (1988:326). 
Jordan’s dependency on foreign rent was put under pressure following the 
economic difficulties of Arab donors, including the 1978 oil recession 
(1988:326). The momentum of economic activity in the 1980s in Jordan was 
maintained by high levels of government expenditure, heavily financed by 
external and domestic borrowing, leading to net budget deficit (El-Said and 
Harrigan, 2009). The increasing debt burden of Jordan led it to call in the IMF 
and negotiate a structural adjustment programme in 1988, which resulted in a 
series of policies of privatisation, trade liberalisation and reduction of public 
debt. This caused unrest in parts of the country due to increasing prices 
(Westrup and Al-Jaghoub, 2007:11, Ryan, 1999:666, Brand, 1992:167). In this 
disruptive context, similarly to Egypt, several privatisation policies of joined 
private-public ownership were implemented to ensure political cohesion in 
Jordan.  
In 2000, Jordan joined the WTO. The same year, a free trade agreement (FTA) 
was signed with the US. Similarly an agreement with the EU was signed in 
2001. Several authors argue that by 2005 Jordan was regarded as an excellent 
example of how a country can develop using the assistance of the IMF 
(Westrup and Al-Jaghoub, 2007:12, El-Said and Harrigan, 2014, Piro, 1998). 
Jordan had made noticeable steps to adjust to international commitments by 
following the IMF and World Bank policies and by joining the WTO and entering 
into FTAs with both the EU and US. The changing economic orientations from 
the 2000s also coincided with a turning point in governing officials. The 
accession in power of King Abdullah II in February 1999 paved the way to a 
series of reforms with the priority of strengthening the economy, increase 
employment and reduce poverty (El-Said and Harrigan, 2009, Zakharova, 
2004). The 1999s governing changes led the path for new generations of 
politicians focusing on competition and technologies to develop the country.  
However, even if King Abdullah II pushed for reforms in a variety of sectors, 
opposition was strong against certain measures undermining the interests of 
groups close to the monarchy. The result has been a close government control 
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on the privatisation programs and the sale of public companies to strategic 
investors with close ties to the palace and often with a link to security 
establishments, similar to Egypt (Choucair, 2006). According to Rivlin, Jordan 
gradually intended to wean itself off reliance on economic rent. The 
reorientation of the economy has brought about a dramatic increase in exports, 
but despite large investments in education and welfare, the country still suffers 
with high unemployment rates, in particular among the young and better 
educated (2013:155). Jordan showed commitment to be part of the international 
community, it has followed structural adjustments quite thoroughly, but 
economic growth did not take place as expected and the state remains closely 
involved in the economy and society.  
5.3.3 Morocco   
Morocco is an interesting case to observe the expansion of the state-led 
economy on one side and the role of the international community in reforming 
Morocco’s economy on the other (Boukhars, 2011). Morocco, as in other 
countries in the MENA area, has seen several challenges emerge in the post-
war era, including a high urbanization rate, a high ratio of youth to total 
population and an increasing impoverishment of the population (Rousset, 1990, 
Storm, 2007). Layachi underlines that such issues were coupled with prolonged 
economic crisis domestically and internationally and with a political malaise well 
into the 1980s (1999:43-6). It ultimately led Morocco to engage with IMF-
sponsored structural-adjustment program in 1983 (Jaidi, 1992). The Moroccan 
fiscal and budget crisis in the 1980s mirrors in several ways the cases of other 
MENA countries, and notably those of Jordan and Egypt. 
Morocco’s main resource is phosphate. It is the largest phosphate exporter in 
the world and possesses around three quarters of the world reserves (FAO, 
2004). White argues that it is specifically Morocco’s resource endowment, which 
facilitated a deferred economic adjustment until well into the 1980s (White, 
2001:122). Morocco furthermore holds controls over rich fishing water, 
developed a sophisticated tourist industry and enjoys remittances from 
Moroccan migrants abroad. Morocco also relies heavily on agricultural exports. 
In 2012, food exports accounted for 17.2% of total exported goods (World Bank, 
2015d). All these characteristics render Morocco a country highly vulnerable to 
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external shocks, as is Jordan. This is particularly the case regarding 
developments in Europe, Morocco’s main trading partner19. In the 1970s 
however, several contextual difficulties accentuated Morocco’s fiscal and 
budget deficit. These include the collapse of phosphate prices after 1976. The 
diminishing revenues from phosphates combined with expenditures due to the 
beginning of the Saharan War increased its fiscal and trade deficit.  
Richards and Waterbury furthermore mention the unwillingness of Morocco to 
cancel investment projects and change its industrialisation policies because of 
political fears of decreasing public-sector salaries (2013:243). Layachi also 
mentions the burden of a decrease in Morocco’s tourism industry, which was 
affected greatly by the instability in the region, the rise of militant Islam in North 
Africa (Layachi, 1999:46). The foreign debt inexorably rose to unmanageable 
heights. As foreign creditors refused to continue financing budgetary deficits, 
Morocco turned to lending bodies for assistance in 1983 (Doumou and El Malki, 
1990). Morocco’s debts and credits were rescheduled against the 
implementation of the IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment measures. 
The structural adjustments carried an important social cost with a decline in real 
wages, rise in unemployment, inflation, increase in urban migration and 
dangerous concentration of poor citizens in overgrown cities. Such worsening of 
conditions led to several riots in the 1980s and 1990s (Sater, 2007, Lofgren, 
2000). Layachi mentions that one of the main impacts of the 1980s restructuring 
measures, however, was the change in the people’s perceptions of the role of 
state, as the public institutions increasingly retreated from public services 
(1999:48). This underlines the diminishing role of the state in the Moroccan 
economy and social services as a consequence of the implementation of 
traumatic adjustment measures. 
Morocco has shown on the international level, a notable commitment to 
implement the Washington Consensus measures, albeit with limited outcome, 
similarly to Jordan. Richards et al. mention that “Morocco provides a striking 
                                            
 
19
 The EU-28 is the main partner for Morocco in trade in goods. In 2014, imports from the EU-28 
countries accounted for 51% of total trade. In 2014, export to the EU-28 accounted for a total of 
63.4% (EUROSTAT. 2015c. European Union, Trade in goods with Morocco [Online]. Available: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113421.pdf [Accessed Nov 23 
2015].) 
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case of a country successfully overcoming political obstacles to reform, 
systematically implementing a wide array of Washington Consensus policies- 
and then having very little in the way of growth or employment creation to show 
for it” (2013:243). Despite a slow path of privatisation, Morocco’s economic 
reforms were praised by international institutions and European partners 
(Cammett, 2007). Morocco notably took the choice to come closer to the EU. 
Ayubi underlines that Morocco has been traditionally driven by mimicking the 
French model, with the result that even its administrative categories and 
terminology are closer to the French ones, than the ones prevalent in the Arab 
East (Ayubi, 1995:304). However, this choice to come closer to the EU has 
made Morocco vulnerable to economic and political shifts in the neighbourhood. 
Richards et al. argue that Moroccan government and policy-makers have 
gambled on integration with Europe, even while Europeans becoming decidedly 
wary of any closer economic ties with any Muslim country (2013:246). The close 
relationship with the EU is still perceptible nowadays with the signing of the 
advanced cooperation status in 2008. 
The influence of the state diminished in Morocco after adjustment measures 
started in 1983. The state slowly reduced its participation in all economic 
sectors of society and engaged in privatisation programs (Malka and Alterman, 
2006:53). The government continued these measures well into the 1990s and 
pursued export-oriented trade with Europe by abolishing many price controls, 
reforming the capital market, and shifting agricultural incentives (White, 
2001:133). However, as mentions Layachi, this did not indicate that the late 
King Hassan and powerful state apparatus were willing to share power with an 
increasingly independent-minded parliament (1999:50). In fact, Richards et al. 
mention that privatisation has often been politically connected, enhancing 
market shares of the owners and weakening domestic competition (2013:246). 
As in Egypt, business and government elites have often been the primary 
beneficiaries of the economic reforms. This is the case, for example of domestic 
conglomerates, such as the Omnium Nord-Africain (ONA)20, which is owned 
                                            
 
20
 ONA was dissolved in 2010 and is now part of the Moroccan National Investment Company 
(SNI). They own 69% of INWI, the third Moroccan mobile operator (WORLD BANK. 2014a. 
Broadband Networks in the Middle East and North Africa: Accelerating high-Speed Internet 
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partially by the Royal Family (Abdellatif, 2014). In Morocco as well, privatisation 
and liberalisation measures have been closely managed by the state and its 
government apparatus. 
In 1998, the appointment of the Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi and 
succession of King Hassan following his death, of his son Mohamed VI have 
nonetheless brought a new dimension to the central role of the state in 
Morocco. The technocratic government in power has supported an additional 
focus on privatisation and the sale of government assets since the 2000s 
(Richards et al., 2013:246). This is similar to Jordan, which experienced similar 
changes of government in the late 1990s. However, according to Rivlin, the new 
King did not relinquish the extensive power accumulated by his predecessor, 
even though a wider circle of people have been consulted and increased 
freedom of debate in the press and other forums has been given (2013:190). 
Thus, the elite remains concerned with economic development rather than 
political change and the monarchy stays central in all significant decision-
making.  
5.4 State variables analysis & discussion 
The contextualisation of the MENA countries and the turning point of the 
structural measures of the 1980s and 1990s support the understanding of 
contemporary state-economy relationship in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan. 
Overcoming economic restructuration measures of the 1980s and 1990s, 
MENA countries in the early 2000s, share similar challenges in both economic 
and political sectors. With an intense demographic growth, and a large young 
population of reproductive age, MENA countries have an enormous potential as 
a work force (World Bank, 2015a). However, high levels of unemployment and 
low economic growth rates have created pressure on the population and the 
government. Rivlin mentions that “[a]lthough the population of working age has 
grown, so has the size of the dependent population and as a result the pressure 
for public sector spending on social services such as education, health, and 
                                                                                                                                
 
Access [Online]. Available: http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/broadband-
networks-in-mna [Accessed Dec 12 2015].) 
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welfare has increased, often beyond the financial abilities of governments” 
(2013:7). Starting the analysis from the 2000s, this section discusses the 
premise that the four selected states’ variables—governance and market 
openness and political and market interconnectedness—show the level of 
vulnerability to external actors and thus define under which conditions does 
policy diffusion take place. This answers the first subquestion of this research, 
under which conditions do countries engage in policy adoption. 
The previous chapter concluded that in Morocco and Jordan, the adoption of 
management ideas in USO and spectrum frequency was clearer than was the 
case in Egypt (Sections 4.3 and 4.4). The chapter concluded that due to the 
notable difference of both Egyptian cases compared to the Jordanian and 
Moroccan cases, a country level divergence must be influencing the results. 
This observation is discussed in this section in the light of the four state 
variables. Figure 7 shows the four graphs representing the results of the 
variable measurement for the three country case studies. The detailed 
measurement is given in the methodological chapter of this thesis (Section 3.3). 
The four graphs are presented jointly so to display a better visual understanding 
of the dynamics at play across the three countries and across the four variables. 
All graphs are set in the post-economic restructuration context of the early 
2000s. They take their origins from the above contextualisation. 
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The first observation of these four graphs is that Jordan scores constantly 
higher than Egypt and Morocco. In all four indicators, governance openness, 
market openness, political interconnectedness and market interconnectedness, 
the higher levels in Jordan are straightforward. As Jordan is one of the 
countries, where policy diffusion is the more readily observable, together with 
Morocco, this basically fits with the hypothesis stating that the higher the level of 
the four variables, the higher the level of policy adoption is to be expected. This 
shows that Jordan presents higher rates of vulnerability to external actors than 
both Egypt and Morocco.  
As discussed in the previous sections, this higher level of vulnerability of Jordan 
can be explained by different factors. From a historical and geographical 
Source: Author. Based upon World Banks’ WGI 
(World Bank, 2015f). 
Source: Author. Based upon the BTI 
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2015a). 
Source: Author. Based upon Aid Disbursements 
(OECD, 2015). 
 
Source: Author. Based upon World Bank 
statistics (World Bank, 2015a). 
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perspective, the role of Jordan as a buffer state has impacted the country 
extensively. Set in a region characterised by political instability, the state has 
been under close scrutiny from the international community. Jordan has been a 
recipient of foreign aid for decades. This explains the great difference in the 
political interconnectedness results compared to Egypt and Morocco. From an 
economic perspective, Jordan is a rentier economy, in a more comprehensive 
and classical form than Morocco and Egypt. This is intertwined with both 
political and market interconnectedness, as rentier economies are categorised 
with higher degrees of vulnerability to foreign influence. In Jordan, two main 
sources of income are linked to foreign origins, notably the reliance on workers’ 
remittances from expatriated labour forces and the reliance on foreign aid. In 
both Egypt and Morocco, rentier features emanate from the revenues of natural 
resources; phosphate in Morocco and oil in Egypt. These sources of income are 
not directly reflected in the above graphs as are foreign aid and FDI.  As a 
result, it seems logical that Jordan scores significantly higher in the above 
graphs. 
The second observation is that for all four variables, Egypt scores the lowest. 
However, the results are not always very distinguishable from the Moroccan 
ones. In one case, for the political interconnectedness variable, the difference 
with Morocco only becomes apparent post-2005. In two other cases, Morocco 
scores lower. This is the case between 2007 and 2012 for the market openness 
variable and between 2004 and 2010 for economic interconnectedness. Egypt 
scores particularly low concerning the governance openness variable. This can 
be explained by different factors. As was observed earlier, the Egyptian state 
traditionally keeps a strong hold on both the government and the economy. The 
military in Egypt is very close to the power and it can be argued, whether in the 
case of Egypt, the military is not in fact the power in charge. Having a military 
government however, is not an absolute condition to say that governance 
openness cannot take place (Liu and Jayakar, 2016). In the case of Egypt, 
several avant-gardist policies were adopted despite having a low level of 
governance openness. This is also currently the case with the ongoing 
implementation of the unified license in the telecommunications sector (Section 
4.3.3).  
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A low level of governance openness is nonetheless an indicator of 
concentration of power under traditional forms of centralised governance, where 
delegation and deregulation may not take place as easily. Furthermore, Egypt is 
also a much larger country than Jordan and has had a different development 
process due to its influence in the Arab world and in the international realm. It 
has one of the largest economies in the region and it still holds a considerable 
political influence within the Arab world and in the Middle East. As such, the 
Egyptian “project” has been different from the Jordanian and the Moroccan 
ones, with the government more closely involved in the development of the 
economy and society than in Morocco and Jordan. Finally, it was observed in 
Chapter 4 that Egypt did not adopt policies as distinctly as in Morocco and 
Jordan. While the variation in results between Egypt and Jordan is illustrated in 
the graphs as expected, it is not the case with Morocco, except for the 
governance openness variable. This suggests that the variable of governance 
openness offers an interesting nuanced explanation regarding which conditions 
lead to policy adoption.  
The third observation is that the results concerning Morocco are mixed. 
Contrasting with the explicit results of Jordan, Morocco scores similarly and 
sometimes lower than Egypt. This is not confirming the hypothesis that higher 
levels of all four variables show higher probability of policy adoption. Since 
Morocco has been regularly and frequently adopting policies that have been 
originating elsewhere, it is surprising that it scores similar to and sometimes 
lower than Egypt in the other three variables, market openness and political and 
market interconnectedness. Morocco is a sophisticated country with a pro-
active government in the field of telecommunications. Chapter 4 concluded that 
Morocco develops its policies with full expertise and knowledge of the subject. 
This is interesting as it confirms, as with the case of Egypt, that governance 
openness is a key indicator to show the conditions under which policy diffusion 
may take place. Political interconnectedness shows mixed results in the case of 
Morocco and Egypt, with a distinction occurring between both countries, 
however, only since 2005. Market indicators, as in market openness and market 
interconnectedness, also show mixed results to observe conditions under which 
countries may adopt policies that originated elsewhere, suggesting that market 
indicators are less revealing than governance openness in this context. 
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These three observations frame the overall comparative results. The Jordanian 
case confirms the hypothesis (H₁ High) that higher levels of the four variables 
lead to higher levels of policy diffusion. The Egyptian case confirmed the 
hypothesis (H₂ Low) that lower levels of all four variables show lower levels of 
policy adoption. Both conclusions illustrate the observations of Chapter 4. The 
Moroccan case, however, does not evidently confirm the hypothesis. Based on 
the observations of Chapter 4, it appears that Morocco shall have scored 
constantly higher as did Jordan. However, in several instances, Morocco scores 
lower than Egypt. These results suggest that one variable, governance 
openness, is more adequate to discuss conditions under which countries adopt 
policies that have originated elsewhere. Market openness, political and market 
interconnectedness provide mixed results, which need to be assessed carefully. 
The next subsection reviews each of the variables in detail to account for the 
fine-grained differences. Each variable is analysed in the light of the regional 
and country cases contexts described in the earlier sections. Commentaries 
regarding validity and limitations are also proposed for each variable in the 
corresponding sections.   
5.4.1 Governance openness 
Governance openness is defined as the degree to which a country takes into 
account the rule of law and the work of regulatory authorities. It is measured in 
terms of effective regulatory governance, based on both the governance and 
regulatory effectiveness of a country. The measurement of this variable is 
based on the aggregation of two of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the 
government effectiveness index and the Regulatory Quality measure. The 
Government Effectiveness index captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al., 
2010:4). The second measure, the Regulatory Quality index captures the 
perceptions of the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010:4). This variable is directly linked to the functioning of 
the government and regulatory governance in particular. It is argued that the 
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higher the level of regulatory openness, the higher the level of vulnerability of a 
state to external influence, leading to a higher potential to adopt policies 
originating externally. On the contrary, the more a government is centralised 
and controlling, the less it is likely to look abroad for inspiration. In such cases, 
the government implements policies that keep regulation under a domestically 
oriented strategy.  
The first section of this chapter argues that in the MENA countries governance 
openness must be understood in the context of an expanding bureaucracy. This 
expansion has taken place at the independence of MENA countries and has 
been rooted in a variety of factors, such as a historically centralised governance 
accentuated by colonial legacy, a weak business class and expansion of the 
higher education, with a direct link to the public office (Ayubi, 1988). In the case 
of Jordan, the expansion of the bureaucracy has paralleled a need for state-
building (Chatelus and Schemeil, 1984). In MENA countries, the level of 
governance openness is low. In fact, for both Egypt and Morocco, the index is 
mostly negative. This is linked to the contextual historical, political and 
regulatory developments expressed earlier.  
The three country-case studies present similar types of governance openness. 
A wide bureaucracy, a centralised power and the close presence of the military 
in decision-making are found in each country. The centralised power in the 
three country-case studies is an important feature of governance openness. In 
such cases, the power is centralised in only a few key figures. Both Morocco 
and Jordan are kingdoms and even if both countries have engaged with 
parliamentary systems, the role of the Kings, King Mohamed VI in Morocco and 
King Abdullah II in Jordan, remains prominent. In Egypt, the government is not 
a kingdom, but the relationship between the military and the political sphere is 
clearer than in many other countries of the MENA region. In fact, the role of the 
military power is wide in all three countries of this research, but in Egypt, the 
direct link between high level political and military figures cannot be disguised. 
The actual President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is a former military chief, as have 
been several other Presidents before him, including Hosni Mubarak, who was 
overthrown in 2011. Large bureaucratic administrations, with prominent 
influence of the state and military apparatus explain why governance openness 
ratings of all three countries are relatively low. 
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Nevertheless, there is an unambiguous difference between the scores for 
Jordan, Egypt and Morocco. The dramatically different results of Jordan and 
Egypt are not surprising. Jordan has undertaken to restructure the economy 
and governance of the country seriously. Egypt has shown a much more 
intense hold of the power in the hands of the political and military elite. The 
results of Morocco are higher than Egypt, as expected, as well as in the case of 
Jordan, as both were considered as best practice examples for the 
implementation of regulatory practices and benchmarks. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to notice that the results between 2000 and 2014 have as a whole 
not been positive and in 2014 we observe even lower levels than was the case 
in 2000. This can be explained by the deteriorating political and governmental 
context, where several citizens’ riots have been dealt with by state control, 
notably in Egypt. The 2011 Arab uprisings in Egypt are a case in point with the 
return in power of more controlled and centralised governing methods of the 
state. In the case of Egypt, the decreasing transparency and openness of the 
government are visible since the 2010. This was underlined in the interviews in 
Egypt, as an expert from Vodafone reported at different instances in the 
interview that if anything may have happened regulatory-wise in Egypt, this 
would have been the case pre-2011, as after that nothing could progress 
anymore due to the uncertainty of what would happen next at the political level 
(Expert EG5, 2014). This shows a difficult context in Egypt to implement policy 
innovations. 
The governance openness variable sheds interesting lights on the development 
of the bureaucracy in MENA countries towards more efficient regulatory and 
government processes. Several measures encompassed in the WGI show a 
process based on the quality of public and civil services and the competence of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations. 
This is key to this thesis on policy diffusion, as policy diffusion is likely to be 
more present in efficient regulatory institutions aimed at enhanced regulatory 
practices based on worldwide best-practice sharing. Furthermore, the data 
dates from 2000, which is very useful to observe the development of the index 
in the complete timespan from 2000 to 2014.  
However, one of the main limitations of this variable is that its scope for analysis 
is incomplete. For instance, having a better regulatory and governance system 
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may suggest that policy diffusion is likely to take place more regularly. It is 
however possible that policy adoption also takes place in a controlled 
environment, if the government decides that there is sufficient interest behind 
the adoption of a new legislation. A second limitation to this indicator is the 
ambiguity between adoption and implementation. An adopted policy does not 
mean that it will be implemented in any case. Freyburg et al. suggest that a 
“successful rule adoption does not necessarily lead to rule application” 
(2009:916). Hughes et al. also mention the need to distinguish between the 
transposition of external policies into domestic law and the actual 
implementation of the policy, which requires tracking over time (2005:11). 
Hence, the openness of government's variable shows a higher or lower 
likelihood to adopt policies which have been adopted elsewhere. It does not 
mean however, that policy adoption will only take place in countries that score 
higher. It also does not mean that an adopted policy will be implemented in any 
case. Nevertheless, it remains a key variable that highlights the central role of 
governments in MENA countries in deciding whether to adopt policies 
originating from elsewhere.  
5.4.2 Market openness 
Market openness is defined as the reliance on national and international market 
forces to regulate the economy. It takes into account the role of the private and 
public corporate sectors and general economic interests leading to regulatory 
changes. It is measured by the “Economic Transformation” figure provided by 
the “Status” part of the Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation index. The 
variables included in the economic transformation index take into account the 
level of socioeconomic development, organisation of the market and 
competition, currency and price stability, private property, welfare regime, 
economic performance and sustainability. These indicators are very 
comprehensive and elaborate on a wide array of market indicators, which is 
useful to capture the essence of market openness in this thesis. This variable is 
based on the idea, similar to the one regarding governance openness, that the 
higher the level of market openness of a country, the higher the likelihood that a 
government will be looking abroad to get regulatory inspiration. This would 
mean that the country is vulnerable to market developments abroad and needs 
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to take them into account to adapt regulation. On the contrary, the lower the 
level of market openness of a country is, the lower the likelihood is that it will be 
looking abroad for inspiration. A country, whose market is self-sufficient, does 
not need to take into account the economic developments abroad.  
The first section of this chapter argues that in MENA countries, this variable 
needs to be understood in terms of the post-independence state-led economy. 
In this context, the rise of the “patron state”, where the state both embraces the 
role of the business entrepreneur and provider at the same time was observed 
(Harik, 1992:1-2). In such a context, the rise of the bureaucracy has been 
paralleled with a rise of the state as a business entrepreneur. This according to 
Harik was maintained by mass mobilisation and bureaucratic regulation 
(1992:1-2). However, this experience of a state-led economy brought several 
inefficiencies and ultimately led to unbearable fiscal and budgetary crisis. 
Ultimately the system proved insufficient to provide for the welfare regime, 
labour provision and domestic economic growth and led to a restructuring of the 
market following the Washington Consensus principles of austerity measures 
and structural adjustment. In such cases, the liberalisation of the market was a 
priority, based on measures of privatisation and deregulation. This reflected a 
change of regime based on sometimes traumatic transformations, led by foreign 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and foreign lenders, such as the 
US and the EU.  
The three country case studies present similar timelines in what concerns 
bureaucratic expansion, state-led economies and ultimately fiscal and 
budgetary crises. The 1980s and 1990s saw all three countries turning to 
international lenders such as the IMF and World Bank and engaging in 
restructuring measures. In this context of fiscal and budgetary crises, the three 
countries of this research have undergone dramatic transformations. Morocco 
engaged with the IMF in 1983, Jordan followed in 1989 and finally Egypt 
engaged with adjustment measures in 1991. What is striking regarding these 
measures is that even in countries, which implemented them seriously, such as 
Morocco and Jordan, the growth did not follow. Several authors criticise the 
measures of the Washington Consensus as being a trend followed by the main 
lenders at the time, providing no choice to the countries suffering the crisis and 
instead imposing even more disruptive measures on the society as a whole. 
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Easterly argues that the liberalisation, marketisation principle of the 1980s failed 
to accelerate growth between 1980s and 2000s representing two lost decades 
for growth (2001). In the three countries, these measures nonetheless launched 
some degree of privatisation and a diminishing role of the state in the economy. 
This shift was observable in the context of the telecommunications sector with 
the sale of government shares to private businesses in the late 1990s and 
beginning of the 2000s. This is detailed in next chapter (Section 6.2, Framework 
Proposition 1).  
The results of market openness of Egypt, Morocco and Jordan follow a similar 
trend. Starting with relatively lower results in 2003, the index experienced an 
increase in all three countries from 2003 to 2006. This can be understood in the 
continuation of liberalisation and market measures that Egypt, Morocco and 
Jordan have under taken following the restructuration of their economies in the 
late 1990s. The rise is particularly apparent for Jordan, who has been a 
champion in privatisation and liberalisation measures since the 1990s. The 
2006 Bertelsmann transformation country reports underline the successful 
period between 2003 and 2006 in all three countries, which enjoyed the fruitful 
outcome of implementing technocratic measures in Egypt, further integrating 
into the worldwide economy for Jordan and enjoying profitable rainfall in 
Morocco, pushing the agriculture to its best in several years (Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2006c, Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006a, Bertelsmann Foundation, 
2006b). After 2006, however, the results stagnated and reached similar levels in 
2012 or even lower levels in the case of Egypt. Difficult weather conditions, 
such as draught in Morocco, slowed growth (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014). 
More generally however, the three countries suffered from their conjectural 
difficulties, including a heavy role of the government in the economy, nepotism, 
unemployment, small space for individual innovation coupled with difficult 
political and security contexts, challenging foreign sources of income such as 
tourism and FDI (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2015a). This situation accentuated 
in the late 2000s.  
The 2011 political upheavals in the region have led to serious political, social 
and economic disruptions. In the case of Egypt, the overthrown government 
brought additional challenges to an already struggling economy (Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2015b). However, as a whole, in the market openness graph, as in 
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the one regarding governance openness, the higher results of Jordan are 
straightforward. As mentioned earlier, this can be explained by the focus on 
Jordan on privatisation measures since the 1990s and its decisions to commit to 
the worldwide economy’s requirements. This variable however gives a mixed 
picture concerning the results of Morocco and Egypt. Morocco was expected to 
score higher than Egypt, and similar to Jordan, however, this is not the case. 
The unanticipated results of Morocco lead to questions regarding the relative 
significance of the four variables. It indicates that to analyse the conditions 
under which a country is more likely to adopt policies that have originated 
elsewhere, the variable on market openness carries less explanatory potential 
than the one on governance openness.  
Nevertheless, the market openness variable is interesting to consider. It 
illustrates the development processes of developing countries towards market 
systems and shows the main economic powers involved in the region, in terms 
of foreign aid, political influence and trade, such as the US and the EU. Nabli 
and Véganzonès-Varoudakis remind that delays and failures in implementing 
economic reforms are amongst the most common constraints in the MENA 
economies. This explains why the variable is generally low (2007). The variety 
of indicators included in the Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation index 
however is appropriate when accounting for the multi-level aspects of market 
openness, even if the starting date of the available data in 2003, does not 
account for the market openness developments of the three first years of the 
millennium, as do the other three variables.  
It can be observed from the four graphs of Figure 7 that the market openness 
variable is closely linked to the one of market interconnectedness, focusing on 
FDI. In fact, the curve of both variables is expected to be similar. This can be 
explained as the more a market will be liberalised and open, the more FDI will 
be able to flow freely in the country itself. The graphs effectively show a rise in 
both market openness and market interconnectedness between 2003 and 2006 
with a sharp decline after that for the market interconnectedness variable, which 
corresponds to a flattened curve for the market openness one. In both graphs 
nevertheless, the Jordanian scores are noticeably higher than the intertwined 
ones of Morocco and Egypt. Two conclusions from the links between market 
openness and market interconnectedness are drawn. Firstly, both market 
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openness and interconnectedness graphs show similar trends, even if they 
depict different information, justifying their joint use. Secondly, despite the fact 
that Morocco has adopted policies more readily than Egypt, as concluded in 
Chapter 4, the intertwined results of Egypt and Morocco in Figure 7 suggest that 
the variable of market openness brings less clear-cut explanatory potential as 
does governance openness.  
5.4.3 Political interconnectedness 
Political interconnectedness is defined as the interconnections for political 
reasons between two countries. It is here connected to the issue of giving and 
receiving foreign aid. It is based on the premise that the more an adopting 
country is relying on external countries for political reasons, the more it will have 
to pay attention to the policy developments taking place abroad. The variable of 
political interconnectedness is measured by the levels of foreign aid received in 
a country in relation to its GDP. The foreign aid data originates from the OECD 
statistical database (OECD, 2015). The GDP values originate from the World 
Bank 2014 Country indicators (World Bank, 2014b). This is based on the 
premise that foreign aid carries a political cost. For instance, in the context of 
telecommunications, Rodine-Hardy argues that it is probable that a country’s 
debt service affects its probability of liberal telecommunication reform. She 
argues that a country with a higher debt service, is more likely to establish 
certain regulatory changes (2013:24-5). The reasoning behind political 
interconnectedness is similar to that of governance and market openness. 
Higher levels of political interconnectedness represent higher vulnerability to 
decisions taken abroad. As such, higher degrees of this variable are linked to a 
higher probability of adopting a policy that originated elsewhere. On the 
contrary, lower degrees of this variable are linked to lower probably of adopting 
a policy that originated elsewhere.  
The first section of this chapter shows that in MENA countries, political 
interconnectedness has a special meaning. Several countries of the MENA 
present characteristics of rentier states and rentier economies. Rentier states 
typically base their revenues on the export of oil. This is the case for example of 
countries of the Arab Gulf. However, a rentier economy needs not be based on 
oil revenues uniquely. In such cases, a country is also dependent on external 
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sources of income, but not directly related to the sale of oil. This is the case of 
workers’ remittances and loans and grants from abroad. Rivlin argues that such 
economies have characterised the economies of the poorer countries in the 
region, such as Jordan, but also Egypt and Morocco (2001:45-8). The main 
issue with such sources of income is that they are highly dependent on 
economic and political conditions abroad, which generally relates to the idea of 
vulnerability presented in this thesis and more specifically to the concept of 
interconnectedness.  
All three country case studies present characteristics of rentier economies. 
Jordan is however the most classical form. It is heavily dependent upon 
unrequited transfers in the form of expatriate worker remittances and economic 
aid. Anani and Khalaf argue that Jordan is most closely related to a “non-oil-
producing oil economy” (1989:211). This shows the dependency of Jordan on 
economic and political developments in the Gulf, both through the remittances 
of Jordanian workers based in Gulf countries and the foreign aid received from 
these countries. In addition, Rivlin argues that debt write offs are also part of the 
characteristics of rentier economies (2001:68). All three countries of this 
research have experienced such debt write-offs between 1990 and 199521. 
Egypt also presents characteristics of rentier economies. Osman underlines five 
key sources of foreign capital in Egypt: oil revenues, the Suez Canal dues, 
remittances of Egyptians abroad, tourism and foreign aid, all of which do not 
originate from the country’s own productivity (2011:140). Morocco finally is one 
of the main producers of phosphate in the world (FAO, 2004). This is also a 
source of revenues which do not originate from domestic production activities, 
but is more closely related to rentier states, than economies. All three countries 
present certain characteristics of rentier states and economies, this shows that 
all three are vulnerable to developments abroad. For instance, all three 
                                            
 
21
 Jordan experienced around USD 300 to 500 million debt reductions every year between 1992 
and 1995. Morocco experienced USD 2.9 billion write-off in 1991. Finally, Egypt experienced 
more than USD 2 billion debt write-off in 1999, followed by more than USD 10million in 1990 
(WORLD BANK. 2015e. International Debt Statistics [Online]. Available: 
http://data.worldbank.org/news/International-Debt-Statistics-2015-now-available [Accessed Nov 
23 2015]..) 
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countries have experienced massive economic disturbances following 
disrupting oil prices and political conflicts in the Gulf. 
The scores of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in political interconnectedness are 
not surprising and they follow the conclusions drawn from the two previous 
variables, governance and market openness. Jordan is the main recipient of aid 
compared to both Morocco and Egypt. This is logical considering its rentier 
economy characteristics and its role as a buffer state in a politically unstable 
region. It experienced a peak in foreign aid in 2003. Morocco’s level of political 
interconnectedness is situated between that of Jordan and Egypt. Until 2005, 
the results of Egypt and Morocco are intertwined, after that Morocco scores 
slightly higher than Egypt. The fact that Morocco situates in the middle of both 
countries in terms of international community’s involvement and reliance on 
foreign aid is logical. Egypt for instance receives proportionally less foreign aid 
compared to both other countries. This is notably due to the size of Egypt and 
the weight of its economy, which is heavier than both Morocco and Jordan. In 
that sense, Egypt does not rely on foreign aid as much as the other two 
countries do. The level of political interconnectedness in Egypt was closer to 
null in 2010 and rose again after 2011. Changes in political interconnectedness 
trends can be explained by the political upheavals in the MENA region and the  
hesitations of main lenders to provide foreign aid as long as democratic 
standards are not re-established, notably regarding fair and ethical elections in 
Egypt (Heydemann, 2014). The results of this variable are inspiring as they 
illustrate contextual changes in the MENA region. 
The political interconnectedness as a variable is interesting when applied in the 
MENA region as it echoes a particular rentier context, with economies that are 
vulnerable to political and economic developments abroad. This variable 
however is limited in its scope for two main reasons. Firstly, it does not reflect 
the rentier economies completely, as the variable only focuses on foreign aid 
and no other sources of rents, such as worker remittances or debt write-offs, 
which are essential to get a comprehensive picture of rentier economies, 
particularly in Jordan. Secondly, this variable does not show any of the political 
consequences of foreign aid. There exists a large debate on the impact of 
foreign aid in Arab countries and the role that it can have, for example as a levy 
or a weapon to achieve political and economic aims of the donors. In such 
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cases, foreign aid can become coercive (Richards et al., 2013:230). Foreign aid 
carries a political cost, which is included in this variable, intending to describe 
the vulnerability to external actors, including the political consequence of 
depending largely on foreign aid. However, there is no explicit nuance regarding 
the different consequences of this vulnerability. To analyse the fine-grained 
political consequences of foreign aid for each country, additional qualitative 
analysis is necessary.  
5.4.4 Market interconnectedness 
Market interconnectedness is defined as the degree of international trade 
interdependence between two countries, in particular in terms of the role of the 
private sector and specifically the role of FDI in the economy of the adopting 
country. The role of foreign investors is central for a country’s domestic 
development. This is particularly true for industries that require large amounts of 
investment such as telecommunications. This variable is measured using levels 
of FDI from 2000 to 2013 of the World Bank databank compared to the GDP of 
each country (World Bank, 2014b). In the literature the consequence of different 
levels of FDI is not always coherent. For instance, Rodine-Hardy argues that 
the effect of FDI pressure is mixed (2013:67). She mentions that it is unclear if a 
country with low levels of FDI will reform its sector to boost these levels and if 
higher levels of FDI shall lead to a policy status quo to profit from the situation 
as it is. She concludes that either way, a relationship between FDI and the 
timing of reform adoption exists (2013:67). In this thesis, the argument behind 
the use of this variable is similar to the other three variables. It refers to the 
degree of vulnerability of a country to external developments. As such, this 
thesis argues that the higher the level of market interconnectedness of a 
country, the higher the likelihood that this country is going to adopt a policy that 
originated elsewhere. On the contrary, the lower the level of market 
interconnectedness, the lower the likelihood that a country is going to adopt a 
policy that originated elsewhere. 
The first section of this chapter shows the link in MENA countries between 
market openness and market interconnectedness and the major structural 
adjustments that took place from the 1980s and 1990s. While such measures 
have not brought the expected growth in countries that implemented them, they 
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have led to radical changes in a number of sectors. During these adjustment 
reforms, measures were taken to revive growth and adopt measures, including 
the liberalisation and privatisation of the economy (Richards et al., 2013:228). 
These measures mostly impacted the quality of the market structure, however, 
the role of FDI and the private sector emerged in parallel. Rivlin underlines the 
important changes that the 1990s restructuration brought to the MENA 
economies. He mentions the increasing role of the private sector as a supplier 
of finance and the growth in private-sector capital flows to developing countries 
(2001:68). The role of the private sector and cross-national flows relate 
adequately to the concept of vulnerability to external influence. 
All three country case studies have seen the emergence of the private sector 
and the growth of FDI following restructuring measures of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Even if the promised levels of economic development following the adjustment 
measures did not take place as expected, a certain level of restructuration took 
place in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. However, it is important to recall the still 
heavy hand of the government in principal enterprises and the characteristics of 
patronage that define most MENA countries. Furthermore, the large role of the 
army and army-related spending remains an obstacle to privatisation and 
ownership. Rivlin underlines that very large military budgets and the 
involvement in conflicts in the region have impeded successful development of 
the private sector in the long run (2013:27). These different reasons explain why 
FDI in MENA countries were relatively low in the early 2000s, but increased 
until the 2006 after successful technocratic measures implemented in the 
MENA region, before declining again afterwards.  
The scores of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in market interconnectedness follow 
the patterns observed with the previous three variables. Once again, the levels 
of market interconnectedness of Jordan are sensibly higher than those of both 
Egypt and Morocco. This is related to previous arguments regarding the 
championing role of Jordan in supporting privatisation measures and FDI. As 
expected as well, the levels of Egypt are lower than that of Jordan. They are 
however higher than Morocco between 2004 and 2010. The scores of market 
interconnectedness in Morocco are again less visible than expected. This 
mirrors the results of market openness and partially, that of political 
interconnectedness. The second market related variable is similarly not 
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straightforward enough so to explain conditions under which policy adoption is 
likely to occur. Even if the country experienced a rise in FDI in 2006, it did not 
attract as many FDI as did both Egypt and Jordan. As observed earlier, the 
results of market interconnectedness follow a similar trend to those of market 
openness. A rise of FDI until 2006 is observed which is also characterised by a 
rise of market openness in the three countries until 2006. After that date 
however, the market openness variables flattens and the FDI declined. Both 
variables show different aspects of MENA economies, however, they behave 
similarly.  
The market interconnectedness variable is interesting when considering a trade 
approach to the vulnerability of countries to external actors. It was observed that 
this variable was close to the variable of market openness. However, the 
information given by both variables are not completely similar. While the 
variable on market openness refers to an index including a variety of factors 
depicting the market structure of a country, the variable on market 
interconnectedness presents developments trade, and notably in FDIs. Both are 
automatically linked to each other, but they complete the understanding of 
market and trade vulnerability in adopting countries. It is in fact, difficult to 
discuss the variable of market interconnectedness in total separation from the 
other three variables. This variable is undeniably connected to the evolution of 
all other three variables. The development of governance, the styles of market 
economy and political interconnectedness, particularly considering the political 
economy features of rentier economies, have an impact on the level, types and 
quality of market interconnectedness. This shows that in practice it is impossible 
to completely consider each variable as separated from the other.  
One of the main limitations of this variable is however, its limited measurement 
scope.  Similarly to the variable of political interconnectedness, the choice of 
measurement is limited to one aspect of market interconnectedness, the FDI. A 
more precise description of flows to the Arab World would be needed to 
understand comprehensively financial movements in the region. As such, a 
focus on FDI uniquely seems an imperfect measure to grasp the full complexity 
of market interconnectedness and the role of multinational companies and 
private actors in the domestic economies of the three selected cases. A focus 
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on FDI remains however, essential to understand the importance of flows 
across regions and to depict vulnerability to external actors more completely. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter answered the first research subquestion: under which conditions 
does a state adopt a policy that originated externally. The chapter was divided 
into three sections to contextualise and discuss the four state variables. The 
first section contextualised the MENA region until the 1980s and 1990s. In 
doing so, it developed four lines of enquiry which reflected the four selected 
variables. This section shed light on Arab regulatory and market developments, 
discussing the role of the state in the market, the different types and 
developments of economies and the phases of restructuration that Arab 
economies have gone through since independence. This contextualisation 
ensured a setting to understanding the cases of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. 
The second section focused uniquely on Morocco, Jordan and Egypt from the 
restructuration of the economies which took place in the 1980s and 1990s until 
the early 2000s. Several characteristics were outlined and are still discernible in 
current institutions. These included the role of the state in the economy, the 
high level of young labour force, unemployment, the role of the military and the 
close relationship between private businesses and governments. This 
contextualisation followed a historical trend and went from the general MENA 
region to the particular cases of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.  
Finally, the third section of this thesis analysed the four selected state variable 
from the early 2000s. The discussion was based on Figure 7, presenting four 
graphs measuring the four variables for each of the countries. The joint 
visualisation of the four graphs allowed for a clearer comparison. The section 
discussed the two hypotheses linked to the conditions to policy adoption. The 
first one (H₁ High) stated that the higher the degree of governance and market 
openness, political and market interconnectedness, the higher the probability of 
policy diffusion taking place. The second one (H₂ Low) stated that the lower the 
degree of governance and market openness, political and market 
interconnectedness, the lower the probability of policy diffusion taking place. 
Based on these hypotheses, the given assumptions were that Morocco and 
Jordan were likely to adopt policies more readily than Egypt, being situated 
190 
 
more to the right of the continuum (Section 1.5.1). These assumptions were 
strengthened by the results of the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4), which 
concluded that in both Jordan and Morocco the adoption of policies that had 
originated elsewhere was more distinctly observable that in the case of Egypt.  
The results of this chapter confirmed that in the case of Jordan, the four 
selected state variables constantly scored higher than in Egypt and Morocco. It 
confirmed the hypothesis that the higher the degree of all four variables, the 
higher the likelihood of adoption. The case of Egypt was also partially correct 
when confirming the hypothesis as it scored lower than Jordan on all four 
variables. However, in three instances, between 2000 and 2005 for political 
interconnectedness, between 2007 and 2012 for the variable of market 
openness and between 2004 and 2010 for economic interconnectedness 
Morocco scored lower than Egypt. This suggests that some variables have 
clearer explanatory potentials, notably government's openness.   
The fact that Morocco scores similarly to Egypt in three instances, brings an 
interesting twist to the framework. In the case of political interconnectedness, 
the lower results of Morocco took place between 2000 and 2005. Afterwards, 
Morocco scored higher as expected. The two other variables of market 
openness and market interconnectedness also present discernible differences. 
This suggests that they have less explanatory potential than expected regarding 
vulnerability to external actors. While the case of Jordan justifies the use of both 
market variables, the case of Morocco limits the significance of the results. The 
Moroccan case suggests that the best variable to explain conditions under 
which a country is likely to adopt a policy that originated elsewhere is 
governance openness. This is significant in countries such as Jordan, Morocco 
and Egypt which are marked by government control in policy-making. This 
brings an interesting nuance to the argument brought about by policy diffusion 
authors that the market may be central to policy diffusion (Elkins et al., 2006, 
Schmitt, 2014, Simmons et al., 2006). In semi-authoritarian countries, such as 
Jordan, Morocco and Egypt, it appears that policy-making is linked to 
government variables rather than market ones.  
At this stage of the empirical research, a major observation can be concluded. 
In the first empirical chapter, focusing on the observation of two management 
ideas in two policy sectors in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, it was concluded that 
191 
 
Egypt did not adopt policies as distinctly as did Morocco and Jordan. In USO 
and spectrum management, the direct correlation between external policies and 
their adoption domestically was less remarkable in Egypt than in both Morocco 
and Jordan. This conclusion was confirmed with the results of this second 
empirical chapter. Taking into account all four state variables, Egypt has scored 
constantly lower than Jordan. The mixed results with Morocco bring a nuance to 
the validity of the four variables, but do not challenge the fact that in the context 
of this thesis and the selected policies, Egypt has not visibly adopted policies 
originating externally and neither was it expected to do so, according to the 
state assumptions of this thesis.  
Following this observation, it has been decided in the context of this thesis not 
to discuss the case of Egypt in the following chapter. This is motivated by the 
fact that the framework of Chapter 6 aims at disentangling mechanisms of 
policy diffusion in cases where policy adoption has been clearly observed. As 
the cases of Egypt have not been as significant as the cases of Jordan and 
Morocco, it has been decided that they will not be further discussed. For 
instance, the next chapter only focuses on four cases. The two high policy 
adoption cases are USO in Morocco (case study 1) and USO in Jordan (case 
study 3). The two medium policy adoption cases are spectrum management in 
Morocco (case study 2) and spectrum management in Jordan (case study 4).  
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6 CHAPTER 6 – Mechanisms of diffusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter answers the second sub-question of this thesis: how does policy 
adoption take place. It combines five sector variables to the four mechanisms of 
diffusion mentioned earlier, learning, imitation, competition and coercion. These 
variables have been outlined in relation to the work of the NRAs in policy 
making. NRAs are considered central to policy making in the 
telecommunications sector, due to the technological aspect of the field. They 
often work as a delegate to the Ministry to engage in the policy-making activity, 
as they possess hands-on knowledge of the field. While the Ministries set out 
the vision and the political aspects of the telecommunications policies, the 
NRAs implement the rules and regulations to allow for the practical functioning 
of the field.  
The relationship of delegation between the Ministries and NRAs was observed 
in the field research. Expert JO1 of the Jordanian Ministry of 
Telecommunications argues that “[w]hen talking about the telecommunications 
sector, the one responsible is the Ministry. It puts the legislation in place. 
However, we always coordinate with the TRC” (Expert JO1, 2014). For 
instance, the TRC participates through the mandate of the Ministry to any UN 
body, such as the ITU, as regulatory issues and technical standards are 
managed by the TRC (Expert JO1, 2014). The relationship between the NRA 
and the Ministry of Telecommunications is similar in Morocco. One of the 
experts of the Ministry mentioned that “[a]ll programmes of the 
telecommunications sector are developed jointly with the ANRT (…) for 
technical practices the ANRT is in charge, there would be no reason to intercept 
in the ANRT’s work (…) However, all missions are established under the 
authority of the government. The Ministry is in charge of establishing the 
strategies, laws and regulations” (MO1, 2014). The Jordanian and Moroccan 
examples illustrate the role of NRAs as delegate to the Ministries. The Ministries 
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are responsible for the legislations that are in place. The NRAs, however, are 
the ones who are part of regional and international regulatory bodies.  
The sector variables are divided into two sets. The first one refers to the type of 
environment in which policy making is taking place for the NRAs. The 
environment refers to two channels of policy-making. The first environment is 
the international one. It refers to the work within international bodies, such as 
the ITU, World Bank or WTO. The second one refers to transgovernmental 
activities. These can take the form of bilateral agreements, institutional 
partnerships such as twinning projects and transgovernmental forums, such as 
EMERG. The second set of variables refers to the sector pressures. It defines 
the push factors to engage in policy-making. These pressures are divided into 
three main categories. The first concept refers to cases where the policy-
making process is made in an attempt to reach enhanced efficiency. Reaching 
efficiency is presented in this framework as the opposed to following the leader. 
Efficiency defines a focus on the action of a policy versus leadership, which 
defines a focus on the actor. The second variable refers to economic interests 
and the need to convene corporate interests and reach maximum profits. 
Finally, the sanction capacity variable refers to situations where policy-adoption 
occurs following the pressure of an external actor. In this variable, the notion of 
having the capacity to impose sanctions on other actors is central.  
This chapter combines the five sector variables to the four mechanisms of 
diffusion, learning, imitation, competition and coercion in order to infer, in cases 
of policy adoption, what mechanism has been at play. Four hypotheses are 
drawn based on the literature of policy diffusion. They are visible in Table 1 
(firstly shown in Section 1.4, page 24).   
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Table 1 Sector variables defining mechanisms of diffusion 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures 
International 
regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Efficiency 
 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanction 
capacity 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - 
Competition (H₅) + - + + - 
Coercion (H₆) + - - + + 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The first hypothesis of the mechanisms of diffusion framework corresponds to 
the learning mechanism (H₃ learning): Learning mechanisms occur in a context 
exempt of international regulatory channels, economic interest and sanction 
capacity, where transgovernmental collaboration is used with the objective of 
efficiency enhancement. The second hypothesis relates to the mechanism of 
imitation (H₄ Imitation): Imitation mechanisms occur in a context exempt of 
international regulatory channels, economic interest and sanction capacity, 
where transgovernmental collaboration is used with the objective to reach 
conformity with the perceived leaders in the field (the absence of efficiency 
variable). The third hypothesis relates to the mechanism of competition (H₅ 
Competition): Economic competition mechanisms occur in a context of exempt 
of sanction capacity, where international regulatory channels and not 
transgovernmental ones, are used with the objective to satisfy economic 
interests and reach efficiency. The fourth and last hypothesis concerns the 
mechanism of coercion (H₆ Coercion): Coercion mechanisms occur in the 
context of economic interest, leadership and sanctions capacity, where 
international regulatory channels and not transgovernmental ones, are used 
principally and possess the capacity to impose sanctions. Based on the above, 
the two sector-cases, USO and spectrum management are linked to 
assumptions that are discussed in this chapter (Section 1.5.2).  
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Following the results of Chapter 4 and particularly Table 19 on page 119, it was 
suggested that sector level differences in USO and spectrum management 
explained diverging levels of policy adoption. USO management ideas were 
adopted more easily in Jordan and Morocco than spectrum management ideas. 
This is due to the fact that spectrum management is a sophisticated field, where 
policy innovation requires technological tools and capacity. USO policies are on 
the contrary of lesser sophistication and scope and can thus be diffused more 
easily. Table 3 summarises how the five variables are linked to the mechanisms 
of diffusion and how the sector assumptions are defined (firstly shown in 
Section 1.5.2, page 33). 
Table 3 Subsector-cases assumptions 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures  
Internationa
l regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Effici
ency 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanctio
n 
capacity 
Policy 
Sector 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - USO 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - USO 
Competition (H₅) + - + + - Spectrum 
Coercion (H₆) + - - + + Spectrum 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
Both subsectors are expected to perform differently in cases of policy adoption. 
The main difference relates to their economic and political weight. The USO 
sector does not carry much economic and political weight, neither nationally nor 
internationally. USO policies do not involve high adoption costs, as their aim is 
rather social and supplementary to other existing regulations. International 
regulatory bodies and corporations do not feel threatened by policy making in 
this field. As a consequence, it is argued that sufficient leeway exists for 
adopting countries to learn or imitate as wished, without restrictions from 
external parties. On the contrary, policies relating to spectrum management are 
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vital to the economy of a country and its connectivity. In contrast to USO 
policies, spectrum policies carry a heavy economic and political burden. 
Corporations are inclined to see harmonised markets across countries to be 
able to enjoy economies of scale. Governments use spectrum for their own 
purpose, for military and security objectives and sometimes also are 
shareholders of phone companies. Furthermore, they gain much profit from the 
sale of spectrum, for example through auctions. Finally, international and 
regional actors have a remarkable interest, both in profit and security objectives. 
As a consequence, patterns of coercion and competition are likely to occur in 
the majority. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the context 
of the telecommunications sector with a focus on Jordan and Morocco. This 
section frames each of the four propositions surrounding the mechanisms of the 
policy diffusion framework (Section 2.4.2) to allow for a deeper sectorial 
understanding of the framework. The second section analyses and discusses 
the four remaining case studies, USO in Morocco (case study 1), USO in 
Jordan (case study 3), spectrum management in Morocco (case study 2) and 
spectrum management in Jordan (case study 4). Each case is discussed in the 
light of the mechanisms of the diffusion framework. It assesses the role of 
international and transgovernmental channels and of the three pressures for 
each of the four remaining case studies.   
6.2 Contextualising the framework propositions  
This contextualisation part is based on the four framework propositions 
presented in Section 2.4.2. Similarly to the contextualisation part of the previous 
chapter (Section 5.2), this section presents a context to understand the four 
framework propositions of the thesis in relation to the empirical cases. The first 
framework proposition concerns the link between economic interests and the 
international structure. This section further elaborates on the 
telecommunications corporate sector to understand market and economic 
interests in the field. The second framework proposition relates to the concept 
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of efficiency versus leadership. The discussion presents a series of arguments 
surrounding both concepts in the field of telecommunications. Notably, it 
focuses on technology and the role of standards in limiting certain regulatory 
choices. The third framework proposition concerns the link between sanctions 
capacity and coercion. The discussion proposes a differentiated approach to the 
capacity of international bodies, such as the WTO, World Bank and ITU to 
impose regulatory decisions. Finally, the fourth framework proposition mentions 
the role of the transgovernmental frameworks and their role as a policy diffusion 
channel exempt of economic and sanction pressures. A closer look into 
EMERG and telecommunications twinning between the EU and Mediterranean 
NRAs further exemplifies and questions this argument.  
Framework Proposition 1: Mapping the multinational corporate sector 
The telecommunications corporate sector has changed in nature over a couple 
of decades. The relationship between economic interests, policy-making and 
telecommunications actors has grown in a more complex and intricate way 
(Raboy and Padovani, 2010, Padovani and Pavan, 2011). Several authors have 
underlined the changing nature of the market in the telecommunications sector 
(Alexiadis and Cave, 2010, Bauer, 2010a, Thatcher, 2004). Changing actors in 
the field have increasingly incorporated multinational regulatory authorities and 
the emergence of large global corporate alliances, with complex patterns of 
ownership (Rodine-Hardy, 2013:16, Bucheli and Salvaj, 2014). In the 
telecommunications sector, the role of the market and economic interests is one 
of the key drivers for development (Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2013). In this 
thesis, the influence of corporations and potential profits in the 
telecommunications sector is confirmed by various experts met during the field 
research.  
Several experts enumerate large multinational corporations as agent of change. 
Expert EU14 of BAKOM, the Swiss NRA mentions that changes in the 
telecommunications sector are almost always directed by economic interests, 
the business opportunities (Expert EU14, 2013). He mentions that “[i]n Europe, 
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many operators are interested in the South Mediterranean market, such as 
Vodafone, Orange, Telefonica, Teleitalia and Deutsche Telecom. They are 
active actors” (Expert EU14, 2013). He furthermore underlines that the main 
objective was preparing the market for the European operators. The aim is not 
to impose a certain regulatory framework but to suggest it (Expert EU14, 2013). 
This position is shared by several experts based in European countries. Expert 
EU16 of the Portuguese NRA, ANACOM mentions that “[a]ll ideas at the EU 
level, we try to export them, so there might be approximation and make markets 
more open and friendly to EU FDI and enterprises” (Expert EU16, 2013). The 
interest of policy-makers to adopt or spread policies that improve the market 
potential of the corporate sector seems logical. It is however, not always easy to 
demonstrate this influence on policy-making.  
A revealing way to discuss the involvement of corporations in policy-making is 
to focus on the ownership of corporations. It offers another approach and level 
of understanding to explain the choice of policy-makers of certain practices and 
standards in the field. In Morocco and Jordan, the role of corporations is central 
to the functioning of the state, even if it is in practice difficult to pinpoint or have 
discussions about it. Table 21 shows the latest ownership patterns for the main 
mobile phone companies in each country. It focuses on up to the three main 
shareholders of each telecommunications company. The table shows five 
categories of ownership. The first two categories show European and Gulf 
ownership. It refers to privately and publically owned companies active in 
Jordan and Morocco, whose origins are either in EU member states or Gulf 
countries. It is followed by two types of domestic ownerships. The first one, 
domestic government interests, relates to the shares that the government owns 
in the company. The next category, domestic private interests, shows the 
ownership by national private companies. The last category, other, includes the 
remaining shareholders when there are more than three. It also includes cases 
of corporations listed in the stock market, as is the case of Maroc Telecom in 
the Casablanca stock market. 
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Table 21 Shareholders of mobile phone operators 
  
Mobile 
Licence 
Latest  
owners
hip 
change Sources 
European 
Companies 
Gulf 
Companies 
Domestic 
Government 
Interests 
Domestic 
Private 
Interests 
Oth
er 
Morocco  
Maroc 
Telecom  
(IAM) 1994 2014 
(IAM, 
2014:32, 
IAM, 
2015:32, 
ANRT, 
2007b)   
Etisalat 
(UAE)* 
53% 
Kingdom of 
Morocco 30%   
17% 
Meditel 1999 2010 
(Meditel, 
2010:24, 
ANRT, 
2007a) 
Orange 
Group 
(France)** 
40%   
Caisse de 
Dépôt et de 
Gestion CDG  
30% 
Finance.C
om 
30% 
  
Inwi 
(ex-
WANA) 2006 2009 
(World 
Bank, 
2014a:1
29)   
Zain/Al Ajial 
(Kuwait)  
31%   
ONA*** 
69% 
  
Jordan 
Jordan 
Telecom  
Fixed 
Service 
only 2008 
(Orange 
Jordan, 
2008) 
Orange 
Group 
(France)  
51% 
Noor 
Telecom  
(Kuwaiti)  
10% 
Social Security 
Corporation 
29% 
 
 
Zain JO  1994 2003 
(Zain, 
2014)   
Zain Group 
(Kuwait)  
91%     
8% 
Orange 
JO Mobile  1999 2000 
(Orange 
Jordan, 
2014:17) 
Orange 
Group 
(France)  
90%       
10% 
Umniah 2004 2006 
(Batelco, 
2013:61)   
Batelco 
(Bahrain) 
96%     
4% 
Notes: As of November 2015. Shares rounded to nearest whole number. 
*Until 2013, partial ownership belonged to Vivendi (France) 53% (IAM, 2014:32, IAM, 2015:32, 
ANRT, 2007b). 
**Until 2010, partial ownership belonged to Telefonica Moviles (Spain) 32% & Servicio de 
Telecommunicaçoes (Portugal) 32%) (Meditel, 2010:24, ANRT, 2007a). 
***ONA was dissolved in 2010 and is now part of SNI. SNI comprises high stakes of the 
Moroccan Royal Family (Abdellatif, 2014). 
Source: Author. Based upon company reports (as mentioned in Table). 
 
Several observations are given by Table 21. The first one is that European 
companies and particularly French ones have had a strong hold on mobile 
companies in both Morocco and Jordan. Lately, however, only the French 
Orange Group is present in both countries. Orange acquired 40% of the 
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Moroccan Meditel in 2010, previously owned by the Spanish mobile phone 
corporation Telefonica Moviles and the Portuguese one Servicio de 
Telecommunicaçoes, who together used to own 64% of Meditel (Meditel, 
2010:24). In Jordan, JTC was previously owned by the state, but in 2000, 40% 
of JTC was sold to the Joint Investments Telecommunications Company, a fully 
owned subsidiary of Orange Group (France). By 2008, the government had 
almost completely retreated from the fixed services, with the shareholding 
reaching 51% for Orange, 28.8% for Social Security Corporation and 10% for 
Noor Telecoms, a Kuwaiti-based conglomerate (Orange Jordan, 2014:18, 
Orange Jordan, 2008:49). JTC was renamed Orange fixed in 2007 after a 
rebranding of Orange phone services in Jordan, including the Orange mobile, 
acquired in 2000 (France Telecom, 2007:12, Orange Jordan, 2014:17). Finally, 
Vivendi, another French consortium, used to own 53% of the shares of Maroc 
Telecom (IAM) until 2013 (IAM, 2014:32, IAM, 2015:32). It was then sold to the 
Emirati company Etisalat. The presence of European companies in Jordan and 
Morocco confirms the importance of studying the relationship between both 
areas in the sector.  
The second observation is that Gulf countries are also very present in the 
telecommunications sector in both Morocco and Jordan. In Morocco, 53% of the 
shares of IAM belong to Etisalat (IAM, 2014:32, IAM, 2015:32). Furthermore, 
the second Moroccan mobile operator, Inwi is 31% owned by Zain, a Kuwaiti 
consortium (World Bank, 2014a:129). Zain also owns 91% of Zain Jordan (Zain, 
2014). Noor Telecom owns 10% of the shares of JTC (Orange Jordan, 2008). 
Finally, Bahrain owns 96% of Umniah the third mobile phone company of 
Jordan (Batelco, 2013:61). While the relationship between the Gulf countries 
and Jordan has always been very close, it is still very interesting to see how 
closely the Gulf countries are involved in major corporations in both countries. 
The Gulf presence in Morocco is more recent, than in Jordan. Zain has been an 
actor in Morocco since 2009 and the Etisalat since 2014 (IAM, 2014:32, IAM, 
2015:32). The increasing presence of Gulf States in the telecommunications 
sector in Morocco shows a shift from European corporations to Gulf ones, 
suggesting a recent turning point in corporate interest in the region. 
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The third observation is that multinational phone corporations come uniquely 
from the Gulf and European regions and no company originates from other 
locations, such as the US, China or other major phone corporations. This 
confirms the importance of being part of the same ITU region to develop the 
market and standards. It also confirms why the EU policy examples are followed 
closely rather than US ones in the field. There is also no presence of Moroccan 
companies in Jordan and vice-versa. Neither is there the presence of MENA 
companies excluding the Gulf region in both countries. This confirms the 
argument of several experts who mentioned the lack of cross-regional interest 
in the MENA region and the consequent minimal practice sharing across 
countries, except for spectrum management through the Arab Spectrum 
Management Group (ASMG) to avoid interferences (Expert JO2, 2014). In fact, 
several experts of Jordan mentioned their interest in EU policies because of the 
lack of other regional examples. One of the experts of the TRC mentions that 
the countries in the extreme vicinity are suffering with civil conflicts. The Gulf 
States are not examples of regulation based on competition, as governments 
own the main phone companies. Finally, the US is too big to be comparable to 
Jordan. For these reasons, countries of the European shore, such as Italy make 
more sense so to compare the models (Expert JO2, 2014). This illustrates once 
more the close relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region and 
the autonomous will of Jordan to grasp policy ideas from the EU countries.   
The last observation is that the Kingdom of Morocco is still present in the field of 
telecommunications. The government owns 30% of IAM. Furthermore, the 
Royal family is a major shareholder of the company SNI (former ONA), which 
owns 69% of the company Inwi (IAM, 2014:32, IAM, 2015:32, World Bank, 
2014a:129). Finally, La Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG), a public financial 
institution, owns 30% of the shares of Meditel (CDG, 2009). In Jordan, the only 
governmental link to the telecommunications corporation is 29% of shares 
owned by the Social Security Corporation, which is also a public financial 
institution. The presence of two public investment funds in the Jordanian and 
Moroccan sectors confirms that such fields are a safe investment to secure 
profits. Nevertheless, the Moroccan government is more involved in the sector 
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compared to Jordan. This confirms two premises. Firstly, that Jordan has been 
a champion of liberalisation practices in the late 1990s, with an almost complete 
retreat of the state in the field. Secondly, the involvement of the Moroccan 
government in phone corporations reminds of the Egyptian situation, with a 
similar involvement of the Egyptian government in the sector (Section 4.3.3). 
The hold of the Moroccan government over the telecommunications market is 
not as apparent as in Egypt, but it shows the weight of the government in the 
field. It illustrates in both cases the lower scores of market openness, compared 
to Jordan, as mentioned in Section 5.4.  
Framework Proposition 2: Efficiency, leadership and the technological restraints 
The difference between focusing on the efficiency of a policy originating 
externally or on the external actor implementing a certain policy is key to 
differentiate mechanisms of diffusion in theory. The pressure leading to policy 
change is different in both cases. However, it is not always simple in practice to 
distinguish the one from the other. One issue is that focusing on the leader may 
be a way to ensure better efficiency, making both aims overlap. It is linked to 
the limits of policy-makers to observe all policy options available to them, which 
is often referred to as bounded or channelled learning in policy diffusion 
literature. This has been discussed in the conceptual chapter of this thesis 
(Section 2.4.1). The focus on efficiency or leaders to implement policy change is 
based on an ideal case scenario where all models are available for the policy-
makers to use.  
In the telecommunications sector, however, which is grounded in cross-national 
economic interests and intensive technology, policy-makers have less options 
for their policy selections, as theory predicts. This is notably the case due to 
technological restraints. These have had a key role from the 1990s with the 
advancement of digital mobile communications.  However it appears that the 
technological constraints are increasingly reducing, with the consequence of re-
designing alliances across regions of the world. Nevertheless, the advances of 
technology do not prevent systems from coexisting. The cohabitation of several 
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standards takes place in the sector (Polak et al., 2014). Polak et al. furthermore 
mentions that technologies are sometimes competing and their cohabitation 
may lead to suboptimal results (2014). The advances in technologies create 
pressures on existing band allocation to free more space. The freeing of 
spectrum is in line with the DTTB decision of GE06 (Section 4.2.2). Furthermore 
the decision taken during WRC-12 and WRC-15 to allocate 700MHz to mobile 
allocation, which is discussed below, also takes place in a context of increasing 
pressure of technological advances on spectrum allocation. 
The role of technological limits between the EU and Mediterranean countries 
has often been a theme mentioned by experts. Contrary to the idea that the 
European shore is more advanced than Mediterranean ones (EMERG, 
2012c:3), several experts questioned traditional power organisation and 
underlined the increasing importance of Southern countries in the field. Expert 
EU6 mentions that some neighbouring countries are sometimes way ahead. He 
argues that certain countries where the fixed network is less developed, have 
acquired advanced telecommunications services based on wireless 
technologies. He mentions that “certain late adopters of 2G or GSM directly 
went to 3G. This is the case of countries, such as Nigeria or Kenya” (EU6, 
2014). Morocco also appears as a case focusing on advanced technologies as 
it just released 4G licenses mirroring and sometimes even leapfrogging EU 
member states. Expert EU6 mentions that in the EU the 2G, GSM model was 
very advanced. With this success, there was less initiative to move on (EU6, 
2014). This suggests that alliance and traditional power relations are 
increasingly put under pressure.  
Countries that are considered less developed than post-industrial ones, 
particularly in sophisticated fields such as telecommunications, may be actually 
ideally positioned to embrace innovative technologies and regulations. A focus 
on the evolution of mobile phone technologies supports the understanding of 
limited choices when looking for inspiring models abroad. Table 22 presents a 
selection of the main technologies used in Second Generation mobile 
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communications (2G), Third Generation (3G) and finally, fourth Generation 
(4G).  
Table 22 Radio Technologies for Mobile Technologies 
Technology Since Access Protocol Service Bit-Rate (downlink) 
2G (GSM) 1991 TDMA/FDMA 22.8 Kbps 
2G (IS95) 1995 CDMA 115 Kbps 
3G (UMTS) 2001 WCDMA 384 - 2048 Kbps 
3G+ (CDMA2000) 2001 CDMA 2.5 – 15.7 Mbps 
3G+ (HSPA) 2005 CDMA 22 - 56 Mbps 
4G (LTE) 2009 OFDMA/SC-FDMA 100 Mbs 
4G (LTE advanced) 2011 OFDMA/SC-FDMA 1 Gbps 
Source: Author. Based upon academic authors and reports (Raychaudhuri and Mandayam, 
2012:827, GSMA, 2015a, 3GPP, 2009, Agilent, 2011, Rohde & Schwarz, 2015). 
 
Table 22 only illustrates a selection of worldwide technologies. There exist 
many additional technologies, such as EDGE or WiMAX that are not discussed 
in this part. The focus on a selection of them already reveals several trends 
shedding light on the selected case studies’ contexts. One of the interests is the 
growing harmonisation of the standards since the launch of 2G. LTE and more 
precisely LTE-advanced is increasingly used worldwide and may lead to a 
worldwide Fifth Generation (5G) standard (Chin et al., 2014). This move from 
region-wide to worldwide standards is illustrated in the historical 
contextualisation below. It appears that harmonisation has growingly taken 
place across technologies and regions to hypothetically reach a worldwide 
standards based on similar band frequencies.   
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The two most common 2G technologies are GSM and IS9522. GSM standards 
were created on the impulsion of the CEPT, who established in the 1980s a 
group named Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM), later called the Global System for 
Mobile Communication, with the task to establish a cellular system to be 
introduced in Europe. It was taken over by the European standard institute, 
ETSI, from 1989 (GSM, 1987, GSM, 1991). The GSM standard was completed 
in 1990, with Finland being the first country to apply the standard in 1991 
(Huurdeman, 2003:529, Taylor and Vincent, 2005:77). Several authors mention 
that the development of the GSM standards in the 1980s illustrates the move 
from monopolistic state-centred systems to privatised and competitive 
telecommunications, as for the first time, private equipment manufacturers and 
industry researchers took part in the development of standards (Acker, 
2014:562, Russel, 2005:10). The development of the 2G technologies naturally 
led to the 3G, also known as Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
networks (UMTS).23.  
The evolution of the 3G technologies was moderated under the ITU’s 
International Mobile Telecommunications, IMT-2000 programme, which 
selected five standards for the use of newly allocated bands based on three 
different access technologies (FDMA, TDMA and CDMA) (ITU, 2015c). 3G was 
a turning-point in mobile standards development as it encompassed key 
features of innovation, such as multimedia entertainment, infotainment and 
location-based services (ITU, 2011a). 3G services typically feature higher data 
transmission than 2G and were allocated frequency bands that were not 
                                            
 
22
 Contrarily to the First generation of wireless mobile communication system, 2G is based on 
digital cellular systems and the use of digital modulation schemes, such as time division multiple 
access (TDMA) and Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) for GSM and code division 
multiple access (CDMA) for IS95 (KUMAR, P., SHARMA, J. K. & MANWINDER, S. 2013. 5G 
Technology of Mobile Communication. International Journal of Electronices and Computer 
Science Engineering, 2, 288-292.) 
23
 The evolution of 2G to 3G increasingly used CDMA2000 as a physical layer resulting in 
higher transfer rates than 2G. UMTS, as is IS-95 and its successor, IS-2000, are based on a 
more evolved form of CDMA, called the Wideband CDMA (WCDMA) (NATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS. 2014. IS-95 (CDMA) and GSM (TDMA) [Online]. Wireless Standards White 
Paper Series. Available: http://www.ni.com/tutorial/7107/en/ [Accessed 2015 Dec 8].) 
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allocated to 2G. Adequate bands for 3G technologies were chosen following the 
1992 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) and confirmed by 
Resolution 212 adopted during the 1997 WRC. In Europe, UMTS technologies 
were adopted, while in the US CDMA-2000 was preferred (Raychaudhuri and 
Mandayam, 2012). 4G developed from the experience of 2G and 3G to include 
a series of high quality voice and video services, coupled with high data-rate 
quality. 
Long Term Evolution (LTE)24 is the evolution from both the GSM and UMTS, but 
also from CDMA2000 networks. This standard was developed by the Third 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) under the Release 8 specifications 
(3GPP, 2015a). 3GPP is hosted in the headquarters of ETSI. It is a consortium 
based on seven organisational partners, such as ETSI, from Asia, Europe and 
North America producing technical specifications to become standards 
approved by standardisation bodies25. 3GPP also includes more than 370 
individual member companies, market representation partners and observers 
(3GPP, 2009). This illustrates the international interest, including that of 
corporations, in developing worldwide standards for 4G mobile communications. 
Figure 8 shows the 4G LTE coverage map.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
24
 It is based on Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) and Single-carrier 
Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) (RUMNEY, M. 2008. 3GPP LTE: Introducing 
Single-Carrier FDMA [Online]. Available: http://cp.literature.agilent.com/litweb/pdf/5989-
7898EN.pdf [Accessed Dec 12 2015].). 
25
 The seven Organisational Partners are ETSI, the Japanese Association of Radio Industries 
and Businesses (ARIB), the American Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions 
(ATIS), the China Communications Standards Association (CCSA), the Indian 
Telecommunications Standards Development Society (TSDSI), the Korean Telecommunications 
Technology Association (TTA) and the Japanese Telecommunication Technology Committee 
(TTC) (3GPP. 2015b. Partners [Online]. Available: http://www.3gpp.org/about-3gpp/partners 
[Accessed Dec 9 2015].) 
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Figure 8 4G LTE World Coverage Map 
 
Notes: As of November 2015.  
Source: Author. Based upon reports (GSA, 2015, World Time Zone, 2015, GSMA, 2015b) and 
format support (Mapchart, 2015). 
 
Figure 8 shows that LTE technologies are already widely spread in the world. 
Countries lagging behind are mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and several other 
countries are still implementing LTE or are pre-committed to the 
implementation, such as Mongolia, Nepal and Iran. Morocco and Jordan both 
have implemented LTE launches as mentioned in section 4.3. The next level of 
advances of LTE is called LTE-advanced, which is recognised by the ITU in its 
IMT-Advanced specification (Agilent, 2011, Rohde & Schwarz, 2015). LTE-
Advanced was presented in 2009 by 3GPP to become an accepted 
standardised technology (3GPP, 2009). With LTE and LTE-advanced, it 
appears that technical limitations, if they have been essential in the sector for 
several decades may reach a new harmonised level.  
Even if it can be observed that some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 
are lagging behind in implementing LTE services, there is an unmissable trend 
where Southern countries present interest and capacity to innovate and 
eventually leapfrog more advanced states in the field. Advances in technologies 
offer opportunities to catch up with worldwide standards directly. This position 
was shared by several experts during the field research. Expert MO7 from the 
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ANRT mentions that technology is now evolving to create new wireless norms 
for high-speed data, such as LTE, which will overcome the geographical limits 
of region 1 (Expert MO7, 2014). This position was also underlined by an experts 
of the EC, who mentions that “[t]he LTE advanced shall soon be the world 
standard and lead to 5G” (Expert EU6, 2014). In addition, the changing 
technologies developments may put traditional practices and alliances under 
pressure. Expert MO7 from the ANRT states that “[w]hen we adopt norms, we 
take into account the CEPT and the ITU and also nowadays the US, via the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). When FCC norms are 
conventional, we can adapt them. However, when we go beyond Region 1, 
there are always limitations. This is also valid for the Asian region. Norms are 
taken into account when they are not contradictory” (Expert MO7, 2014). 
However, this expert underlines that with advances in technology, norms 
advertised by the FCC may be increasingly relevant to Moroccan context as 
well (Expert MO7, 2014). Hence, if it is true that in a close past technology has 
limited the possibilities to choose standards and policies freely, technological 
advances bringing new worldwide standards may offer further opportunities to 
go beyond traditional policy flows.  
Framework Proposition 3: Defining the environment’s sanction capacity 
The sanction capacity of the telecommunications environment is ambiguous. 
Three main international bodies are active in the telecommunications sector, the 
ITU, the WTO and the World Bank. But only the WTO possesses the DSM 
mechanism to settle specific issues. In the context of USO and spectrum 
policies from 2000, the World Bank is not expected to possess sanction 
capacity due to its role as a best-practice sharing forum and not as a lending 
body. This supports Rodine-Hardy’s argument that the role of the World Bank 
has developed into information gathering and facilitation rather than in coercion 
(2013:35). The World Bank handbook and platform are key references and 
several experts mentioned the positive reputation of certain models advertised 
209 
 
 
 
within the World Bank, as was the case for USO models of Latin American 
countries, which were taken over by Morocco.  
The case of the ITU is interesting in this thesis. Several experts share the 
opinion that the ITU does not possess much power in terms of sanction 
capacity. They mention its key role to provide information and advices regarding 
telecommunications regulation, but not as a coercive body. Expert EU21, from 
the ITU, mentions that “[t]here exists no enforcement mechanism for sanctions, 
or to deprive members from certain rights” (Expert EU21, 2014). He argues that 
the ITU is a gentleman's agreement, which functions by consensus in a stable 
framework and mentions that it would be very damaging if certain countries did 
not follow the regulatory framework or even adopt counter-positions. The result 
of which is the signature of each measure or treaty after long discussions and 
consensus (Expert EU21, 2014). This argument is shared by expert EU6 from 
the EC who mentions that there are no risks, for example financial fines, 
involved in not following the ITU legislation. He nonetheless mentions that the 
ITU could take some decisions, for example refusing to register and thus protect 
some signals (Expert EU6, 2014). This suggests that measures to implement 
sanctions with the ITU are only limited. This position is shared by Rodine-Hardy, 
who argues that the ITU plays a key role as an information network, with no 
sanctioning power for membership and no strict enforcement mechanism for 
harmonisation (2013:33). She argues, that the ITU “does not have much “teeth” 
in terms of requiring countries to take action for regulatory reform” (2013:35). In 
that regard, the ITU does not impose sanctions in a visible and consequent 
manner.  
However, the ITU may also present much subtler forms of power struggle. The 
ITU does not possess sanctioning power as an institution. However its role in 
allocating spectrum and agreeing on standards is central to the sector, 
revealing large governmental and business interests. Its members can be 
persuasive so to reach a specific outcome. The role of alliances within the ITU 
was underlined by several experts. Expert EU21 from the ITU mentions that 
persuasion is attempted in order to reach certain ends (EU21, 2014). This was 
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confirmed with Expert EU6 of the EC, who mentions that in the ITU cooperation 
and relationship, the balance has changed significantly, as everybody is 
pushing their own agenda. He underlines that there are noticeable efforts to go 
to greater convergence, however alliances create and develop challenging 
existing orders (Expert EU6, 2014). In the ITU, negotiations are intensive, but 
recently, a shifting of powers and the rise of the new forces of regulatory powers 
has taken place. This is apparent in Expert EU6’ statement mentioning that 
“[r]ecently the African countries have had more and more weight in the 
regulation” (Expert EU6, 2014). In fact, the WRC 2012 has been a key point, 
where the resistance of African and Middle Eastern countries has been felt 
against traditional patterns of power emanating from the EU.  
During WRC-12, African and Arab countries called for the allocation of the 694-
790 MHz band to mobile services to meet the growing broadband demand. The 
item was actually not on the WRC-12 agenda and came as a surprise for the 
European counterparts. African and Arab countries argued that the 694-790 
MHz band was already allocated in ITU regions 2 and 3 for mobile service and 
thus an harmonised allocation would improve the use of worldwide systems (El-
Moghazi et al., 2013:24). European countries were opposing these proposals 
due to their allocation of 694-790 MHz bands to terrestrial broadcasting services 
(Ala-Fossi and Bonet, 2015). Moreover, large investments had already been 
made in Europe to proceed to the DTTB (Stirling, 2012, Lamy, 2014). Following 
the WRC-12, the frequency band 694-790 MHz was associated with mobile 
allocation and Resolution 232 called for technical studies to take place during 
WRC-1526 (ITU, 2012e). WRC-2015 confirmed the mobile allocation for 694-790 
MHz band aligning itself to the rest of the world, already using these bands for 
                                            
 
26
 The decision was part of the revision of the ITU-R Radio Regulations Article 5. A footnote 
(5.312A) was included in the reviewed 2012 Radiocommunications Regulation mentioning that 
in Region 1, the use of the band 694-790 MHz by the mobile, except aeronautical mobile, 
service is subject to the provisions of Resolution 232 (WRC-12) (ITU. 2012c. Radio Regulations, 
Articles [Online]. Available: http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
s/oth/02/02/S02020000244501PDFE.PDF [Accessed August 8 2015].) 
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mobile allocation (Digital TV, 2015). This decision confirms a change in the 
balance of power within the ITU. 
The proposition of the African and Arab countries was taken seriously by all 
members of Region 1, as no one wished to risk market dismantlement (El-
Moghazi, 2015). This situation recalls the importance of harmonisation in the 
field of telecommunications, where large economic interests depend on 
consensus over technologies and standards. The WRC-12 confrontation 
between different members of Region 1 illustrated a noticeable transition with 
African countries becoming stronger actors in policy-making in the sector and 
the European countries reconsidering their spectrum plans. This is an 
interesting indicator to show that Southern countries are emerging as central 
actors in international telecommunications regulation. It appears that subtler 
power relationships in the ITU have an impact on regulatory decisions.   
Finally, the case of the WTO is at the core of the discussion surrounding 
sanction capacity in the field. Several authors mentioned the breakthrough of 
restraining states’ sovereignty in the GBT deal (Section 2.4.3). Furthermore, the 
use of the DSM, capable of making and enforcing decisions in case of violations 
of free-trade agreements is a novelty of the GATS system (Rodine-Hardy, 
2013:43). The 2011 World Bank handbook also reiterates the importance of the 
WTO obligations and commitments, enforceable through the WTO’s binding 
dispute settlement process (World Bank, 2011:21). However, in this thesis the 
role of the WTO, through the GBT and the DSM has been less influential than 
expected. For instance, the GBT deal is more limited than it appears, in 
particular as it has mostly mirrored a reform process that was already taken 
place elsewhere (Drake and Noam, 2000:52, Rodine-Hardy, 2013:43-4). The 
EU’s internal market reforms paralleled and sometimes took place prior to those 
of the GBT deal (Michalis, 2007). Thus, the impact and scope of the GBT deal 
and the existence of the DSM may not be as advanced as expected.  
Both Morocco and Jordan are members of the WTO and have signed the WTO 
agreement in Telecommunications services (WTO, 1997c, WTO, 2000). 
Surprisingly, Jordan has put limitations on foreign presence for mobile voice 
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and data services, contrary to Morocco. In Jordan, commercial presence is 
subject to 51% foreign equity (WTO, 2000, WTO, 2003). This limitation does not 
seem to have particular implications for the telecommunications sector, in the 
present state, as all companies present in Jordan are owned in majority by 
foreign corporations. Furthermore, the influence of the DSM in both countries 
was not observed. In fact, in the case of telecommunications, four DSM cases 
took place since 1995, none of which concerned either Jordan or Morocco27. In 
fact, out of these four cases two were solved by the action of the DSM, one was 
settled bilaterally and one remained pending. It appears that 
telecommunications disputes have not taken place extensively through the 
WTO DSM system. Figure 9 presents a map of disputes between WTO 
members. It includes all types of disputes settled through the DSM. 
 
 
                                            
 
27 In 1995 a case was actioned by the EU against Japan claiming that telecommunications 
equipment between Japan and the US had been inconsistent. The case mentions that although 
there had been no official notification, the case had appeared to be settled bilaterally (WTO. 
1995a. DS15: Japan — Measures Affecting the Purchase of Telecommunications Equipment 
[Online]. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds15_e.htm 
[Accessed Dec 10 2015].) 
In 1997 a case against Belgium actioned by the US was opened regarding the provision of 
commercial telephone directory services. This case is still pending as of 1997, with no 
information regarding resolution (WTO. 1997b. DS80: Belgium — Measures Affecting 
Commercial Telephone Directory Services [Online]. Available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds80_e.htm [Accessed Dec 10 2015].) 
In 1997, a case against the Republic of Korea, was also actioned by the EU and concerned the 
laws, regulation and practices in the telecommunications sector. The EU claimed that the 
Korean telecommunications sector discriminated against foreign suppliers. It was resolved in 
1997, with a mutually agreed solution (WTO. 1997a. DS40: Korea — Laws, Regulations and 
Practices in the Telecommunications Procurement Sector [Online]. Available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds40_e.htm [Accessed Dec 10 2015].) 
Finally, a case settled in 2005 that was actioned against Mexico by the US, concerned Mexico’s 
commitments and obligations under the GATS with respect to the basic and value-added 
telecommunications services. It was resolved with a new resale regulation by Mexico complying 
with DSM recommendations (WTO. 2005. DS204: Mexico — Measures Affecting 
Telecommunications Services [Online]. Available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds204_e.htm [Accessed Dec 10 2015].) 
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Figure 9 Map of disputes between WTO Members 
Notes: As of December 2015. 
Source: WTO’s Map of Disputes (WTO, 2015). 
 
Both Morocco and Jordan, while being members of the WTO have had no 
dispute settled through the DSM. Most DSM cases have been linked, as 
complainants or as respondents, to the US and the EU. This shows that the 
WTO is preferred as an institutional tool for dispute settlement for these two 
major actors, whereas for countries such as Jordan and Morocco, this method 
has never been actioned. This shows the supremacy of the EU and the US 
actors in the use of the WTO institutional tools, compared to less developed 
region, such as the MENA and Sub Saharan Africa areas.  
The few cases of the DSM in the telecommunications sector and the fact that no 
case concerned either Jordan or Morocco, shows that the WTO, through the 
GBT and DSM may not be as influential as previously expected in the 
telecommunications sector. It appears that in this thesis the WTO has become a 
forum of best-practice based on competition principles. This is consistent with 
Rodine-Hardy who mentions that the WTO telecommunications framework may 
well have become a forum for expert discussion and best practice exchanges, 
as is the ITU and World Bank (2013:43-4). The sanction capacity of the DSM in 
the WTO in the telecommunications sector is not confirmed in this thesis.  
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Framework Proposition 4: Governance, coercion and transgovernmental 
collaboration 
The role of transgovernmental collaboration has been argued in this thesis as 
being linked to learning and imitation. It is linked with the first proposition 
mentioning that international regulatory bodies aim to manage economic 
expectations in the sector. Transgovernmental collaboration is exempt from 
such pressures and can aim for policy adoption, without similar pressures. In 
this thesis, two main transgovernmental channels have been discussed due to 
their direct connection between both the EU and the Mediterranean countries. 
These two forums are the EMERG and telecommunications twinning projects. It 
is interesting to observe whether these groupings are exempt from economic 
and sanction pressures as argued in this thesis, or whether such pressures are 
exercised in different ways. As Cardwell mentions, the variety of EU institutional 
actors and competences involved in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
corresponds to a system of governance, however, this does not preclude the 
system in question from being dominated by the EU institutions as central 
actors and policy-makers (2011:237). He argues that the values contained in 
the establishment of the system of governance are those of the EU, rather than 
the product of joint negotiation and agreement with the partner states. Thus, EU 
governance in the Mediterranean area may be an opportunity to fulfil its aims 
and promote its values (2011:237). This projection of EU values can be 
observed in EMERG and the telecommunications twinning, however, MENA 
countries are not empty recipients of EU promotion and a closer look into both 
transgovernmental partnerships sheds light on the type of relationships between 
both areas.  
The first regulatory grouping to be closely observed in this thesis is EMERG. It 
was created as regulators from the ERG and from Mediterranean countries 
emphasised the need for further liberalisation of the telecommunications 
markets in order to stimulate widespread information and communication 
technologies and encouraging foreign and domestic investment (EMERG, 
2008). In fact, the economic interest behind the creation of EMERG is visible. It 
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is at the heart of its 2008 creation statement (EMERG, 2008). The statement 
underlines that EU member states and neighbouring countries face many 
similar challenges and opportunities, thus adopting common regulatory 
measures shall help to face those challenges and uses sustained economic 
growth and market potential in both areas. It furthermore mentions the high 
potential of the young population and high usage of mobile telecommunications 
services and booming internet in the Euro-Mediterranean region (EMERG, 
2008:1). Similarly to cooperation taking place at international levels, it appears 
that EMERG as a regional grouping among NRAs also entails the focus of 
harmonising the market and reaching economies of scale.  
The balance of powers within the grouping is essential to take into account 
when analysis the potential for economic competition and sanctions in EMERG. 
The EMERG statement sheds light on this issue. It underlines that this network 
is a tool to spread EU best-practice in Mediterranean countries and to 
progressively implement the EU regulatory model abroad (EMERG, 2008). It is 
observed that the EMERG is emphasising the unidirectional example of the EU 
as a best-practice model to be followed. The 2012 EMERG report reiterates the 
logical choice of using the EU framework as the key model to be followed and 
implemented when gaps are identified. It states that “it stands to logic to use the 
European model as a basis for comparison and if this leads to identifying 
relevant opportunities for improvement, to seek to implement them and/or to try 
and convince competent decision makers to adopt them” (EMERG, 2012b:7). 
The reports further underlines that “[i]n many non-EU countries there still are 
many examples of regulation that differ from the EU best practice example 
which need to be explored and if appropriate, improved” (EMERG, 2012b:4). 
This shows that EMERG is mostly an EU-led initiative using the method of best-
practice sharing based on the EU model, confirming Cardwell argument 
(2011:237). It suggests that the dynamics within EMERG are more vertical, 
imposed by the EU, than horizontal as previously thought.   
It appears that economic interests and asymmetrical power relationships may 
be taking place in the EMERG, contrary to what was argued by the framework. 
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However, the key difference with the international regulatory framework in this 
case, is that EMERG is based on a voluntary basis and is dependent on the 
commitment of participants towards setting up resources to manage the 
network. One of the experts of the EC mentions that in general the ENP 
suggests a certain direction. He mentions that “[t]here is no coercion, but the 
possibility to finance expertise (…). This is a soft approach to the export of EU 
legislation” (Expert EU2, 2013). This focus on a non-coercive approach to 
expand EU legislation to the Mediterranean countries was straightforward in the 
interviews of EC experts. Indeed, the 2012 EMERG report reminds that this 
forum is not an action-oriented vehicle of diffusion “EMERG is flourishing as a 
platform for knowledge exchange between experts, but not  yet as an action-
oriented vehicle for improvements and alignments” (EMERG, 2012b:5). The 
report underlines that if it is true that regulatory harmonisation is at stake in 
EMERG, it is also true that Southern Mediterranean countries are not member 
states, nor candidate countries to the EU, thus no legal obligation is set upon 
them to integrate the EU model (EMERG, 2012b:7). To conclude, the EMERG 
network is different to international collaboration due to the voluntary and 
autonomous commitment of its members. This does not exclude the fact that 
economic interests remain a key motivation for regulatory exchange, in such 
profit-oriented sectors. 
In the context of twinning instruments, the EU stresses the idea that entering 
such a project follows a decision taken by the beneficiary country, including 
political and financial commitment to achieve mandatory results. It is thus a 
voluntary and action-oriented instrument. As the beneficiary country needs to 
commit to achieve operational and concrete mandatory goals, it is not a regular 
technical assistance project. The EC underlines that there are high expectations 
for the beneficiary country to achieve the reforms (European Commission, 
2012a). However, as seen in the context of EMERG, the EU benchmark is the 
only model to be approximated. This capacity-building instrument is based on 
the primacy of EU legislation. This can be seen in one of the scopes of the 
twinning instruments, which is to support ENP countries in harmonising their 
legislation with the EU and bringing common fundamental principles of ENP 
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countries in line with those of the EU’s (European Commission, 2012a). As 
such, similar to EMERG, this best-practice sharing project is the result of a 
voluntary commitment, but it still focuses on the primacy of the EU policies.  
In the Jordanian TRC twinning project, reference is made to the authority of the 
EU model in several stages of the project description. Firstly, the project sets its 
main purpose as the development of the regulatory framework and operational 
capacities of the Jordanian Telecommunications sector in line with EU best 
practices and international standards (European Union and Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, 2010:2). Later on, one of the reference benchmarks is set on the 
successful update of the Jordanian regulatory regimes in line with the EU 
regulatory framework (European Union and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
2010:24). This illustrates the ambiguous relationship between the commitment 
of the beneficiary country and the spreading of the EU model. The difference 
with twinning projects is the level of commitment of the beneficiary country to 
change policies thanks to the support of EU experts. This is different to 
EMERG, which is mostly a best-practice sharing forum with no mandatory 
commitment to conduct policy change. This difference is taken into account 
when discussing the Jordanian cases in the next part (Section 6.3).  
The EMERG and twinning examples show that if it is true that economic 
interests exist when entering such regulatory commitment, this is mostly linked 
to the nature of the telecommunications sector, which entails large economic 
potential. Thus, regulatory harmonisation is expected to improve market 
conditions in the member countries. However, these groupings are voluntary 
and policy changes only take place following the autonomous decision of the 
member countries. In twinning instruments, this commitment is more explicit, as 
the beneficiary country commits to harmonise regulation according to EU NRAs. 
In such case, the beneficiary NRA decides to follow a regional example in the 
field, rather than studying different efficiency models, as would be the case in 
EMERG. It shows a closer focus on the actor, rather than the action, which is 
better embodied in the imitation mechanism. This is discussed closely in the 
following section.   
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6.3 Sector variables analysis  
The assumptions linking the sectors to the mechanisms of diffusion (Section 
1.5.2) mention that in sectors, such as USO, where there are only limited 
economic interests and sanction capacity, adopting states are free to implement 
policy changes with only minimal external pressure. In such cases, learning and 
imitation may take place. On the contrary in sectors where economic and 
political interests are high, as is the case in spectrum management, the 
adopting states are mostly going to engage in policy changes through 
mechanisms of competition and coercion, where external pressures are higher. 
The results of this last part of the analysis confirm these assumptions. Table 23 
shows the results for the four case studies under review based on the field 
research data.  
Table 23 USO & Spectrum management in Jordan and Morocco 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures  
Internationa
l regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Effici
ency 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanctio
n 
capacity 
Policy 
Sector 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - MO: USO (1) 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - JO: USO (3) 
Competition (H₅) + +/- + + - 
MO: 
Spectrum (2) 
Coercion (H₆) + +/- - + + 
JO: 
Spectrum (4) 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism as expected; -: absence of 
variable is related to mechanism as expected; +/-: presence or absence of variable whereas it 
was not expected. 
Source: Author. 
 
It illustrates that as expected, USO in Morocco and Jordan follow mechanisms 
of learning and imitation. USO in Morocco (case study 1) corresponds exactly to 
the combination of the five variables of learning mechanisms. USO in Jordan 
(case study 3) corresponds exactly to the imitation mechanisms. As expected 
as well, spectrum management policies in Morocco and Jordan follow 
competition and coercion mechanisms in the majority. Spectrum in Morocco 
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(case study 2) corresponds almost exactly to the mechanisms of competition 
except for one ambiguity regarding transgovernmental collaboration. Spectrum 
in Jordan (case study 4) corresponds almost exactly to mechanisms of 
competition except for one ambiguity regarding the transgovernmental 
collaboration as well. As such, the presence and absence of variables follow 
expected paths except in two instances. Two ambiguities exist concerning 
transgovernmental collaboration in the Moroccan spectrum and Jordanian 
spectrum. The ambiguous relationship of transgovernmental collaboration in the 
case of Moroccan USO was decided because of the close relationship between 
Morocco and France in the field of spectrum management. The ambiguous 
relationship of transgovernmental collaboration and coercion was decided due 
to the existence of a telecommunications twinning in Jordan, dealing with the 
issue of spectrum.     
One main observation can be made based on Table 23. It is observed that 
transgovernmental collaboration takes place in all four case studies. This is 
logical due to the fact that the thesis focuses on the environment of NRAs and 
that NRAs are increasingly collaborating with international and regional NRAs, 
on a bilateral or multilateral basis. This confirms that soft governance has 
increased in the sector of telecommunication and that transgovernmental 
channels are growingly used as channels for policy-making in addition or 
instead of international regulatory forums. For instance, transgovernmental 
collaboration is not sufficient enough as a variable to distinguish between the 
four mechanisms of diffusion.  
6.3.1 Case study (1) USO in Morocco 
In the case of USO in Morocco, it appears that much time, thoughts and 
resources were deployed in order to embrace an adequate model. Thus, in 
2002 a consultancy agency was hired to provide a review of the satisfactory 
USO models worldwide. Several models were presented from Europe and in 
particular from Latin America, where funds for universal access and services 
were renowned across the ITU and the World Bank. It is not until 2004 that a 
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new system was adopted, which included the creation of a USO governance 
comity by 2005, chaired by the Moroccan Prime Minister and consisting of a 
ministerial representation, including the Ministries of telecommunications, 
interior affairs, finances, territorial planning and national defence. In addition, 
this comity includes the president of the USO department at the ANRT and the 
General Director of the ANRT, who has a consultative voice (MINCOM, 2005: 
art.10(1)).  
Regarding the sector environment variables, it appears that a focus has been 
put on the well-known international model of Latin America. In the interviews 
several experts mentioned how the Latin American model was solid and had 
long been supported and advertised by the World Bank. However, these 
experts underline that the model was seriously considered after being 
presented by a consultancy firm, which suggests that if the reputation of the 
World Bank on Latin American cases has supported its reputation, it was not 
the channel that Morocco chose for getting acquainted with the Latin American 
policies. Regarding transgovernmental collaboration however it appears that the 
ANRT has shown enthusiasm to participate in several forums, including the 
AREGNET, EMERG and FRATEL. The EU model for USO has been presented 
and discussed in the EMERG. However, the interest for Morocco began to fade 
out. The EU USO ideas were not adequate to the Moroccan project (Expert 
MO6, 2014). Finally, during the 2014 EMERG plenary in Jordan, it was agreed 
not to discuss USO anymore, as it is a case where EU regulation cannot be 
applied (Expert MO6, 2014). For instance, USO was discussed through 
transgovernmental channels in the period between 2000 and 2014, but 
increasingly the Moroccan model developed on its own pace and the EU model 
became irrelevant. In the time period observed nonetheless, USO has been a 
subject of discussion in transgovernmental forums.  
Regarding the sector pressure variables, the focus on performance and 
efficiency enhancement is distinct in the Moroccan USO case. First of all, the 
interviews revealed the inadequacy of the EU USO model. Several experts 
mention that the issue in Europe was very different to Morocco. It could not be 
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applied as it was, with a unique focus on fixed telephony. It needed to be 
adapted. Expert MO5 from the ANRT mentions that between 1998, when the 
liberalisation of telecommunications in Morocco occurred and 2004, the USO 
system did not work at all. Hence, this expert states that during this time “[t]he 
USO were ill-defined and the realisation of the USO was given to the historical 
operator Maroc Telecom. Straight away Meditel (the second operator) said that 
it was not normal to withdraw money from them to give it to the incumbent 
operator, which was their main competitor” (Expert MO5, 2014). During the 
2004 Moroccan regulatory review and the re-assessment of the USO, expert 
MO5 mentions that the French case was presented, however France designed 
a USO provider, France Telecom, and other operators need to compensate this 
USO provider via a Universal Service Fund (USF), which is not what they 
decided to apply in Morocco. They decided to stay closer to the market and use 
calls for tender to allocate projects (Expert MO5, 2014). For instance, the 
Moroccan USO model developed further away from the EU one. 
Economic interests in the sector of USO in Morocco can be observed. Phone 
companies are involved in the process. There is evidence in the interviews of 
regular contact between the phone operators and the ANRT directly. However, 
it also appears from the interviews that the corporate sector does not have a 
significant say in this sector. Several disagreements were expressed by the 
corporate sector against the Ministry’s and NRA’s decisions to allocate the USO 
fund, however there is only little that the corporate sector can do to change 
such decisions. The expert from Maroc Telecom mentioned that there is an 
exchange with the ANRT in terms of what USO is and what the USO projects 
shall be. However, this expert mentions that even if it is possible to exchange 
ideas with the ANRT, the government orientations are not discussible and the 
ANRT will implement them in any case (Expert MO11, 2014). Lastly, regarding 
the sanction capacity variable in USO, as expected, there is no pressure in such 
case to follow a specific model.  
As a conclusion, the Moroccan USO case is characterised particularly by the 
presence of transgovernmental channels and a focus on performance. 
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Transgovernmental collaboration appears important when exchanging best 
practices generally, but increasingly from 2000 to 2014, the EU model became 
inadequate for the Moroccan case and experts decided during the EMERG 
2014 plenary not to discuss this subject anymore. Regarding the pressures in 
the sector, as expected, there is no existence of a sanctions framework in the 
field. Regarding economic interests in the field, these are limited as expected as 
well. The corporate sector in Morocco is, nevertheless, included in policy-
making and collaboration exists between the regulators and the phone 
companies. However, the interviews also show that the corporate input in the 
USO sector was not taken into consideration in the policy-making process for 
USO. It seems that the aim of USO policies lies elsewhere in the case of 
Morocco. In this case, the intention of enhancing performance was obvious. The 
interviews revealed a lack of efficiency in the French system and the importance 
of bridging a gap in the sector. The Latin American models where very 
influential and as a result the Moroccan USO system was created by a 
comparison of the available possibilities in the field and taking into consideration 
the domestic background.  
In the case of USO in Morocco, it is interesting to observe that the EU was not 
considered as a leader to follow, as could be expected due to the close political 
and economic ties in the both areas. In fact, Moroccan policy-makers did 
include this example in the elaboration of their strategy, but they did not feel the 
need to copy the European countries in any way. On the contrary they 
distanced themselves from the model. The Moroccan interviews illustrate the 
will of Morocco to become its own leader in the field and not to become 
attached to any formal example. Experts emphasised the development of 
Morocco as a leader for other countries, in particular for African countries. For 
instance, an expert of the ANRT mentions that the Moroccan USO project is a 
success and the African countries come to Morocco to replicate the model 
(Expert MO3, 2014). Expert MO5 also mentions that the Moroccan USO model 
“creates appetite among a certain number of countries” (Expert MO5, 2014). In 
the context of the mechanisms of diffusion framework, the USO model in 
Morocco has transited through transgovernmental channels with the aim to 
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increase efficiency of its model. This is a case for policy adoption following the 
mechanisms of learning. 
6.3.2 Case study (3) USO in Jordan 
In Jordan, with regards to both USO and spectrum management provisions, it is 
observed that much attention is drawn towards the EU, as a key benchmark, 
due to its technical expertise and market dominance. USO provisions in Jordan 
date back to 1995 and designate the incumbent fixed operator, JTC, part of the 
Orange group as the universal service provider at a national level. Functional 
internet access is also included in the USO regulation. A review of USO 
provisions was done in 2006 and the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Commission (TRC) published the Information Memorandum on USO. 
Discussions on the review of the system have taken place since then and a 
communication in 2014 confirmed the fact that neither mobile telephony nor 
broadband services shall be included in USO. This position is actually exactly 
the same as the EU on the subject, where USO is based on a model of service 
supplying that is based on the fixed line. USO does not include broadband 
services or mobile services. The focus on fixed telephony and functional 
internet was reconfirmed in the 2011 E-services Communication  (European 
Commission, 2011). In this case, the EU and Jordanian model are very similar.    
Regarding the sector environment variables, Jordan, like Morocco, is part of the 
ITU and the WTO. Jordan has been a good student in many ways regarding the 
implementation and changes of policies according to international standards. In 
the case of USO, however, no information was given as to how much 
international bodies have had an impact on policy making in the field of USO. 
Jordan is also part of various international and regional bodies and is very 
involved in the EMERG. Nevertheless, the most important channel of policy-
making in the USO field for Jordan is to be found in the relationship with the EU. 
One of the key milestones is the conclusion of the twinning project between the 
TRC and the Italian, Spanish and French regulatory authorities. Jordan 
committed to implement policies following the European NRAs model, with a 
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financial support of EUR 1.4 million from the EU (European Union and 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2010:19). The call for proposals was launched 
in June 2010. The start of the project followed a year later with the completion 
planned for December 2013.  
The twinning project aims at supporting “the development of the Jordanian 
Telecom sector in regards to telecom market, competitive environment and 
quality and quantity of telecom services” (European Union and Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, 2010:2). It encompasses the objective to achieve a 
“regulatory regime compatible with the EU regulatory framework, that includes 
questions such as that of universal services and spectrum management 
(European Union and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2010:7). Two of the 
agenda items included the definition of universal service and spectrum 
management techniques (European Union and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
2010). The fact that twinning projects are financed by the EU and are conducted 
by EU NRAs may show a certain level of constraints to achieve EU-oriented 
goals. However, twinning projects are based on the commitment from the 
recipient country. They do not represent a constraint, but a voluntary 
engagement by Jordan to engage in policy changes following a specific model. 
Regarding the sector pressure variables in Jordan, it is the contrary to Morocco. 
The focus is not on performance but on the leadership of the followed model. 
Jordan is a typical case showing that USO based on fixed line and functional 
internet is not adequate, as the fixed telephony is losing market shares and 
households are increasingly relying on mobile services only (ITU, 2014). 
Several experts in Jordan mention that USO policies are ill-suited. Expert JO8 
from the TRC mentions that the Jordanian USO system is actually too old 
(Expert JO8, 2014). In Jordan the question arises why fixed telephony is still the 
focus. Expert JO8 of the TRC mentions that even if the fixed infrastructure 
covers the whole country, it is not used in many areas, because of the 
preference of using mobile services. However, the fact that fixed telephony is 
getting less and less popular in Jordan, represents a reason for certain experts 
of the TRC not to change anything to the policy at the moment (Expert JO8, 
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2014). The ill-suited policy has in fact not much implication in the 
telecommunications landscape of Jordan.  
The obsolescence of the USO system in Jordan is however not accepted by the 
corporate sector who wishes for changes. An expert from the Orange group, of 
which the USO provider is part, mentions that in Jordan a USF does not exist, 
which means that all USO costs are borne by Orange fixed. This expert deems 
the situation unsatisfactory and wishes for the imitation of other models, notably 
creating a USF or organising tenders (Expert JO10, 2014). The other two 
mobile phone companies in Jordan, however, rather than supporting the 
creation of a USF or tenders, advocate for the cancellation of USO policies. 
Expert JO11 of Umniah, one of the main Jordanian mobile operators argues 
that as the fixed telephony is decreasing and not used in its whole capacity, no 
USO policy is actually needed (Expert JO11, 2014). Another expert from the 
other phone company, Zain, mentions that USO in Jordan is old fashioned. It 
should be cancelled and overlooked (Expert JO9, 2014). The fact that 
competition in mobile services in Jordan is sufficient to provide 
telecommunications services to the whole population is also underlined by the 
Ministry (Expert JO1, 2014). However, so far, USO policies have remained as 
they are despite their unsuitability to the domestic context. The position of the 
corporate sector is clearly critical towards the USO policy in Jordan. However, it 
does not impact the policy-making process in the TRC. This confirms, as in 
Morocco, that the corporate sector does not have much regulatory weight. 
Lastly, as for Morocco, no variable of sanction capacity was observed.   
In the case of USO in Jordan, there is no proof that any form of sanctions is 
taking place behind the adoption of EU policies in Jordan. The twinning project 
executed with regulatory experts from Italy, France and Spain corroborates this 
point. It confirms a will from the Jordanian regulatory system to approximate the 
European regulatory system, without pressure from the EU. For instance, the 
Jordanian cases supports the argument that twinning projects with EU NRAs, in 
the case of Southern Mediterranean countries, does not aim at a strict 
transposition of EU regulation and neither does it aim at a potential EU 
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accession. Twinning projects in such cases, represent an exercise of capacity-
building (European Commission, 2012a:VI). In the Jordan TRC twinning for 
instance, the 2012 twinning evaluation report states that “it must be highlighted 
that transferring the EU Acquis is not part of Jordan’s objectives. Therefore 
mandatory results are very often simply considered ordinary results or classical 
technical assistance outputs” (European Commission, 2012a:24). 
Mediterranean countries do commit to transfer a selection of EU policy practices 
in the framework of twinning project. However those are selected according to 
their own objectives.  
To conclude, this twinning project confirms a commitment from Jordan to 
approximate the EU regulatory framework through an institutionalised channel. In 
this case study, policy adoption is mostly based on the actor that is perceived 
as a leader in the area. It appears that sanction capacity has no role in policy 
adoption in this case. Finally, economic interests in Jordan are ambiguous. In 
effect, the provider of the fixed line in Jordan is owned by the same company as 
the one in France. In both cases, Orange fixed is the main shareholder of the 
company providing USO services. In Jordan, however, the USO provider does 
not enjoy compensation from USF, as is the case in France (ARCEP, 2015). 
The French NRA was also part of the twinning project taking place from 2011 to 
2013, which did not challenge the USO model based on the fixed line. It 
suggests that even if other mobile phone companies may not have a 
remarkable say in policy-making in this sector, the parallelism with Orange in 
France confirms Jordan’s commitment to satisfy European interests. It suggests 
a link between a focus on a specific leader and economic interests. In the 
context of the mechanisms of the diffusion framework, the USO model in Jordan 
has transited through transgovernmental channels with the aim of following 
leaders in the field. This is a case for policy adoption following the mechanisms 
of imitation. 
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6.3.3 Case study (2) Spectrum management in Morocco 
In the case of spectrum management in Morocco, it appears that attention is put 
into creating conditions to develop the market. Operators may use spectrum 
according to technological neutrality and regulators pay notable attention to stay 
in line with international regulation on the matter, allowing for a better regulatory 
context for investors. In this case, it is argued that economic competition 
mechanisms are taking place in the majority and are leading to a convergence 
of the models. This confirms what Kettani and El Mahdi argue regarding ICT 
policy in Morocco. They mention that ICT are also viewed as a path towards 
achieving a ‘historical leap’ via the development of an ICT industry of national 
merit. They argue that “[t]his vision is adequately covered in the phrase le 
rattrapage technologique et économique28, which highlights the country’s quest 
for a technological and economic leap” (Kettani and El Mahdi, 2011:174). 
Spectrum management and USO in Morocco reveal an apparent commitment 
by policy-makers in the country to innovate and implement sophisticated 
policies. 
Regarding the environment variables, the peculiarity of spectrum is that each 
country needs to agree with its neighbours to avoid interferences. Moroccan 
experts mentioned several times that most contacts take place with countries, 
which are directly neighbouring Morocco. This is due to coordination needs so 
to avoid potentially harmful interferences. However, these meetings are mostly 
limited to coordination contact and no further meetings are organised to discuss 
such issues. As expected, the spectrum management is directly linked to a 
remarkable international structure and Morocco accords to what the ITU 
demands in terms of spectrum regulation. It appears very important for the 
country to show the level of sophistication of its experts at the international 
level. This is also illustrated by the DTTB which took place in Morocco in July 
2015. Expert MO10 from HACA underlines the importance for Morocco to 
                                            
 
28
 Translation: The technological and economic catch-up 
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respect its GE06 engagement in front of the international community (Expert 
MO10, 2014). Morocco is one of the only countries of the MENA region to have 
respected the DTTB UHF switch-off in 2015.  
Furthermore, Morocco is part of the Radio Regulation Board (RRB), which is a 
committee of the ITU29. An expert of the ANRT argues that the RRB members 
represent their country however, the elected members are chosen for their 
competences. Their position must be neutral and independent. In any case of 
conflict of interest, the RRB members must abstain from giving an opinion 
(Expert MO7, 2014). According to an expert of the Ministry of e-commerce, the 
fact that Morocco is part of the RRB has a double value. Firstly, the ministry 
needed to approve the election. Hence this represents a sovereign choice from 
Morocco to be part of this committee. Secondly, this nomination acknowledges 
competences and in particular, gives the possibility of accessing further 
competences. For this expert, being part of this comity allows the possibility of 
gaining very valuable international experience in order to solve potential future 
issues of Morocco regarding spectrum management (Expert MO1, 2014). This 
shows again the importance given to be part of the worldwide community in ICT 
sophistication.  
The determination of the ANRT and of the Ministry to be part of the RRB shows 
commitment to participate at the international regulatory level as a peer to other 
leading countries. Concerning transgovernmental cooperation in the case of 
Morocco, the EMERG appeared limited at bringing any practical 
recommendations, as the subject is too technical (Expert MO5, 2014). For 
instance, Morocco works with countries of the European Union through other 
channels. In particular, the relationship with France is regular and 
                                            
 
29
 The RRB consists of 12 members who give advices on spectrum related issues. They are 
elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference for a 4-year mandate and meet up to four times a 
year. The RRB receives a mandate every time there is a conflict or a difficulty in interpreting 
certain rules. They approve rules of procedure and provide advice as requested by the various 
Radio communications bodies (ITU. 2015b. Radio Regulations Board (RRB) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/conferences/RRB/Pages/default.aspx [Accessed December 7 
2015].)  
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institutionalised and they exchange views on the sector through a bilateral 
partnership. An ANRT expert mentions that “[w]ith France, we have a 
partnership agreement with the ANFR. It allows for the exchange of expertise. It 
goes beyond the bilateral framework. We organise workshops together for 
French speaking countries, which take place in France or in Morocco” (Expert 
MO7, 2014). He mentions that France organises meetings in preparation for the 
WRC with French speaking countries where positions from the different areas 
are presented. France presents the opinions of France and of the EU member 
countries, while Morocco presents the opinions for Morocco and for Arabic 
speaking countries and French-speaking African countries (Expert MO7, 2014). 
Hence, in addition to the well-established regulatory context of the ITU, it 
appears that Morocco is close to its neighbours due to the necessities of the 
cross-border aspect of frequencies. In addition, a special relationship with 
France on this issue is confirmed. In all cases, Morocco underlines its role as an 
equal partner in the regulatory process and not as a follower.   
Regarding the sector pressure variables, as mentioned above, Morocco shows 
a political will to perform at the international level. In several instances, the 
experts mention how close Morocco is to the international community. This is 
apparent at the ITU level and with the role of Morocco as a key policy adviser in 
the RRB. It is also distinct in its relationship with France, where both countries 
organise workshops as equals and prepare positions to the WRC jointly. 
Regarding the economic interest variables, there is a visible role of the 
corporate sector in the field of spectrum. This is notably observable in terms of 
standards. For instance, there is a direct attention drawn towards the EU due to 
similar use of technological standards. Several experts mentioned that 
currently, being part of Region 1 together with the EU, has often led Morocco to 
adopt European technological norms and practices. One of the experts of the 
ANRT mentions that “[t]he EU develops norms in relation to this (Region 1) 
spectrum area, Morocco as a member of this region, needs to take them into 
account” (Expert MO7, 2014). This has been the case with technologies bound 
to the Euro-Mediterranean geographical space, such as GSM.  
230 
 
 
 
Economic interests are present in the spectrum management sector in 
Morocco. The link between France and Morocco is confirmed concerning 
multinational corporations as well. There is notably a distinguishable presence 
of French corporations in the telecommunications sector in Morocco. French 
companies own or have owned major shares in two of the mobile phone 
companies in Morocco. This is the case of the French company Orange, which 
owns 40% of the Orange group in Morocco, after a change of ownership in 
2010 (Meditel, 2010:24). Furthermore, Vivendi, a French consortium, used to 
own 53% of the shares of Maroc Telecom (IAM) until the sale of the shares in 
2013 to Etisalat (IAM, 2014:32, IAM, 2015:32). The presence of French 
companies in Morocco and the close link between Morocco and France in the 
coordination of spectrum is revealing and confirms the idea that leadership and 
economic interests are more closely intricate than expected. Finally, with 
regards to the sanction variable, there is no mention in the interviews of forms 
of sanctions or punishment in the framework of the ITU in this sector.  
To conclude, in the case of spectrum management in Morocco, policies are very 
up-to-date with the newest management techniques. Morocco also proceeded 
to the digital switch-over in July 2015, as one of the only countries in the region 
to do so. Morocco is particularly clear in showing its level of sophistication in the 
field and its membership to the RRB and the switching off of its digital signal as 
required by the GE06 has been an example of this high level policy making 
capacity. In the case of spectrum in Morocco, international channels are 
important, notably the ITU. However, the interviews suggested the presence of 
transgovernmental channels as well, due to a close collaboration with the 
French NRA. Regarding pressures, economic interests in the field are visible 
and they actually mirror the regulatory connection between Morocco and 
France. In the context of the mechanisms of the diffusion framework, spectrum 
in Morocco is marked by international channels and a close attention to reach 
efficiency and follow the corporate sector. This suggests that mechanisms of 
competition are at play in this context. However, an ambiguous relationship 
exists with transgovernmental channels. In fact, this can be explained by the 
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characteristics of the spectrum sector which require regular coordination 
between neighbours.  
6.3.4 Case study (4) Spectrum management in Jordan 
Regarding spectrum management in Jordan, it is mentioned in policies that the 
TRC shall adopt wherever possible advanced spectrum management principles, 
including a technology and service neutral approach to spectrum; spectrum 
reuse; and spectrum sharing (MOICT, 2007:art.68(f)). One of the heads of the 
TRC mentions that Jordan is fully harmonised with the ITU directives. He 
mentions that Jordan is in line with the ITU requirements and neighbouring 
countries, its policies are generally up-to-date (Expert JO6, 2014). Expert JO6 
mentions that “[w]e participate in all activities related to the spectrum, we do 
believe that we have a very efficient spectrum management in Jordan” (Expert 
JO6, 2014). In addition, spectrum management tools were part of the 
telecommunications twinning project that was done with the EU. In this sector, 
as in USO, a will to approximate to the EU was expressed by Jordanian NRAs. 
However, Jordan has not yet proceeded to the digital switch-over. As of July 
2015, it had not yet switched off its terrestrial signals. This is an ambiguous 
issue in Jordan, as the spectrum is not crowded, which does not create 
pressure for a change of policy.   
Regarding the sector environment variables, similarly to Morocco, one of the 
heads of the TRC mentions that spectrum management is not a national issue 
and that the ITU plays a very important role in this case (Expert JO4, 2014). 
This expert mentions that “[t]he planning is in line with the ITU and in 
coordination with the neighbouring countries” (Expert JO4, 2014). This expert 
mentions that Jordan has now acquired “modern spectrum management tool” 
and Jordanian policy includes the questions of reframing and white spaces 
(Expert JO4, 2014). Hence, Jordan is aware of new management techniques 
and has included them in the policies, at least informatively, since technically 
the Jordanian experts mentioned the difficulty for the country to apply new 
regulatory management techniques, as long as the digital switch-over has not 
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been concluded allowing for the liberation of more bandwidth (Expert JO5, 
2014). In terms of transgovernmental cooperation, EMERG, as was the case for 
Morocco, did indeed discuss questions of spectrum management but was not 
key to the implementation of new management practices. The TRC twinning 
however, included the enhancement of spectrum management practices and 
aimed at achieving a regulatory regime compatible with the EU regulatory 
framework in the field of spectrum management techniques (European Union 
and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2010:7). It is observed that in the case of 
Jordan, transgovernmental collaboration has had an impact in policy change as 
well, due to the signature of the twinning project.  
Regarding the sector pressure variables in Jordan, it appears that enhancing 
performances is not the main driver of the policy changes. Several experts of 
the corporate sector deplore the lack of efficiency of the regulatory 
implementation in favor of higher revenues for the government. However, 
Jordan is very involved in the ITU and very close to the work of the EU in the 
field of spectrum management, particularly following the telecommunications 
twinning signed with several EU NRAs. Regarding economic interests in 
Jordan, the corporate sector has had recently a noticeable weight in the 
process of government auctions. For instance, in 2014, the government made a 
tender for new spectrum bands, as they wanted to welcome a new entrant in 
the field. However, expert JO9 of Zain mentions that the existing operators were 
against this decision and lobbied in order for the available spectrum to be 
offered to existing operators to expand and upgrade their offer (Expert JO9, 
2014). As a result, the government received only two offers that were both 
disqualified. 
Expert JO9 mentions that the failure of the auction and of the entrance of a 
fourth entrant in the field was a success, even if they had to go through the 
whole process of bidding until reverting to the same situation as before (Expert 
JO9, 2014). The weight of the corporate sector and its influence in the TRC 
decisions are also embodied by expert JO9 of Zain who mentions that 
concerning the TRC twinning, the corporate sector was often consulted. He 
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mentions that “[t]he TRC consults us and publishes the answers to the website 
and then discuss the meeting and finally come with a draft instruction and final 
instruction” (Expert JO9, 2014). In Jordan, the corporate sector is close to the 
TRC for spectrum related subjects. Issues, however, arise regarding the 
implementation of the decisions. Expert JO9 of Zain mentions that “[t]he only 
problem is at the level of implementation of the operators’ feedback, which is 
minimum” (Expert JO9, 2014). This suggests that even if the corporate sector is 
very well-integrated in the policy-making process of spectrum management, the 
outcome does not always lift up the expectations of the corporate sector. 
Finally, regarding sanction capacity, the Jordanian case shows that Jordan has 
only limited leeway to implement its own policies. Several experts mentioned 
power struggles within the ITU. The expert from Umniah describes the 
relationship with the EU as forced. He mentions that “[w]e are forced to do in 
many cases, what the EU does” (Expert JO11, 2014). For this expert, this is not 
always a bad thing if it means that the Jordanian government’s spectrum 
regulation of spectrum gets closer to the rules of the market, as it is in the EU 
(Expert JO11, 2014). Expert JO5 from the TRC mentions that Jordan affiliates 
itself with the Arab countries in the ITU and adds “[w]e are not a group 
producing technology, we are using it. So we are not influencing. We can vote, 
but at the end we ally with the EU” (Expert JO5, 2014). He further states that in 
situations where the EU and Arab countries differ in the ITU, it is not always 
possible to implement the interest of developing countries. Some major players 
in the EU are a lot stronger (Expert JO5, 2014). This gives a notion of who do 
the policies benefit at the end, which becomes a case of coercive incentives, as 
it benefits the diffuser country, rather than the adopting country. This suggests 
that in the case of Jordan, subtle power relationship within the ITU shed light on 
asymmetrical relationships, where Jordan needs to apply what has been 
decided internationally.  
To conclude, in the case of spectrum management, Jordan is up-to-date with its 
policies. It is close to the ITU regulation and again has a discernible interest 
towards benchmarking with the EU. One of the interesting but contentious 
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points of the Jordanian spectrum policy is that in Jordan, there is no pressure 
on spectrum. In fact, spectrum scarcity is not an issue in Jordan. Expert JO6 
mentions that in the field of spectrum [t]here is no shortage, it is always ready 
and available” (Expert JO6, 2014). Confirming this position, Expert JO9 of Zain, 
one of the three mobile phone providers of Jordan mentions “[w]e discuss 
reframing, white spaces, digital dividend, spectrum trading. Luckily in Jordan, 
we do not have shortage, and this is not really the problem” (Expert JO9, 2014). 
The issue of spectrum shortage is very different to the situation in Europe, 
where DTTB represents a clear source of available spectrum to be freed. In 
Jordan, the DTTB, for instance, does not carry the same value. 
It appears that Jordan adopts policies regarding white spaces or digital 
dividend, only because it is something being done in the ITU or in the EU, but it 
is not really needed domestically. The expert interviews have shown that Jordan 
is not a state directing policy making within the ITU (Expert JO9, 2014). In 
several occasions, experts have underlined how they need to follow the leaders 
in the field, particularly the EU, as they share similar band frequency. In the 
context of the mechanisms of diffusion framework, spectrum in Jordan is mostly 
regulated by the international channels and also transgovernmental, following 
the twinning project in the field. It is also a sector where efficiency is not as 
important as the need to follow a leader, in this case the EU. Economic interests 
are discernible in this case, as was the case in spectrum management in 
Morocco. Finally, sanction capacity was observed in the interviews, where 
experts deplored the fact that Jordan needs to follow other regulators in the 
field. This is notably the case within the ITU, where subtler games of powers 
among members shed light on asymmetrical power relationship. This suggests 
that the spectrum sector in Jordan mostly follows coercion mechanisms, 
however, this is not hard coercion, as no formal risk of sanctions were 
mentioned by Jordanian experts. It is a more subtle form of coercion based on 
alliance and asymmetrical regulatory powers. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter answered the second research subquestion how does a state 
adopt a policy that originates from elsewhere. The chapter was divided into two 
sections to assess and analyse the mechanisms of the diffusion framework. The 
first section aimed at providing additional information to understand the 
framework propositions of Section 2.4.2 in an appropriate context. The first 
focus was on the role of economic interests in the telecommunications sector, 
corresponding to the first framework proposition. This part showed the role of 
telecommunications multinational corporations in Morocco and Jordan and shed 
light on the presence of EU and Gulf companies in the region. The second 
focus addressed the question of efficiency and leadership, corresponding to the 
second framework proposition. An emphasis was put on the role of technology 
in the sector and the freedom to focus on certain leaders and policies freely. 
The third focus discussed sanction capacity in the telecommunications sector, 
corresponding to the third framework proposition. It appears that in the field, 
subtler forms of power relationship exist, rather than formal sanctions 
imposition. However, an interesting trend is the emergence of the Southern 
States as key actors in the field, illustrated by their position in WRC-12 against 
the EU member states. Finally, the last focus was on the role of 
transgovernmental framework in the field, their focus on economic profits and 
their potential for coercion, corresponding to the last framework proposition. It 
was observed that economic interests are central to the existence of such 
frameworks, particularly to enhance harmonisation and standardisation among 
partners. However, no mandatory commitments are expected in the field, 
contrasting with international organisations.  
The second section of this chapter gave the analysis of the four case studies, 
USO and spectrum management in Morocco and Jordan. As expected by the 
assumptions of Section 1.5.2, the two cases of USO correspond to mechanisms 
of learning and imitation and the two cases of spectrum management 
correspond to the mechanisms of competition and coercion. The four cases are 
used to discuss the four hypotheses set regarding the mechanisms of diffusion. 
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The first case study, USO in Morocco (case study 1) corresponds completely to 
the combination of the five learning mechanisms variables. The hypothesis (H₃ 
Learning) stating that learning mechanisms occur in a context exempt of 
international regulatory channels, economic interest and sanction capacity, 
where transgovernmental collaboration is used with the objective of efficiency 
enhancement, was confirmed. The second case study, USO in Jordan (case 
study 3) also corresponds completely to the combination of the five imitation 
mechanisms variables. The hypothesis (H₄ Imitation) stating that imitation 
mechanisms occur in a context exempt of international regulatory channels, 
economic interest and sanction capacity, where transgovernmental 
collaboration is used with the objective to reach conformity with the perceived 
leaders in the field (absence of efficiency variable), is confirmed. 
The third case study, spectrum management in Morocco (case study 2) 
corresponds almost completely to the combination of the five competition 
mechanisms variables. The only ambiguity concerns transgovernmental 
collaboration. In fact, it appears that in the case of spectrum management in 
USO, close collaboration between Morocco and France exists following a MoA 
in the field. This collaboration is institutionalised and used to prepare joint 
propositions for the WRC conferences. It shows as such that both international 
and transgovernmental channels are used to develop spectrum policy decisions 
in the field. Based on the observed ambiguity regarding the use of 
transgovernmental channels in the field, the hypothesis (H₅ Competition) can be 
adapted. It is changed as follows, economic competition mechanisms occur in a 
context exempt of sanction capacity, where international regulatory channels 
and transgovernmental ones, are used with the objective to satisfy economic 
interests and reach efficiency. 
The fourth case study, spectrum management in Jordan (case study 4) 
presents a similar result to the case study 2. It corresponds almost completely 
to the combination of the five coercion mechanisms variables. The only 
ambiguity concerns, transgovernmental collaboration. It appears that in the 
case of spectrum management in Jordan, transgovernmental channels have 
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been used in the form of the twinning project with the EU so to discuss policy 
changes in the spectrum area. In this case, it shows that both international and 
transgovernmental channels have been used to conduct policy change. This 
case also presents interesting findings regarding coercion. As expected, 
coercion in the telecommunications sector is not formal and obvious. On the 
contrary subtler forms of asymmetrical power take place. In such cases, 
alliances and the power to stand against the leaders in the field may shed light 
on sanction capacity of certain actors. In this case, sanctions must not be 
understood in terms of effective and visible sanctions, but in terms of game of 
power and alliances taking place in the international realm. Based on the 
observed ambiguity regarding the use of transgovernmental channels in the 
field, the hypothesis (H₆ Coercion) can be adapted. It is changed as follows, 
coercion mechanisms occur in the context of economic interest, leadership and 
sanction capacity, where international and transgovernmental channels are 
used and possess the capacity to impose sanctions. 
Based on the results of the empirical research, one major observation can be 
drawn. The transgovernmental collaboration variable is not adequate to 
disentangle mechanisms of diffusion. Two comments can be ascertained. 
Firstly, the field research supported the idea that soft governance and 
particularly, transnational soft governance, is central to the telecommunications 
sector. The empirical research shows that several types of transgovernmental 
collaboration, such as transgovernmental regulatory groups (EMERG) and 
bilateral and multilateral regulatory collaboration (twinnings and MoA), are now 
completely institutionalised in the field. They complement or substitute 
international channels as is shown in the four case studies. Secondly, if the 
transgovernmental variable shall still be used in such a framework, then an 
eventual distinction may be made between transgovernmental regulatory 
groups, which are usually based on a horizontal and balanced representation of 
power and bilateral and multinational regulatory collaboration, which may reveal 
relationships of dependency between two or more partners.   
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The results of this last empirical part shed light on the four propositions 
mentioned in section 2.4.2. Firstly, the proposition that competition and coercion 
mechanisms occur principally in situations where economic interests and 
international channels exist, was confirmed. Secondly, the proposition that 
efficiency is linked to learning and competition and leadership to imitation and 
coercion, was confirmed as well. Thirdly, the proposition that sanction capacity 
can only be imposed by international channels was partially confirmed as 
transgovernmental channels are used in combination to international channels 
nowadays. This renders a distinct demarcation of balance of powers more 
difficult to observe. Finally, the proposition that transgovernmental frameworks 
lead mostly to learning and imitation mechanisms was not confirmed. The 
empirical results show that in contemporary policy-making the 
telecommunications sector, transgovernmental frameworks are used in 
combination or in replacement to international channels. This variable is not 
useful to disentangle mechanisms of diffusion.  
One of the main empirical findings of this chapter is the interest of both Jordan 
and Morocco to be part of the international community. Both countries show in 
different ways the importance of signalling to worldwide partners their 
commitment to improve the sector. This corresponds to the concept proposed in 
the literature of international attention. Several authors discussing policy-making 
refer to the fact that the adoption of a policy may be aimed at improving the 
reputation of a country at the international level. This takes place when the 
adoption of certain policies gives signals to the international community of both 
the government’s interest to improve practices and be a more involved part of 
the international community. Weyland argues that normative appeal and the 
quest for international legitimacy prompt emulation of foreign innovation. He 
argues that to “look good in the eyes of global public opinion, decision-makers 
want to be modern and up-to-date and therefore imitate new policy models. 
They are determined to avoid the stigma of being backward and therefore try 
hard to keep up with the latest trend” (2006:4). As such, the adoption of certain 
policies may become instrumental, as a lock-in reform strategy to obtain non-
economic profits, or at least not direct economic profits (Mattli, 1999). It might 
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show a real will from the partner countries towards implementing transnational 
regulatory practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:151). Policy diffusion becomes 
a tool to show commitment in implementing and improving regulation.  
The role of USO in terms of international attention has been observed in this 
thesis. One of the Experts of Cullen mentions that USO policies carry a positive 
image in the eyes of the international community. He mentions that the 
examples given by USO policy to protect citizens carry legitimacy and spread 
good reputation (Expert EU20, 2014). This was confirmed in the context of USO 
in Jordan and Morocco. The interesting nuance between both countries is the 
different approaches that they take towards policy change. Jordan is committed 
to the EU model and shows its good will by implementing EU policies in the 
field, even if they are not always suitable to the Jordanian market. Morocco, 
however, shows another strategy. It proves to the worldwide community that it is 
committed to telecommunications innovation by proposing advanced practices 
that are leapfrogging the EU models. The concept of leapfrogging policy-making 
refers to cases where policies emerging in the global South supersede 
international benchmarks. Policy diffusion does not refer to such cases in 
particular. However, several authors of policy diffusion remind us of the 
importance not to conclude that convergence is the only outcome of policy 
diffusion (Ladi, 2011, Knill, 2001, Beckert, 2010). Divergence may as well take 
place as a result of policy diffusion. Leapfrogging policy-making represents such 
a case of divergence, as the adopted regulatory policies go beyond the 
international benchmarks in the field.   
Finally, this empirical chapter confirms the emergence of new regulatory flows 
beyond the traditional North-South and North-North flows as described by 
Bauer (2010b:9) (Section 1.6). The North-North dimension illustrates regulatory 
changes where the US and other Northern countries embarked on policies of 
privatisation and liberalisation. It was soon paralleled by a North-South flow, 
where industrialised countries imposed processes of reform on Southern 
countries, particularly through the demands of lenders such as the World Bank 
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(Bauer, 2010b:9). Both the flows were confirmed in the historical 
contextualisation of the second empirical chapter (Section 5.2).  
This thesis however confirms the emergence of the two following flows. A 
regional South-South flow was undeniably confirmed in the case of USO in 
Morocco. In fact, the emergence of Latin American countries as key providers in 
regulatory reforms already became a focus of authors in the late 1990s. For 
instance, Galal mentions that a handful of developing countries, such as Chile, 
Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela started relying on private ownership, 
competition and incentive regulation of the monopolistic segment of telecom 
markets, already in the mid-1980s, at similar times or even sometimes prior to 
EU member states in the field (1999:133). Gentzoglanis also mentions that the 
trend of privatisation of state-owned telecommunication providers started with 
Latin American countries, before being taken over by Asian countries and finally 
African ones. He mentions that Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Mauritania joined the trend only later in the late 1990s (2003:81). The use of 
Latin American policies in the telecommunications sector was shown in the 
case of USO in Morocco and confirms South-South trends. Finally, the last flow 
of South-North regulatory process is also emerging, even if less evidently. 
Several experts of the EC, for instance underlined how Nigeria or Kenya have 
directly caught-up with advanced technologies superseding the EU in certain 
fields (EU6, 2014). This shows that the Global South is proposing technological 
solutions that may well become the new centres for innovations.  
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7 CHAPTER 7 – Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Several main theoretical contributions to the literature of policy diffusion and 
telecommunications policy diffusion were given. The thesis contributed to the 
phenomenon of policy adoption and specifically to the concept of mechanisms 
of diffusion. This thesis elaborated on a framework based on four state 
variables and five sector variables. The state variables shed light on the 
likelihood of policy adoption. The presence or absence of sector variables infers 
which of the different mechanisms of diffusion is at play. This is theoretically 
innovative, as it had not been experimented systematically before. In addition, 
empirical findings regarding telecommunications in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt 
completed the thesis. It presented the selection of two subfields of 
telecommunications, USO and Spectrum management in three MENA 
countries, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. This choice of cases contributes 
adequately to empirical findings. Firstly, USO and spectrum management are 
never studied jointly, despite their joint objectives of connecting the citizens to 
ICT. Secondly, telecommunications in MENA countries are only rarely studied, 
as the focus in such sectors is rather on the EU members or major players in 
the field such as the US or China. Lastly, these three countries have not been 
compared in this field, which represents an additional empirical contribution.  
This thesis answered one main research question: does policy adoption take 
place in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in the telecommunications sector? It 
focused on two additional elements, in case the first question was answered 
positively. That is, under which conditions do countries adopt a policy that 
originated externally and how does this adoption take place. The main focus of 
this thesis was to contribute to policy diffusion theories, particularly regarding 
what concerns the observation and systematisation of mechanisms of diffusion. 
The thesis was built under the premise that the dependent variable is the 
adoption of policies according to four mechanisms of diffusion; learning, 
imitation, economic competition and coercion. Before proceeding to the analysis 
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of the data, and being able to answer the second and third research foci, the 
first and main research question needed to be discussed. As such the adoption 
of policies in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt in the telecommunications sector was 
the aim of Chapter 4. This chapter was tied to methodological considerations. It 
used both product and process to identify policy observation. This was done 
using two management ideas to trace the diffusion of policies.  
Following Chapter 4 establishing the variation across six case studies, Chapter 
5, presented a set of four state variables. They revealed the likelihood of policy 
adoption in the countries under study. Four of them were defined, based on the 
premise that policy adoption exists due to the necessity of adopting countries to 
look abroad for models. This is called the vulnerability of a state to external 
forces and was defined as a combination of four variables relating to different 
levels of market and governance openness and market and political 
interconnectedness of the adopting countries; governance openness, market 
openness, political interconnectedness and market interconnectedness. This 
chapter confirmed the findings of Chapter 4. It also confirmed that in Egyptian 
USO and spectrum management, diffusion was less observed than for both 
Morocco and Jordan. In Chapter 6, five sector variables were discussed to 
disentangle the four traditional mechanisms of diffusion discussed in this thesis, 
learning, imitation, economic competition and coercion. Four different 
combinations of the five variables shed light on what mechanisms had been at 
play in both Morocco and Jordan’s USO and spectrum management policies.  
This conclusive chapter reviews the contribution and findings of the above 
mentioned chapters. The first section presents the main findings of the thesis. It 
focuses mostly on the literature of policy adoption and telecommunications 
diffusion literature. The conclusive discussions of all three empirical chapters 
are discussed in this section. The first part of this section reviews the 
methodological framework set to discuss the observation of policy diffusion. The 
second part addresses the conditions leading to policy adoption, arguing that 
state variables are adequate to define the likelihood of a policy adoption. The 
third part discusses the role of sector variables to infer which diffusion 
243 
 
 
 
mechanisms have been at play during the adoption. The second section of this 
chapter presents the limitations to these findings. Limitations concerning the 
theories and framework are the key focus. Methodological limitations will not be 
reiterated as they were explained in detail in the corresponding section of this 
research thesis (Sections 5.3 and 6.3). Finally, a section on generalisability is 
presented. It proposes sectors and areas of research for further study. 
7.2 Main findings and contribution  
Several key findings have been given in this project. The main ones relate to 
the theoretical and empirical contributions. This thesis defined two different 
frameworks that contribute to policy diffusion literature. The first one predicted 
that state variables shed light on the likelihood of policy adoption. The second 
one defined that different combinations of sector variables infer the mechanisms 
of diffusion at play during the process of adoption. The likelihood of policy 
adoption was the object of chapter 5. The focus on the mechanisms of diffusion 
was the object of chapter 6. Additionally, chapter 4 presented methodological 
tools to observe policy adoption across six cases. Each of the findings is 
reiterated below.  
7.2.1 Observing policy adoption (Chapter 4) 
The aim of the first empirical chapter was to present the research question: 
does policy adoption take place in the telecommunications sector in Jordan, 
Morocco and Egypt? The main task of this chapter was to define an adequate 
methodological framework to analyse the gathered qualitative data. This 
chapter hypothesised that policy diffusion could be observed in all six cases of 
this thesis. This is notably due to the fact that the telecommunications sector is 
a cross-border sector in nature and that looking abroad for examples to follow is 
part of the daily routine of administrations. It was not straightforward, however, 
how to engage with the observation of policy diffusion both systematically and 
objectively. The aim of the chapter was to build an integrated framework to link 
the theory of policy diffusion to the empirical analysis. In this chapter, different 
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steps were followed to develop the methodological framework and observe 
policy diffusion. In this thesis, based on small-n cases and using almost 
uniquely qualitative methods, a good knowledge of the sector under study was 
necessary before conducting interviews. The knowledge of the developments in 
the policy area was required to identify the most recent trends in the field. 
Defining the current subjects under discussion in such policy areas was 
essential to both being able to discuss of technicalities with experts, but also to 
trace the diffusion of ideas in the field. The identification of two recent policy 
ideas, central to the sector, was key to observing the development of the 
policies in various states.  
The selection of these management ideas can be difficult and sometimes 
misleading. As such two different cases are desirable to level the developments 
of the policy. Once policy ideas have been identified, it is then possible to 
systematically build the interviews with experts in the field. It gives practical and 
existing technical contextualisation to the experts of what the researcher means 
by policy diffusion, which is a term used solely in academic work and less in 
hands-on fields. It is also suitable to identify management trends before 
comparing different laws and policies, in order not to lose the focus in the 
amount of publications released by the concerned administrations and to be 
able to directly focus on specific articles.  
The last step of the methodological framework was to observe policy diffusion 
using two concepts, the product and process. The product means that it is 
necessary that two different laws or policies are similar, even partially, across 
two different state jurisdictions. The process means that that there is evidence 
of cross-country collaboration and exchange across administrations. Both 
product and process are necessary to conclude that policy diffusion has taken 
place. In this thesis, two management ideas for each of the two sub-sectors 
were identified and tested in terms of product and process in all three countries 
under study. Table 20 shows the overview version of the result of chapter 4 
(firstly shown in Section 4.4, page 147). A longer version is available in Section 
4.3 presenting the detailed results of this work (Table 19, page 119). 
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Table 20 Results of the observation of policy diffusion (overview) 
 Case 
Study (1) 
Morocco: 
USO 
Case 
Study (2) 
Morocco: 
Spectrum 
Case 
Study (3) 
Jordan: 
USO 
Case 
Study (4) 
Jordan: 
Spectrum 
Case 
Study (5) 
Egypt: 
USO 
Case 
Study (6) 
Egypt 
Spectrum 
Idea 1 + 0 + 0 0 - 
Idea 2 + 0 + 0 - - 
TOTAL + 0 + 0 - - 
Notes: Values: +: high policy adoption; 0: medium policy adoption; -: low policy adoption; na: 
Not Applicable. 
Source: Author. 
 
Table 20 gave the main findings of this chapter. It was concluded that USO in 
Morocco and in Jordan presented characteristics of high policy diffusion. 
Spectrum management in Morocco and Jordan presented medium policy 
diffusion and lastly, USO and spectrum management in Egypt resulted in low 
policy adoption. Several observations were given based on this table. Firstly it 
showed that in both policy sectors Egypt did not score as high as Morocco and 
Jordan, proposing that a state level variation might be expected in this case, 
which is discussed in the second empirical chapter of the thesis (Chapter 5). In 
the four remaining cases, it could be observed that USO followed higher levels 
than spectrum management. This suggested that a variation with the 
telecommunications sector might be expected, this is discussed in the last 
empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6). 
Empirically, the chapter confirmed that Morocco and Jordan are closer to 
external models, such as European and Latin American models, rather than is 
the case for Egypt. In the first case, USO in Morocco (case study 1), it was 
shown that the European and Latin American models have had a key role in the 
development of USO since 2000. In the second case, spectrum management in 
Morocco (case study 2), it was concluded that its close links with the EU and 
particularly France existed to develop the subsector. In the third case, USO in 
Jordan (case study 3), a parallel between EU and Jordanian decisions in the 
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field was confirmed. This link was reiterated with the fourth case, spectrum 
management in Jordan (case study 4). These four cases showed the 
emergence and existence of a Euro-Mediterranean telecommunications 
environment where regulation does travel across borders. In the last two cases, 
USO in Egypt (case study 5) and spectrum management in Egypt (case study 
6), the low level of policy adoption was confirmed. The scope of USO has been 
narrow, until the recent calls to provide mobile services to three cities in South 
Sinai.  Egyptian spectrum management policies have also been limited. These 
lower results in policy adoption reflect state characteristics, such as the control 
of the military over the regulatory authority, the government involvement in the 
telecommunications market and more importantly the general political instability 
rendering status quo the best policy to follow at the time. 
This chapter confirmed the assumption that policy adoption would be 
observable in all six cases. The assumption was developed due to the cross-
border characteristic of the field of telecommunications and the need for states 
to look abroad for models to follow. This was confirmed in the empirical findings 
of this chapter. Methodologically, this chapter also showed that the conceptual 
framework based on two management ideas for each subsector, with the 
support of the product and process concepts was adequate to observe policy 
diffusion across states and policies. Both results tables, Table 19 and Table 20, 
built a strong basis for discussion in the two subsequent empirical chapters. A 
particular focus was set on the state divergences of Egypt compared to Jordan 
and Morocco (Chapter 5) and also within the sector’s differences between USO 
and spectrum management in Jordan and Morocco (Chapter 6).     
7.2.2 Conditions leading to policy diffusion (Chapter 5) 
The aim of the second empirical chapter was to establish under which 
conditions is a country expected to adopt a policy which originated in another 
country. In this chapter, all three country cases were reviewed and analysed 
according to the different selected state variables. The four variables were 
defined on policy diffusion literature and based on two main ideas. Firstly, states 
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tend to diffuse each other’s policies due to their vulnerability to the influence of 
external actors. Secondly, states tend to diffuse each other’s policies due to the 
interrelations of states actions and decisions in a growing interconnected world. 
The two properties representing state vulnerability to external forces are 
described as governance and market openness. Governance openness is 
defined as the degree to which a country is taking into account the rule of law 
and the work of regulatory authorities. Market openness is defined as the 
reliance on national and international market forces to regulate the economy. 
The two properties defining the interrelations across state policy decisions are 
entitled political and market interconnectedness. Political interconnectedness 
means that the more an adopting country is relying on third countries for 
political reasons, the more it will have to pay attention to the policy decisions 
taken abroad. Market interconnectedness refers to the degree of international 
trade interdependence, in particular in terms of the private sector and the role of 
FDI. 
The thesis hypothesised that higher degree of governance and market 
openness, political and market interconnectedness, the higher the probability of 
policy diffusion taking place (Hypothesis H₁ High). It also hypothesised that the 
lower the degree of governance and market openness, political and market 
interconnectedness, the lower the probability of policy diffusion taking place 
(Hypothesis H₂ Low). Figure 1 illustrated the two opposing hypotheses (firstly 
shown in Section 1.4, page 22). Figure 2 illustrated the state assumptions of 
Morocco, Jordan and Egypt (firstly shown in Section 1.5.1, page 29). 
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Figure 2 Country-cases assumptions 
Low  High 
Governance openness Governance openness 
Market openness Market openness 
Political interconnectedness Political interconnectedness 
Market interconnectedness Market interconnectedness 
  
EGYPT  MOROCCO 
 JORDAN 
Source: Author. 
 
Figure 2 illustrated the expectation that due to the linkage of Jordan and 
Morocco to external partners, for instance regarding trade with the EU for 
Morocco and the reliance on foreign aid for Jordan, such countries were likely to 
engage in policy adoption more readily than Egypt, which is on all points more 
autonomous then both Morocco and Jordan. These assumptions were analysed 
for each of the three countries and concerning each of the four variables. The 
measurements of the four variables were embodied in Figure 7 presenting four 
graphs giving the joint results of each country (firstly shown in Section 5.4, page 
173). 
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Based on Figure 7 several observations were made bringing noteworthy 
empirical and theoretical insight in the thesis. The four graphs showed that as 
expected, the results of Jordan were high, confirming the hypothesis that the 
higher levels of the four variables lead to higher levels of policy diffusion. The 
results of Egypt confirmed the hypothesis that lower levels of all four variables 
show lower levels of policy adoption. Both conclusions illustrated the 
observations of Chapter 4. However, the Moroccan case only confirmed the 
hypothesis and expectations partially. In several instances, Morocco scored 
lower than Egypt, the only straightforward result being that of governance 
Source: Author. Based upon World Banks’ WGI 
(World Bank, 2015f). 
Source: Author. Based upon the BTI 
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2015a). 
Source: Author. Based upon Aid Disbursements 
(OECD, 2015). 
 
Source: Author. Based upon World Bank 
statistics (World Bank, 2015a). 
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openness. These results suggested that this variable was more adequate to 
discuss the conditions under which countries adopt policies that have originated 
from elsewhere. Market openness, political and market interconnectedness 
provided mixed results, which needed to be assessed carefully.   
Empirically, this chapter was useful to link the Jordanian, Moroccan and 
Egyptian contexts to policy diffusion theories. The high results of Jordan 
brought interesting insight into the theory. It showed that Jordan presents higher 
rates of vulnerability to external actors than both Egypt and Morocco. This can 
be explained by the role of Jordan as a buffer state in a politically and 
economically unstable region. Jordan has been under close scrutiny from the 
international community since its independence and has been a recipient of 
foreign aid for decades. Furthermore, Jordan is a rentier economy, relying 
mostly on workers’ remittances from expatriated labour forces and on foreign 
aid. The thesis argued that rentier economies are categorised with higher 
degrees of vulnerability to foreign influence (Section 5.2), which is confirmed in 
the case of Jordan. These different elements explain why Jordan scores 
remarkably higher in the above graphs and contributes to the validy of the 
framework.  
The lower results of Egypt confirmed the results of Chapter 4, as it showed that 
Egypt has lower levels of openness and interconnectedness than Jordan in all 
four variables. Egypt scores particularly low concerning the variable on 
governance openness, which can be explained by the historically strong hold of 
the military over the government and market. However, the thesis also 
remarked that having a military government however, was not an absolute 
condition to say that policy diffusion cannot take place. It is nonetheless an 
indicator of concentration of power, where principles of delegation and 
deregulation may not take place easily. Egypt is also a much larger country than 
Jordan and has had a different development process due to its influence in the 
Arab world and in the international realm. It has one of the largest economies in 
the region and it still holds a considerable political influence within the Arab 
world and in the Middle East. Egypt presents lower degrees of vulnerability to 
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interconnectedness with external actors than Jordan, validating the framework 
as well.   
The last empirical observation concerns Morocco, which showed mixed results. 
The governance openness variable scored in between Jordan and Egypt. 
However, in the case of political interconnectedness the difference with Egypt 
only became apparent post-2005. In what concerns the two market-related 
variables, market openness in Morocco scored lower than Egypt between 2007 
and 2012 and also between 2004 and 2010 for economic openness. These 
mixed results gave interesting nuances to the state variables’ framework. As 
Morocco has been regularly and frequently adopting policies that have been 
originating elsewhere, its results shed light on a different grade of significance 
of state variables. It confirms, what was already suspected with the case of 
Egypt, that governance openness is a key indicator to show the conditions 
under which policy diffusion may take place. The three other variables need 
careful consideration. Political interconnectedness confirmed the basic 
hypothesis, but only post-2005. Market related variables, such as market 
openness and market interconnectedness also provided mixed results in the 
context of Morocco and were thus less revealing than governance openness in 
this context. 
The importance of the governance openness variable is significant in countries 
such as Jordan, Morocco and Egypt which are characterised by sustained 
government control in policy-making. This brings an interesting nuance to the 
argument brought about by policy diffusion authors that the market may be 
central to policy diffusion (Elkins et al., 2006, Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009, 
Schmitt, 2014). In semi-authoritarian countries, such as Jordan, Morocco and 
Egypt, it appears that policy-making is more closely linked to government 
variables rather than market ones. This suggests that the state is highly 
instrumental in these countries and that authoritarianism does not affect the 
market as extensively as previously thought, similarly to China (Liu and 
Jayakar, 2016). This also confirmed the expectation regarding Egypt based on 
the results of chapter 4. The low adoption results of Egypt in both selected 
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subsectors of telecommunications can be explained by decisions taken at a 
state level that proceeds to policy changes or keeps the regulation of a sector in 
its status-quo. This was confirmed with the governance openness in the case of 
Morocco which illustrates adequately the role of vulnerability to external actors 
when adopting policies that have originated from elsewhere.    
7.2.3 Mechanisms of policy diffusion (Chapter 6) 
The focus of the last empirical chapter was on the mechanisms of diffusion. It 
answered the second sub-question of this thesis, focusing on how does policy 
diffusion take place. It combined five sector variables to the four mechanisms of 
diffusion, learning, imitation, competition and coercion, taking NRAs as the main 
analysis point. This chapter used the literature on soft governance to link the 
telecommunications sector with policy diffusion. This was based on the premise 
that Ministries delegate to NRAs so that they engage in policy-making activities. 
The thesis argued that this is likely to take place in technological fields such as 
telecommunications, where high levels of expertise and technological 
knowledge are requested for the development of policies. In this chapter, in 
cases where policy adoption was observed, sector variables supported the 
disentanglement of four traditional mechanisms of diffusion: learning, imitation, 
competition and coercion. This is an innovative idea contributing to theories of 
policy diffusion and particularly regarding the concept of mechanisms of 
diffusion. The literature on mechanisms of diffusion does not propose a 
framework to deduce which mechanism is at play when observing policy 
diffusion.  
In this thesis, five sector variables were identified and different combinations of 
these variables shed light on the mechanism at play. Thus, as the focus is set 
on NRAs, the variables are divided into two sets defining the environment and 
pressures in which NRAs conduct policy making. The environment variables 
were defined as the international and transgovernmental channels. The 
pressure variables are grouped according to the interest of reaching better 
policy efficiency, the need to satisfy economic interests and the risks of 
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suffering from sanctions in case of non-compliance. Four combinations of these 
five variables shed light on the mechanisms at play, hence representing four 
different hypotheses, of which empirical evidence determined their validity. The 
combinations were given in Table 1 (Section 1.4, page 24). The first hypothesis 
(H₃ learning) argued that learning mechanisms occur in a context exempt of 
international regulatory channels, economic interest and sanction capacity, 
where transgovernmental collaboration is used with the objective of efficiency 
enhancement. The second hypothesis (H₄ Imitation) argued that imitation 
mechanisms occur in a context that is exempt of international regulatory 
channels, economic interest and sanction capacity, where transgovernmental 
collaboration is used with the objective of reaching conformity with the 
perceived leaders in the field (absence of efficiency variable). The third 
hypothesis (H₅ Competition) argued that economic competition mechanisms 
occur in a context exempt of sanction capacity, where international regulatory 
channels and not transgovernmental ones, are used with the objective to satisfy 
economic interests and reach efficiency. The fourth and last hypothesis (H₆ 
Coercion) argued that coercion mechanisms occur in a context of economic 
interest, leadership and sanction capacity, where international regulatory 
channels and not transgovernmental ones, are used principally and possess the 
capacity to impose sanctions. 
The two chosen sectors USO and spectrum management were selected based 
on their differences concerning environment and pressure variables (more in 
Section 1.5.2 page 30). Following the results of Chapter 4, it appeared that 
sector level differences in USO and spectrum management explained different 
levels of policy adoption. This is due to the fact that spectrum management is a 
more sophisticated field, where policy innovation requires technological tools 
and capacity. USO is on the contrary of lesser sophistication scope and can be 
diffused more easily. Table 3 summarised the assumptions concerning policy 
sectors. It argued that USO policies were mostly expected to follow learning and 
imitation mechanisms, whereas spectrum management policies were likely to 
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take place following competition and coercion mechanism (firstly shown in 
Section 1.5.2, page 33). 
Table 3 Subsector-cases assumptions 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures  
Internationa
l regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Effici
ency 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanctio
n 
capacity 
Policy 
Sector 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - USO 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - USO 
Competition (H₅) + - + + - Spectrum 
Coercion (H₆) + - - + + Spectrum 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism; -: absence of variable is related 
to mechanism. 
Source: Author. 
 
The hypotheses and assumptions in this empirical chapter were based on four 
propositions originating from the literature of policy diffusion, 
telecommunications policy diffusion and soft governance theories (Section 
2.4.2). All four propositions were discussed in chapter 6 and contributed to the 
development and adaption of the theories to meet empirical evidence.  
The first proposition concerned the linkage between economic interests and 
international structures and proposed that in policy sectors where large 
economic profits and benefits are at stake, as it the case in the 
telecommunications sector, conflict may easily arise and so may asymmetrical 
power relationships. In such cases, international regulatory bodies impose rules 
to create a worldwide framework and control the developments in the sector.  
Competition and coercion mechanisms are therefore linked to economic 
interests and international channels of regulations (illustrated in Table 5, page 
62). The second proposition argued that the concept of efficiency is adequate to 
distinguish between the mechanisms of diffusion, as it shows a distinction 
between the focus on efficiency, as in learning and competition and the focus 
on the actor, as is the case in imitation and coercion (illustrated in Table 6, page 
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65). The third proposition argued that the role of sanctions or the risk thereof is 
directly linked to coercion mechanisms (illustrated in Table 7, page 67). Finally, 
the fourth proposition argued that the variable of the transgovernmental 
collaboration is proposed as a counterweight to the variable of the international 
framework. In transgovernmental collaboration, the motivation is not linked to 
the asymmetrical relationship of powers, as is seen in coercion and competition 
mechanisms. As such, transgovernmental collaboration is linked to mechanisms 
of learning and imitation (illustrated in Table 8, page 68). These four 
propositions were central to the discussion of Chapter 6.  
This chapter only focused on the four cases where policy adoption had been 
observed more clearly. Both subsectors cases in Egypt were left at this stage, 
as it was concluded that in the two policy subsectors, the case of Egypt was 
less relevant. The empirical analysis of this last empirical chapter thus focused 
on USO and spectrum management in Jordan and Morocco. Table 23 presents 
the results of the empirical analysis of the four study cases (firstly shown in 
Section 6.3, page 218). It showed that each sector case corresponded to a 
different mechanism of diffusion. The case of USO in Morocco (case study 1) 
was linked to the mechanism of learning, the case of USO in Jordan (case 
study 3) to imitation, spectrum management in Morocco (case study 2) to 
competition and finally, spectrum management in Jordan (case study 4) to 
coercion. The fact that each case was explained by one mechanism of diffusion 
is useful for comparison purposes. It allowed the possibility of drawing 
similarities and divergences across subsectors and countries and discussing 
the combinations of variables with a clear focus. 
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Table 23 USO & Spectrum management in Jordan and Morocco 
 
Sector Environment Sector Pressures  
Internationa
l regulatory 
channels 
Transgovern
mental 
collaboration 
Effici
ency 
Economic 
Interest 
Sanctio
n 
capacity 
Policy 
Sector 
Learning (H₃) - + + - - MO: USO (1) 
Imitation (H₄) - + - - - JO: USO (3) 
Competition (H₅) + +/- + + - 
MO: 
Spectrum (2) 
Coercion (H₆) + +/- - + + 
JO: 
Spectrum (4) 
Notes: Values: +: presence of variable is related to mechanism as expected; -: absence of 
variable is related to mechanism as expected; +/-: presence or absence of variable whereas it 
was not expected. 
Source: Author. 
 
Table 23 showed that as expected, USO cases corresponded to learning and 
imitation mechanisms in the majority and spectrum management cases to 
competition and coercion. This confirmed the sector assumptions of Table 3 
(firstly shown in Section 1.5.2, page 33). Sectors with low adoption costs and 
low international economic and political interest, such as USO, follow more 
easily learning and imitation mechanisms. In such cases, more leeway is given 
to the domestic countries to decide upon the policy changes they wish to take. 
On the contrary, policies that encompass much heavier economic and political 
interests, such as spectrum management, follow more evidently mechanisms of 
competition and coercion. In such cases, more intense external pressure exist 
requesting domestic countries to adopt policies following specific patterns.  
In the case of USO in Morocco, the development of the policy became almost 
an international statement showing the commitment of Morocco to improve its 
connectivity. The policy-makers gathered energy and information to provide a 
specific model fitting the domestic context. In this case, policy learning 
occurred. In the case of USO in Jordan, it was observed that policy imitation 
took place instead of policy learning. This resulted in a domestic choice to follow 
a perceived external leader in the field, in this case the EU. In the case of 
spectrum management in Morocco, it was observed that competition was the 
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stronger mechanism, with an apparent motivation of the Moroccan policy-maker 
to prove their equal competences at international level. This resulted in 
competition mechanisms the majority. In the case of spectrum management in 
Jordan, however, an additional focus was set by the policy-makers on the need 
to follow the decisions made by the main actors in the field, the EU in this case, 
and the minimal impact that Jordan could have to influence policies. This 
corresponded to subtler power relationships that are part of the variable of 
sanction capacity. The result of which, was to observe mechanisms of coercion 
in this last case.  
One major conceptual and theoretical observation was made based on Table 
23. It showed that almost all properties were present or absent, as expected, in 
each of the four cases. This allowed the conclusion that the presence of the 
mechanisms in each of the cases in a straightforward manner. Only in two 
instances, did the variables not conclude as expected. This was the case of 
transgovernmental collaboration which also took place during the competition 
and coercion mechanisms and not only in learning and imitation cases. This 
suggested two things. Firstly, that the variable of transgovernmental 
collaboration is not sufficient to differentiate across the mechanisms. Secondly, 
this showed that in the telecommunications sector, soft governance has 
become the rule to proceed to policy change and hence several 
transgovernmental channels, such as regulatory groups, MoA and twinning 
partnership overlap in the process of policy-making. This observation allowed 
for the adoption of the hypotheses so to include the empirical lessons learned 
from the chapter. 
While both the learning and imitation hypotheses remained unchanged, an 
adaptation was required for both coercion and competition. Based on the 
observed ambiguity regarding the use of transgovernmental channels in the 
field, the competition hypothesis was adapted, as follows (H₅ Competition): 
economic competition mechanisms occur in a context exempt of sanction 
capacity, where international regulatory channels and transgovernmental ones, 
are used with the objective to satisfy economic interests and reach efficiency. 
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Based on the observed ambiguity regarding the use of transgovernmental 
channels in the field, the coercion hypothesis was adapted as follows (H₆ 
Coercion): coercion mechanisms occur in context of economic interest, 
leadership and sanction capacity, where international and transgovernmental 
channels are used and possess the capacity to impose sanctions. 
Finally, the results of this last empirical part shed light on the four propositions 
mentioned in section 2.4.2. The two first propositions, which argued that 
competition and coercion mechanisms occur principally in situations where 
economic interests and international channels exist (Proposition 1) and that 
efficiency is linked to learning and competition and leadership to imitation and 
coercion (Proposition 2), were confirmed. The first section of chapter 6 notably 
addressed the corporate and sanction context of telecommunications (Section 
6.2, Framework Propositions 1 and 2). It was argued that corporations have a 
revealing weight in the telecommunications sector, as there are parallels to be 
found between the ownership of main corporations and regulatory alliances in 
the field. Regarding sanctions, it appeared that in the telecommunications 
sector, sanctions are not as visible and direct, as would be, for example, 
economic sanctions imposed by the UN, such as the interdiction to conduct 
commercial and financial activity with a country threatening international norms 
(Charron and Portela, 2015). On the contrary, sanctions in the 
telecommunications sector are closely linked to a subtle relationship of power 
linked to the objectives of economic interests and profits. Such relationships of 
power were notably observed within the ITU. However, this chapter also noticed 
that traditional power relationships are being challenged, with African and Arab 
countries growingly resisting to EU decisions in the ITU and following their own 
agenda.   
The two last propositions however were only partially confirmed (Section 6.2, 
Framework Propositions 3 and 4). The third proposition arguing that sanction 
capacity can only be imposed by international channels was partially confirmed 
(Proposition 3). Transgovernmental channels are used in combination with 
international channels nowadays, which render a straightforward demarcation 
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more difficult to observe. Finally, the fourth proposition arguing that 
transgovernmental frameworks mostly lead to learning and imitation 
mechanisms was not confirmed (Proposition 4). Confirming the finding of the 
third framework proposition, the fourth framework proposition showed as well 
that in contemporary policy-making in the telecommunications sector, 
transgovernmental frameworks are used in combination or in replacement to 
international channels. For instance, this variable is not useful when 
disentangling the mechanisms of diffusion. It showed that the sector is 
increasingly managed by a variety of overlapping actors, including horizontal 
and vertical, transnational and international, institutional, corporate or private 
actors. This confirms the argument of telecommunications and media policy 
authors, who argue for the increasingly diverse range of actors regulating the 
field (Padovani and Pavan, 2011, Raboy and Padovani, 2010). This chapter 
underlined the overlapping and intertwined actors in policy-making in the field of 
telecommunications. 
To conclude, this chapter confirmed the validity of the sector variable 
framework, except for the role of transgovernmental collaboration, which has 
been increasingly used by the policy-maker in the subject, making the variable 
inadequate to differentiate among mechanisms of diffusion. It appeared from 
this chapter, that pressures existing in a specific sector limit the types of 
mechanisms of diffusion which can take place. High levels of economic 
interests and sanction capacity have a tendency to provoke mechanisms of 
competition and coercion, while learning and imitation take place in contexts 
exempt from such pressures. Empirically, this chapter also provided interesting 
information regarding the interactions between the international policy-making 
environment and each of the selected case studies. The meeting points 
between both levels of policy-making shed interesting insights into the 
development of globalised policy-making nowadays.  
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7.3 Limitations  
This thesis gathered the data in an objective and ethical manner. The research 
design, theoretical and conceptual frameworks and operationalisation of 
variables have been developed based on the literature on the policy diffusion in 
the most informed way. However, several limitations have been present all 
along in the process from decisions regarding the research design to the data 
gathering and empirical analysis. Several of the limitations regarding the 
research design have nonetheless been discussed in the thesis, during the 
methodological section (Chapter 3) and the empirical section (Chapters 4, 5 and 
6). This is particularly true regarding the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the variables, which is extensively discussed in chapter 3.1 
and in each of the empirical chapters. Some of the limitations that have not yet 
been discussed are given in this part. They are important to consider as they 
may have had a possible impact on the results of this study.  
The main limitation refers to the selected timeline. The focus of this research is 
very contemporary. This is linked to the chosen topic as modern developments 
in policies in spectrum management and USO have mostly started to take place 
in the late 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. As the timeline focused on these 
new laws and their developments until the year 2014, it seems obvious, that in 
some cases, data, such as policy documents and programmes, were not yet 
available to the public. While conducting interviews as well, the time lag 
between the creation of certain projects in the MENA countries and the 
questions that were asked was sometimes extremely short. This means that in 
several cases, a critical distance had not yet been achieved.  
In several cases, the lack of such distance supported the quality and 
abundance of relevant answers to the thesis and allowed me to meet the people 
who really worked on the projects themselves. Some of the decisions were also 
just being discussed and sometimes taken. For example, the Egyptian NRA 
published the results of the first USO project call at the beginning of 2014, 
which was just a couple of weeks before the interviews took place and no public 
information was available to triangulate the information gathered in the 
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interviews. In Jordan, the decision concerning the inclusion or not of broadband 
in the USO had just been made a few days before my arrival in Amman. In 
Morocco, spectrum auction for LTE technologies took place in 2014. However, 
the fact that these decisions are so recent, also make it a very interesting 
experience for research. For instance, in most cases, the experts that were 
interviewed, had been or were the ones still working on the policies themselves, 
and thus a hands-on experience could be shared. It also allowed for very 
precise information to be shared, with contextualisation and anecdotes that 
were alive and precise in the experts’ minds.  
Another limitation concerns the expert interviews. In the three countries under 
study, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt some issues regarding the field research 
concerned the semi-authoritarian political systems of these countries. This is 
notably the case regarding the level of independence of the NRAs from the 
relevant Ministries. This had two different impacts regarding the gathered data. 
Firstly, it was often the case that the information given by experts remained in 
the limits of what the official discourse from the Ministry was. Furthermore, it 
often happened that reports, laws or programmes that should have been 
published on the respective websites of the NRAs, were not always available. 
More publicly available data would have allowed for a better triangulation of 
information. Furthermore, it often appeared difficult to request these documents 
to the concerned teams. This was particularly the case with Egypt, where the 
country was still under the turmoil of political changes. In this case, interviews 
took place with the heads of the NRAs and Ministries, but it appeared difficult to 
contact the experts working on specific subjects.  
Finally, it is possible that the influence of other variables have not been a 
sufficient focus of this thesis. This is the case, when looking at the adoption 
costs behind the adoption of certain programmes. The budgets of implementing 
programmes have not been a key interest of this thesis, as the focus was on the 
diffusion of ideas and the exchanges across jurisdictions. Thus, no questions 
were asked regarding the adoption costs, including the allocated budget within 
the NRA, for different subsectors and programmes. It is possible that budgeting 
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may have had an impact on the decisions to implement certain projects at the 
expense of others. Linked to this point, is also the possibility for alternative 
explanations to depict the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. To compensate for that sort of limitations, a systematic approach to 
analysing the data was taken and explained in detail in the methodological 
section. It is nonetheless not impossible, that other interpretations could add 
explanatory value to changes and continuities. 
7.4 Generalisability 
The generalisability of the case studies is important to support the arguments 
made in the thesis and to extend research to other levels. Generalisability in this 
thesis can be divided into three different parts. Firstly, it can be generalised to 
other states. For example, it could be interesting to compare results with states 
who share similarities in terms of geographical situation, economic development 
or political systems. The results can also be generalised regarding the selection 
of the sector, for example in terms of scope, whether it is a cross border field 
and the type of economic interests. Finally, generalisability could also concern 
the actors, who are active in such regularised fields. The role of international 
regulatory bodies in diffusion is not only applicable to telecommunications and 
other sectors are ruled by similar system, as is for example the case of 
international aviation.  
The generalisability to other countries can be divided into three categories. In 
this thesis, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt have been considered. They share 
several common features, particularly, the fact that they are part of the Euro-
Mediterranean area, that they are semi-authoritarian countries and finally that 
they are middle-income countries. It is possible to imagine other cases who 
share the three similar features. This could be the case of Algeria and Lebanon 
for example, who are part of the Euro-Mediterranean area, and are semi-
authoritarian countries with middle income economies (World Bank, 2015a, 
Center for Systemic Peace, 2014). To some extent, Tunisia could be a case as 
well, even if in this case the political system is evolving slowly, as Tunisia is still 
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struggling to emerge positively from the 2011 political turmoil (O'Brien, 2015). 
The Palestinian territories and Libya are also part of the Euro-Mediterranean 
area, as well as being middle income economies (World Bank, 2015a, Center 
for Systemic Peace, 2014). However, the political situation differs in several 
ways, as both have issues regarding the legal independence of the state for the 
former and legal status of the government for the latter. Nonetheless a greater 
sample of cases based on state characteristics would bring significant potential 
for comparative analysis.   
It could be stimulating to extend this research to other geographical areas. 
Many African states are not part of the Euro-Med area but would be adequate 
for empirical research. Most of them are middle income countries and in several 
cases correspond to semi-authoritarian countries. This would be the case of for 
example, Sub-Saharan countries, such as Cameroon, Gabon or Nigeria (World 
Bank, 2015a, Center for Systemic Peace, 2014). They represent a fascinating 
field for telecommunications, as they are great consumers of such services. 
Sub-Saharan countries are also part of region 1 of the ITU together with 
European and Gulf States which reveal potential to unravel conflict of interests 
in the field. Other middle income countries, which would be very interesting to 
further research, are countries in Latin America. As seen in this thesis, the 
relationship between Latin America and the MENA countries is closer than 
expected. Even if Latin American countries have more stable and democratic 
governments as the selected cases, they represent interesting potential from an 
economic point of view (World Bank, 2015a, Center for Systemic Peace, 2014). 
As such, studying middle income countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Columbia or 
Paraguay would bring interesting insight into telecommunications 
developments. 
The second type of generalisability of this thesis concerns the chosen sector. 
Telecommunications were selected as a case study for several reasons, which 
includes the fact that it is a cross-border field by definition, due to the need for 
states around the world to cooperate to best use the necessary resources. It is 
also a field characterised by high levels of necessary technology and 
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investments to develop the sector. Lastly, the existence of conflicting economic 
interests and profits delineate actors in the field. As such, similar sectors for 
generalisability shall comprise of these characteristics, being a cross-border 
service, technology and investment intensive and being economically relevant. 
Several sectors correspond to such a definition, which have been mentioned 
earlier in the thesis. One of them relates to technological fields such as bio-
technology industries, where high level of education and experience are needed 
in order to advance policy developments in the field. In such sectors, interests 
are strong as large amounts of money have to be invested for growth. 
Furthermore, its development is central for a variety of other sectors such as 
agriculture or pharmaceuticals. Other technology intensive sectors, where high 
levels of interests are entangled, concern computer sciences, which are also 
largely marked by technology intensive characteristics. Furthermore the role of 
computer sciences in the development of other sectors of the economy has an 
equally high level of potential economic profits.  
Lastly, generalisability may apply to the transgovernmental and international 
actors in the field. In the telecommunications sector, the ITU is an exceptionally 
broad regulatory forum, encompassing both public and private actors and 
whose longevity and authority has not been paralleled so far. Concerning 
international regulators, several sectors could be interesting which are regulated 
by worldwide associations or organisations. A variety of forms of supranational 
regulations exist in other fields, such as in international aviation with the ICAO 
or in the banking sector, the BCBS (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000:117). In such 
sectors, international regulatory fora provide promising areas for policy diffusion 
research. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations is 
also an interesting body for the study of international forum’s influence in policy 
making in a field characterised by its importance for states all over the world.  
7.5 Conclusive words 
This thesis proposed several views on policy diffusion and elaborated three 
different theoretical and conceptual frameworks used to observe policy 
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adoption, to understand the role of state variables in the likelihood of adoption 
and to identify sector variables and mechanisms of diffusion. These conceptual 
and theoretical frameworks opened the path to observe more global regulatory 
encounters. Weyland mentions the importance of such studies to disentangle 
the relative weight of international versus domestic forces, the role of symbolic 
versus utilitarian motives and the prevalence of comprehensive versus bounded 
rationality (2006:11). All of these elements were present in one form or another 
in this thesis. This thesis focused on the role of international versus domestic 
forces in several ways, discussing the interactions of the international and 
transnational regulatory process with the domestic policy-making level. It 
showed that countries which adopt policies from external actors do not do so by 
being forced and pressured in every case, but are independent to choose and 
assess options according to their own agenda. A variety of responses to 
international and transnational policy making forces was observed in the thesis. 
Symbolic motives and utilitarian motives were present in this thesis as well. This 
was particularly the case with the development of USO, which is a very 
symbolic policy compared to spectrum management, which is a more utilitarian 
and corporate area (Jayakar and Liu, 2013). The role of symbolism in policy 
diffusion in this thesis was observed in the concept of international attention 
when adapting and adopting new policies.  
The qualitative exploration of cases in Jordan and Morocco showed that looking 
good in the eye of the international community is central to policy-making. USO 
policies in particular, are useful to show commitment to improving practices, as 
they carry a social aim that is accepted worldwide as being a positive policy to 
develop and it furthermore does not need political and economic sacrifices to be 
achieved. Finally, the limits of human rationality and the need to engage in 
interconnected activities to best develop certain sectors, was central in this 
thesis. Limits to rational decision-making are central to the definition of policy 
diffusion, but also to the mechanisms of diffusion. The focus on the role of 
efficiency versus the perceived leader shed light on different approaches policy-
makers chose to follow to conduct policy-making process. 
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One of the interesting and unexpected findings of this research is the changing 
regulatory flows in the sector of telecommunications. This was observed in 
different instances. Firstly, it was observed that countries such as Morocco are 
very sophisticated and up-to-date with their policy innovations in the 
telecommunications sector. In some cases, it was even observed that Morocco 
was leapfrogging the EU. This was the case in the context of USO policies. This 
shows that traditional North-South regulatory flows are being challenged. It was 
also the case with the observation of changing power relationships within the 
ITU following the WRC-12 and WRC-15, with Arab and African countries 
countering EU propositions in spectrum allocation. The emergence of South-
South regulatory flows was also observed in the case of USO in Morocco, 
where policy-maker took their inspiration from Latin American countries, 
suggesting that more resemblances and parallel can be found in countries of 
the Global South to progress with telecommunications regulations. These 
different elements confirmed the emergence of new regulatory flows, 
particularly the South-South flows, challenging the traditional North-South and 
North-North flows, as mentioned in Section 1.6 (Bauer, 2010b:9). Finally, the 
last flow, South-North, has been less evidenced in this thesis, but there is no 
doubt that with innovative ideas emerging from the Southern countries, the 
Northern more traditional telecommunications powers will increasingly have to 
take these ideas into account.  
To conclude, different possibilities for generalising the findings of this thesis 
have been discussed earlier (Section 7.4). In addition, several suggestions for 
subsequent research can be useful to develop the argument further. Firstly, 
additional research would be needed to test the three frameworks in other 
cases. This thesis used qualitative methods. It would be fascinating to test the 
variables on a greater scale and look for large-n data. This would allow for a 
greater potential to draw inferences between variables and analyse these 
frameworks from a different angle. For instance, a large sample of states could 
be selected to test hypotheses quantitatively. This would be particularly 
interesting for mechanisms of diffusion, as no such study has yet been done on 
a larger scale. Furthermore, this thesis has focused mostly on the adoption side 
267 
 
 
 
of policy diffusion. Three countries were selected where a potential of adoption 
existed. However, these countries are not only the adopters of policies but also 
the diffusers for other states, as is the case with Morocco and its role as a policy 
example for African countries. Moreover, traditional policy diffusers, such as the 
EU may increasingly become adopters themselves, having to cope with 
increasingly challenging and sophisticated international actors. Hence another 
approach towards the distinction between adopters and diffusers may bring 
interesting insight into changing roles of international regulatory powers and 
more precisely embody the changing regulatory flow that the sector is currently 
experiencing.   
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